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Abstract
People do not form their political preferences in a vacuum. They are deeply
influenced by everyday experiences in the communities where they live and
work—experiences that cannot neatly be categorised as ‘economic’ or ‘cultural’.
These insights, this thesis argues, are crucial to understanding why people vote
for radical right parties in Europe. The thesis examines these local contextual
factors using panel regressions and multilevel analyses based on original and
existing datasets of fine-grained census, electoral and survey data. It makes
three main contributions. First, the thesis adds a spatial dimension to the
study of radical right voting behaviour by showing how local sociotropic mech-
anisms—such as local labour market competition from immigrants with similar
skill levels (paper 2) and the degradation of local socio-cultural spaces (pa-
per 3)—affect people’s vote, alongside individual and national factors. Second,
the thesis reconciles competing theories about the influence of economic and
cultural factors on radical right support by pointing to the role of additional
variables. Paper 1 shows how ‘subjective social status’ intermediates the rela-
tionship between economic distress and the rejection of cultural outgroups (a
radical right catch-cry). Paper 3 explores how the decline of everyday opportu-
nities for communal interaction—here, the closure of British pubs—fuels radical
right support. Paper 2 looks at the economic effects of immigration at a more
granular level, showing that it is neither immigration nor unemployment per
se that boosts radical right support but rather localised competition between
immigrants and natives with similar skillsets. This finding points to the third
contribution of this thesis: it explains why middle-class voters are also drawn
to the radical right. Overall, this investigation of local contextual factors adds
a crucial new dimension to our understanding of what drives people to vote for
radical right political parties.
10
Contents
Statement of Originality 3
Acknowledgements 5
Abstract 9
List of Tables 15
List of Figures 17
1 Introduction 18
1.1 Contributions to Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.2 Methodology: Model and Data Contributions . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.3 Defining the Radical Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.4 Paper 1: The Janus-Faced Nature of Radical Voting: Subjective
Social Decline and the Radical Right and Radical Left Support . 41
1.5 Paper 2: Local Labour Market Competition and Radical Right
Voting: Evidence from France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.6 Paper 3: Pissed! Local Socio-Cultural Degradation and Radical
Right Support: The Case of British Pub Closures . . . . . . . . 44
1.7 Road Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
11
2 The Janus-Faced Nature of Radical Voting: Subjective Social
Decline at the Roots of Radical Right and Radical Left Sup-
port 47
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.2 Similarities: Status Anxiety, Radical Right and Radical Left Vot-
ing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3 Additive Attitudinal Effects on Status
Anxiety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.5 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3 Local Labour Market Competition and Radical Right Voting:
Evidence from France 83
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.2 The Radical Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.3 Local Labour Market Competition and Radical Right Voting . . 91
3.4 Data and Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.5 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.6 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4 Pissed! Local Socio-Cultural Degradation and Radical Right
Support: The case of British Pub Closures 121
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
12
4.2 The Local Socio-Cultural Degradation
Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.3 Data, Case Study and Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.4 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5 Conclusion 160
5.1 Summary of Key Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
5.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Avenues . . . . . . . . . 169
5.4 Implications for Research into the Radical Right and Political
Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
5.5 Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
A Appendix 1 184
B Appendix 2 193
C Appendix 3 197
Bibliography 205
13
List of Tables
1.1 Classification of Radical Right Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.1 Predictors of Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status . . . . . . 66
2.2 Status Anxiety, Radical Right and Radical Left Support . . . . 71
2.3 Interaction Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.1 Local Labour Market Competition and Radical Right Voting . . 107
3.2 Local Labour Market Competition, Economic Deprivation and
Radical Right Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.3 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.4 First Difference Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.1 Community Pub Closures and Community Cohesion . . . . . . . 141
4.2 Local Social Degradation and UKIP Support . . . . . . . . . . . 146
4.3 Interaction Effects (Individual Features) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4.4 Interaction Effects (Contextual Features) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4.5 Local Social Degradation and UKIP Support . . . . . . . . . . . 154
4.6 Local Social Degradation and UKIP Vote Share (2014 EU Elec-
tions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
4.7 With Additional Dependent Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.8 Local Social Degradation and Support for Mainstream Parties . 157
14
A.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
A.2 Codebook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
A.3 Classification of Radical Right and Radical Left Parties . . . . . 186
A.4 Social Placement, Radical Right and Radical Left Support . . . 187
A.5 With Populist Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
A.6 With Other Attitudinal Determinants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
A.7 Without Different Set of Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
A.8 Status Anxiety and Mainstream Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
A.9 Hierarchical Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
B.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
B.2 Reconfiguration of Socio-Professional Categories along Skill and
Education Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
C.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
C.2 Codebook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
C.3 Entropy Balancing Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
C.4 Neighbourhood Degradation and Radical Right Voting . . . . . 202
C.5 With Assets of Community Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
15
List of Figures
2.1 Mean Values of Social Placement in Comparison to their Parents
for Each Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.2 The distribution of Social Distance to Parents across the full
sample and by occupational class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.3 Predicted Values of Social Distance Relative to Parents on Rad-
ical Right and Radical Left Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.4 Interaction Effect of Attitudinal Factors and Social Placement on
Radical Right and Radical Left Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.5 Placebo Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.1 Marginal Effects of Local Labour Market Competition for each
Skill Level on Radical Right Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.2 Marginal Effects of Local Labour Market Competition and Eco-
nomic Deprivation on Radical Right Voting . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.1 Mean of Community Pub Closures per Year for each Region in
Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.2 Pub Closures (left) and Community Pub Closures (right) since
2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.3 Normal Distribution of Community Pub Closure Ratio . . . . . 140
4.4 Interaction Effects: White population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
16
4.5 Interaction Effects: Working Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.6 Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
B.1 The Spatial Distribution of FN Vote Shares in Presidential Elec-
tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
B.2 The Evolution of the Net Migration Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
17
1 | Introduction
How can we explain subnational variations in support for the radical right in
Europe? Providing explanations of different radical right vote shares within a
country in Europe is a difficult exercise. To give one example, the contrasting
electoral results of the French radical right, the Front National, in Neuwiller and
Villing in the last 2017 presidential race would leave anyone confused. Despite
sharing similar demographic, contextual and political characteristics, these two
municipalities register very different radical right vote shares. Both munici-
palities are located on the border with Germany, with around 500 inhabitants
mostly composed of retirees and professionals. Both have a large immigrant
population of similar ethnicity, low unemployment and an independent mayor.
Yet, the electoral support of the Front National was 2.5 times higher in Neuwiller
than in Villing. What could explain this difference?
The puzzling variation of radical right vote shares has raised several im-
portant questions for political scientists. One relates to the fact that similar
sociodemographic features may not necessarily lead to similar radical right vote
shares. Compositional studies at the cross-national and national levels, which
suggest that areas with a larger concentration of white male manual labourers or
white-collar professionals with low disposable income should receive more rad-
ical right support, do not resolve this puzzle (Mayer, 1995; Arzheimer, 2009).
Since Neuwiller and Villing do not have such a population, why would they not
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both register low levels of radical right support? Another important question
taps into the ongoing debate behind demand-side explanations of radical right
support: whether people are voting as a result of an economic backlash or as
a way of expressing their anti-immigrant stance. Most analyses highlight that
areas with high levels of unemployment (or any feature of economic depriva-
tion) and/or with a rapid change of (preferably low-skilled) immigration should
fuel more radical right support, and thereby oppose economic versus cultural
factors (Golder, 2003; Golder, 2016). Since Neuwiller and Villing both register
low rates of unemployment and high levels of immigration, why would Neuwiller
have more radical right votes than Villing? Not only is the variation of the two
municipalities surprising, but the larger radical right support occurs in the mu-
nicipality that, of the two, would be less expected to display such support. Why
would Neuwiller, the town with a majority of high-skilled immigrants, register
the largest radical right vote share? This finding goes against the conventional
wisdom that low-skilled migration is the radical right’s breeding ground. It also
casts doubt on the validity of the economic and cultural contextual indicators
that are commonly used to explain radical right support. The levels or inflows
of immigration, as well as the unemployment rate, may not provide unique
associations with the radical right.
My answers to these questions focus on the local dynamics of the two
municipalities and the type of local labour market competition in particular.
Neuwiller and Villing are distinguished by the occupational activities of immi-
grants and native residents. Radical right support increases in areas where im-
migrants and native residents with similar skillsets are directly interacting with
each other. Inhabitants of Neuwiller, who are mainly high-skilled, are compet-
ing locally with high-skilled newcomers. This competition triggers processes of
19
nativism and rejection towards immigrants that are then expressed through a
radical right vote. By contrast, residents of Villing, where recent immigrants
are predominantly low-skilled, do not face any direct local market competition.
It is the absence of local competition, rather than the number or type of immi-
grants, that explains the distinction in radical right support between Neuwiller
and Villing. Economic and cultural factors are also not mutually exclusive
since immigration, the cultural contextual factor, has an economic component
in the form of occupational status. Unemployment, an economic variable that
is extensively employed in the literature, even compounds the local competition
between immigrants and natives and demonstrates that economic and cultural
variables complement rather than exclude each other.
This comparative example, which is drawn from the second paper of the
dissertation, highlights the need to recognise dynamic local contextual drivers in
explaining radical right support. Often these understated and neglected factors
remain mysterious to most academics, policymakers and journalists. Within
the recent literature there has been relatively little development, in terms of
of theoretical arguments and empirical investigation, as to how local contexts
ought to matter, which would advance some long-standing debates. This dis-
sertation extends previous work on demand-side factors behind radical right
support by adopting a local contextual perspective. In a series of papers, I ex-
plore how local context advances our understanding of radical right support by
revisiting well-debated theories of radical right support. While the first paper
reconciles the false dichotomy between economic versus cultural grievances with
a probit analysis at the regional level, the two other papers investigate patterns
of local labour market competition and local socio-cultural degradation with
constituency-level and individual-level analyses. I find that local context helps
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resolve contested issues surrounding explanations behind the rise and sustained
success of the radical right. The three papers provide nuanced contributions
- both theoretically and empirically - to our understanding of radical support
and point to key policy implications for containing its spread.
My dissertation on the analysis of local context behind radical right sup-
port produces novel findings and contributes to important debates on the radical
right. I focus on four debates in my thesis. The first relates to the relevance of
local sociotropic accounts as an alternative to individual pocketbook or national
sociotropic evaluations. I provide an explanation of the undetected contextual
effects at the national and individual levels by showing that the local surround-
ing of voters shapes their political preferences. The second debate addressed by
my thesis deals with the prevailing economic versus cultural debate. I go beyond
this dichotomy by demonstrating that economic and cultural factors become in-
tertwined and complementary at the local level. The third debate revolves
around the investigation of new contextual factors that can equally contribute
to the mobilisation of radical right support. Moving down to the local level
allows me to explore the complex dynamics of the local environment and inves-
tigate another driver of radical right support, the social component. Finally,
the last debate that this thesis relates to is the question of the socio-economic
diversity of the radical right’s voting base. I show that local contextual dynam-
ics explain why voters who belong to the middle-class can be attracted to these
parties to the same extent as traditionally radical right blue-collar supporters.
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1.1 Contributions to Debates
The Local Sociotropic Account
This dissertation contributes to the literature on the radical right by examining
local contextual effects which are unobservable at the national and individual
levels. Building on ethnographic works (Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2016; Gest,
2016), I argue that individuals are politically embedded in their proximate en-
vironment and these local geographies shape their voting preferences.
In my first paper, I provide a pan-European comparative analysis of local
factors behind the radical right. This comparison is at the regional level; the
finest grid at which a vast number of socioeconomic contextual variables are
available across countries. The regional scale increases sample sizes, provides
more accurate data for comparison and makes the comparison more appropriate
as regions are units of comparable size (Snyder, 2001). No effect of contextual
variables is detected at the regional level, which stresses the need to go down to a
lower level of analysis to draw valid inferences on their importance. It is however
worth noting that, despite not directly examining local contextual features, this
first paper focuses on a concept, Parent-Relative Subjective Status, that relates
to another characteristic of people’s local contexts: their family networks. I test
how the decline of younger generations’ social status of younger generations
relative to their parents affects radical right and radical left support. This
psychological phenomenon involves social comparisons that imply a strong role
for local context in the sense that one’s parents are a key local-environmental
influence on one’s expectations and interpretations of the world.
In my second paper, I analyse the impact of immigrants in the local
labour markets of native residents on radical right support. I argue that this is
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the ideal level of analysis because it is the context in which residents interact
with immigrants on an everyday basis. I find that changes in local labour mar-
kets positively affect radical right support, a hypothesis that has previously been
unsupported by empirical evidence at the national scale (Kriesi et al., 2012).
Immigration at a national level is unlikely to have affected the job prospects of
the average native-born worker, but at a local level it does have an effect. In the
same vein, I revisit the social isolation thesis, an under-studied hypothesis, with
a local perspective in my third paper. I demonstrate that the disappearance of
everyday local social spaces (i.e. pubs in my paper) strongly fuels radical right
support in Britain. Social isolation can only be perceived if individuals witness
some form of local degradation in their immediate surroundings. All the three
papers show that local unemployment compounds the effects of status anxiety,
labour market competition and local socio-cultural degradation on radical right
voting.
This local sociotropic account has received relatively little development
in existing work on the radical right. Radical right studies are mostly based on
cross-national, national aggregate or individual-level panel data, which disregard
the country specificities and large subnational variations in radical right support
(Mudde, 2007; Golder, 2016). While contextual analyses would focus on immi-
gration and unemployment (Golder, 2003; Golder, 2016), the individual-based
studies would highlight the anti-immigrant, Eurosceptic and anti-democratic
attitudes of a similar sociological radical right electorate in an area (Arzheimer,
2009). Yet, the range in far-right support across regions and constituencies,
from 4.97% to 31.5% in France, 0% to 44% in the United Kingdom and 0.30%
to 24.3% in Germany, which cannot be explained by national and individual-
level analyses (Golder, 2016). These subnational variations call into question
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what is being captured by national measures and, ultimately, the usefulness of
theories that focus solely on national-level or individual features. With this local
perspective, my dissertation accounts for these large subnational variations and
gives prevalence to theories whose effects were masked in aggregate analyses.
Theoretical arguments about the local sociotropic account and how ex-
actly local geographies ought to condition voting preferences have also been
lacking in the voting behaviour literature more generally. Scholars often dis-
tinguish between individual or pocket-book effects on citizens’ attitudes and
sociotropic effects on preferences and behaviour that are presumed to descend
to an individual’s preference from characteristics of a geographic scale larger
than themselves. First, the pocketbook approach looks directly at how so-
cioeconomic characteristics of voters correlate with their radical right political
support (Erikson et al., 2002). This approach focuses on questions like whether
rich individuals support right-wing parties or whether working class individuals
are more drawn to left-wing parties (Evans, 1999). In contrast, a second liter-
ature has looked beyond the individual properties and individual-level features
to consider the context in its broader sense. In this sociotropic view, people
are not motivated by their atomistic, individual sense of economic wellbeing
or distress, but rather by the larger society they inhabit (Fiorina 1981; Kinder
and Kiewiet 1981; Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck 2011). The level of analysis that is
frequently used is the country or nation and the research agenda is to explain
how changes in national GDP or unemployment influence voting.
This local sociotropic account offers a way to move beyond this deadlock
by looking to shared communities of interest to generate a fuller account of
how people make sense of their local preferences (Enos, 2017). This specific,
geographically scaled economic reality intends to override individual and more
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national level considerations. These accounts do not simply seek to link individ-
ual preferences to their own sense of atomistic, individual or egocentric inter-
ests, but to broader sociotropic spheres of membership. Individuals’ views are
informed by the larger communities with which they identify. They formulate
preferences not just as individuals, but also as part of a particular geographic
locale and set of everyday cultural and economic experiences. Distinguishing
between national and local sociotropic accounts allows me to revisit the con-
temporary debate about radical right support. It gives credence to the labour
market competition and social isolation hypotheses which have previously been
neglected due to their lack of significance at the national or individual levels.
This thesis suggests a research agenda for pushing forward a more complete
understanding of the ways in which local sociotropic mechanisms are at work
in individuals’ voting behaviour and how this may be shaping politics today.
Bridging Cultural and Economic Factors
A second debate that I contribute to in this dissertation relates to the opposi-
tion between economic and cultural explanations behind radical right support.
I show how the investigation of the local context can overcome this false di-
chotomy. Scholars and pundits alike tend to respond to the question of what
pushes people to vote for a radical right party with contesting explanations that
have economic conditions on the one hand and culture on the other. Instead, this
thesis supports the notion that the interaction of material and cultural factors
shapes political preferences and outcomes. My first article posits that economic
and cultural factors work in tandem through social status. The subjective po-
sition of a person within the social hierarchy is a dynamic relational variable
which results from both economic and cultural factors. A growing literature
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uses social status as a mechanism through which economic and cultural devel-
opments contribute to radical right voting behaviour (Gest et al., 2018; Gidron
and Hall, 2017; Mutz, 2018; Kurer, 2018). The shift of the white-working class
from the centre to the periphery, after globalisation, de-industralisation, and the
migration crisis, has pushed this social class to reject immigrants, which can be
expressed in an electoral setting with a vote for the radical right. This decline of
status indicates a discrepancy between the working class people’s understanding
of an idealised vision of a homogenous constituency and their current situation
with either the perceptions of competition or actual competition with immi-
grants over jobs, cultural heritage and other public services. I find that people
with higher status decline relative to their parents are more likely to support
a radical right party and the effect is magnified for those with anti-immigrant
attitudes.
Thinking through the status anxiety component offers an alternative that
prevents us from relying on the overly simplistic narrative of economics versus
culture. This consideration of status anxiety has not been taken from most re-
search studies, mainly because economic and cultural factors tend to be treated
separately in opposition. On the one hand, scholars defend the economic anx-
iety thesis that associates labour market competition between immigrants and
natives with radical right support (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Lancee and
Pardos-Prado, 2013; Pardos-Prado and Xena, 2019). The collapse of manu-
facturing coupled with the transition to knowledge economies, technological
automation and more global flows of capital and labour (including the inflow of
migrants and refugees) have led to growing inequalities in income and wealth.
This has slowly eroded organised labour, welfare benefits and precipitated the
introduction of austerity measures. These economic transformations have af-
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fected the low-waged unskilled workers, the unemployed and the individuals de-
pendent on shrinking social benefits. Since they lack the economic and human
capital to attain the same standards of living as in the past, they become more
economically insecure and more threatened by the arrival of immigrants, which
eventually leads to a radical right vote (Betz, 1994; Minkenberg, 2000; Golder,
2003). On the other hand, there is the perspective that the arrival of newcom-
ers has prompted a cultural backlash against the threat immigrants hold over
cultural heritage (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; McLaren, 2002; Sniderman
et al., 2004). In the context of mass immigration and multiculturalism, na-
tive residents may be nourished by ‘retro reactions’ against the cultural change
that has taken place (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Ignazi, 2010). Given the shift
from materialist to non-economic values during the silent revolution, cultural
considerations have been put to the centre of political issues (Inglehart, 1990).
Through their nostalgic rhetoric, radical right parties construct an image of the
glorified homogenous nation as under threat from increased immigration. The
nationalist credo of these parties provides a psychological comfort to socially
conservative individuals that seek stability. Individuals’ inherent desire for self-
esteem pushes them to perceive their ingroup as superior and to reject their
outgroup - the immigrants.
I also argue in this dissertation that one critical way for both material
economic conditions and cultural dynamics to play out is through their local
contextual characteristics, as different local economic and cultural geographies
generate different lived experiences, and thus contrasting identities, that may
fundamentally condition how people see their interests and how they perceive
politics. A localised perspective goes beyond the arbitrary consideration of eco-
nomic and cultural factors as separate entities where the relationship is, in fact,
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more complex. My second paper looks at the economic threat of immigration by
evaluating how the skillset of immigrants can influence the political behaviour
of native workers in French municipalities. I develop a set of hypotheses as to
how cultural threat with immigration is expected to have different effects on
natives’ economic risk depending on how immigrants affect competition within
their occupational category. I find that it is the local competition of natives
and immigrants of similar skillsets, and not simply the immigration rate, that
boosts radical right support at the local level. Areas with a large share of na-
tives with high-skills are more likely to register larger radical right support as
long as there is also a large concentration of high-skilled immigrants. I also show
that the presence of difficult economic conditions in municipalities, measured
as unemployment, intensify the effect indicating the relevance of the economy
to any cultural threat. Stressing the importance of the local context therefore
facilitates a more helpful bridging of the economics and cultural identity divide
while likely better accounting for the pattern of political transformations.
Local Socio-Cultural Factors
The third advance I make in the radical right literature relates to new indicators
explaining radical right support, which are examined through a local contextual
perspective. Local context matters in the study of radical right support because
it transcends the simple consideration of material or cultural factors that con-
dition people’s voting behaviour. While market transitions and immigration
are identified as responsible for the radical right’s electoral support in West-
ern Europe, the social transitions that accompany modernisation also impact
individuals’ voting patterns. Since people’s views are informed by the immedi-
ate communities with which they identify, social interactions shape individuals’
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identities and give meaning to how they understand their political preferences.
Unlike the more nationally focused work of sociotropic studies and individual
preference formation, this thesis casts light on a more-communal sense of iden-
tity, rooted in the everyday, lived experiences in conditioning how people make
sense of their political interests.
The third article of this thesis unpacks the undeveloped theoretical ideas
behind the notion of local experience as a driver, with attention to the social
logics inherently at work when moving from the attitudinal determinants at the
individual level to the notion of local socio-cultural degradation shaping radical
right support. I first build on the social isolation hypothesis which has arisen
from the deterioriation of traditional community bonds and the emergence of
increasingly fluid and anomic societies (Gusfield, 1962; Kornhauser, 1959; Put-
nam, 1993). The increasing individualisation and de-massification effects have
alienated the community and increased support for the radical right following
the decline of collective movements and organised labour (Rydgren, 2009:78).
New forms of local loyal ‘quasi-communities’ and ethnic nationalism have re-
placed decaying identities and social attachments (Kornhauser, 1959; Fennema
and Tillie, 1998; Rydgren, 2009; Coffée et al., 2007; Veugelers, 2015). I then
combine the social isolation hypothesis with the local sociotropic account to
generate a new thesis, the ‘local socio-cultural degradation’. This thesis argues
that the disappearance of everyday social spaces with the closure of commu-
nity pubs positively affects the radical right vote in British local authorities.
Pubs represent the heart of the community where people can frequently meet.
Their disappearances have accelerated the processes of social marginality and
have particularly questioned the socio-cultural heritage of the people affected
by these closures, the white working class.
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This ‘local socio-cultural degradation’ thesis advances the debate on the
social isolation effect behind radical right support, which has been theoretically
understudied and rarely empirically examined. The associations between social
isolation, such as (lack of) friendship relations, (weak) family structures, (no)
membership in civil society organisations, and radical right voting show no con-
sistent results (Mayer and Perrineau, 1995; Eatwell, 2003, 2005; Fennema, 2005;
Fennema and Tillie, 1998; Rydgren, 2009; Coffée et al., 2007; Veugelers, 2015).
This closer look at local social dynamics not only revives the under-explored so-
cial isolation thesis, it also invites me to explore the two ways the local context
can influence individuals’ political preferences. Local context refers to ’spaces’,
objective and more easily measurable distributions of economic, social and de-
mographic statistics, and to ‘places’, subjectively experienced but geographi-
cally bounded communities, which shape political self-understanding (Agnew,
2011). These two dimensions provide a better account of the complex influences
and interactions of local geographies on individuals’ political behaviour, thereby
bridging the disciplines of political geography and political science.
A Diversified Radical Right Electorate
The finale debate to which I contribute with a local contextual perspective
involves explaining the significant variety amongst radical right supporters. Al-
though the radical right is traditionally known to attract low-skilled workers
and those who are more vulnerable to the rise of unemployment, as shown in
my third article, its electoral base also includes middle-class groups. This thesis
provides an explanation to the socio-economic diversity of this group of vot-
ers by examining how local contextual dynamics can push any socio-economic
group to vote for the radical right. My second paper highlights that local labour
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market competition between natives and immigrants, and not immigration per
se, is what triggers voters to cast a radical right ballot. Municipalities with
direct competition between immigrants and natives with similar skillsets are
likely to register more radical right support because the economic risk associ-
ated with their occupational categories has intensified. This work advances the
existing research agenda on the electoral sociology of the radical right. The
majority of studies usually defend the perception that typical radical right vot-
ers are the most marginalised individuals in economic and social terms who
are most vulnerable to de-industralisation and globalisation processes (Ryd-
gren, 2009). Those who are manual workers with little education and low dis-
posable income are more prone to to the radical right’s ethno-nationalist and
anti-immigrant rhetoric (Betz, 1994; Arzheimer, 2009; Golder, 2016; Gest et
al., 2018). However, radical right parties have also attracted other segments of
the population who are part of the middle class (Mayer, 2005; Halikiopoulou
and Vlandas, 2016). The electorate is now considered a conglomerate of voters
with diverse socio-economic backgrounds such as the white-collar workers and
employees who are situated a few rungs higher up (Bornschier and Kriesi, 2012;
Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016; Gidron and Hall, 2017). Focusing on local
contextual dynamics presents an explanation for these varied socio-economic
bases of electorate support.
Another explanation behind a large public support for the radical right,
which is presented in my first paper, is the perception of decline in people’s
socio-economic positional relative to that of the past and/or relative to other
groups. I advance the argument that those who have experienced relative decline
in their status compared to previous generation are more prone to cast a radical
right vote. This does not only include low-skilled workers but also encompasses
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people who feel discarded for their skills or economic value (Gest et al., 2018).
I find in my first paper that small business owners and unskilled workers are
equally likely to support a radical right party in Europe. This is in line with
previous research that considers why people who do not necessarily belong to
the poorest strata of society are also drawn to the radical right (Gidron and
Hall, 2017; Gest et al., 2018). This thesis helps us to understand the wide
variety of the radical right’s electoral base and advance the knowledge of the
radical right’s electoral sociology.
I now turn to the methodology and the explanation of various statistical
methods, data sources and variables.
1.2 Methodology: Model and Data Contributions
Most of the comparative research on demand-side factors have been mainly op-
erationalised in three ways: survey data that capture voters’ attitudes towards
economic conditions and immigration (Tillie and Fennema, 1998; Van der Brug
et al., 2000); multilevel analyses that combine aggregate and individual data
to address the structural conditions and individual perceptions linked to rad-
ical right electoral support (Lubbers et al., 2002; Kessler and Freeman, 2005;
Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2009); and national-level contextual
studies that combine socioeconomic factors to the radical right at the most ag-
gregated level of analysis (country) (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Knigge, 1998;
Golder, 2003). Most studies are restricted to a handful of attitudinal measures
and a set of simple sociodemographic variables that were consistently replicated
over time and at a macro-level.
These studies raise some methodological issues. On the one hand, aggre-
gated units of analysis tend to produce stronger correlations across variables of
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interest and alter the types of statistical conclusions that one can draw. The risk
of ecological fallacies is also important. For instance, the effect of immigration
on the radical right was shown to vary depending on the levels of analysis. Con-
tact effects that result in more inter-ethnic tolerance and less anti-immigrant
electoral support have been found in smaller geographical units (Kaufmann and
Harris, 2015; Della Posta, 2013); ethnic competition and the threat of the white
natives towards immigrants increase as unit size increases (Hainmueller and His-
cox, 2010). On the other hand, individual level studies do not acknowledge the
local surrounding that may impact individuals’ voting behaviour and may suf-
fer social desirability bias due to an under-reporting of radical right supporters
(although the effect is less strong nowadays).
It is, however, empirically difficult to define the relevant geographic
boundaries for testing local experiences. The local level includes several ge-
ographical sub-levels and unit sizes that range from the regional down to the
micro-local level (Savelkoul et al., 2017: 218). Regions, cities, towns, municipal-
ities, voting districts, and neighbourhoods can all equally detect various local
spatial scales (Biggs and Knauss, 2011). The definition of local for purposes of
hypothesis testing unavoidably depends upon the convenience of data availabil-
ity for operationalising alternative contexts (Huckfeldt 1983). There is spillover
and frequent interaction across geographic boundaries, and data that are not
spatially aggregated are often costly or simply unavailable. The choice of the
geographic scale and the particular borders among geographic units of a given
size is therefore often arbitrary. In light of these limitations, this thesis pays
close attention to the most appropriate unit of analysis. It departs from the
traditional techniques used in the literature to combine individual and meso-
level contextual data. The first paper adopts a cross-regional comparison in 19
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countries over fourteen years (from 2002 to 2016) that combine data at the indi-
vidual and regional levels. Since this paper does not find any contextual effect
at the regional level, the other two papers go one level lower to adequately assess
the changing local context at the municipal and district level in two Western
European democracies, France and the United Kingdom.
These smaller units of analysis offer ‘an ideal mix of specificity and gen-
erality’, therefore overcoming the pitfalls of both micro and macro units of
analyses (Little, 2010: 16). In comparative politics, a turn towards the sub-
national level has increased sample sizes and provided more accurate data for
comparison (Snyder, 2001). Firstly, the meso-level is able to capture effects
that might omit both individual and national analyses. With these levels of
analysis, individuals may more readily recognise their locales in terms of their
own position in the socio-economic or political distribution. I use the munici-
pality level in France for my second paper because municipalities are very small
geographic areas of 1,200 inhabitants on average that are directly relatable to
inhabitants. My third paper also explores the closures of pubs for each district
in Britain (there are 317 districts in Britain) in order to evaluate the decline of
socio-cultural hubs that individuals are exposed to. Secondly, meso-level analy-
ses use units of analysis of comparable size which facilitates the accurateness of
the study. My first paper compares NUTS 2 regions which are very similar in
sizes and population density across countries (226 NUTS regions in 19 European
countries). The exhaustive and reliable data for a large panel of countries help
to provide original and accurate insights of factors behind radical right support.
Thirdly, meso-level studies can observe within-country variations over time that
contribute to radical right voting. My second paper shows that it is the direct
competition between immigrants and natives in municipalities that affects radi-
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cal right support. Finally, my local-level analyses enable me to control for other
significant, time-invariant local socioeconomic factors which are unobservable
or very difficult to measure quantitatively. This prevents any omitted variable
bias at the local level which can affect the estimation of my variables. The use
of panel data and fixed effects in my three papers also contribute to reducing
such biases.
This thesis has also constructed three unique datasets. In my first pa-
per, I combine European Social Surveys, Eurobarometer Surveys and Euro-
stat data to evaluate the level of status anxiety, individual determinants and
contextual variations on individuals’ propensity to support a radical right or
radical left party. My second paper uses an original longitudinal dataset of fine-
grained municipal electoral, demographic and economic data from France over
the 2002-2017 period to provide empirical evidence of local contextual influences
of economic competition between natives and immigrants. This paper presents
the skill level of immigrants and natives, respectively classified as unemployed-,
low-, medium- and high-skilled. Some local contextual variables, such as the
type of urbanity (rural, suburban or urban municipalities), of economic activity
(residential-, industrial or service-based areas) as well as the share of Mosques
are also added to the models. My third paper combines data on pubs from the
Local Data Company (LDC), district-level data from the Office for National
Statistics (ONS) with individual-level data using the multi-wave UK Household
panel data from 2013 to 2016. The district of respondents is the common vari-
able between the three datasets. A district-level analysis that merges district
data from the LDC and the ONS replicate the analysis at the district level.
In addition to these new datasets, I have introduced novel variables in
my analyses. The Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status (PRSSS) variable
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in my first paper is created from calculating the mean values of the subjective
social status for each age categories and country of the 2017 Fairness, Inequality
and Inter-Generational Mobility Survey. These values are then allocated to each
individual in the European Social Survey. This offers a cross-national and up-
to-date measure that assesses the subjective social status relative to individuals’
parents. In my second paper, I gather the data of each skill level, low- medium-
and high-skilled level, for immigrants and natives in each municipality from 2002
to 2017. The data distinguish between the share of immigrant workers and the
share of native workers for each sector. It is more precise to evaluate what type
of immigrant population triggers radical right support than relying on an overall
level of immigration that would mask skill differences across immigrants. My
third paper combines rich individual data from the UK Household Panel with
the number of community pub closures per number of pubs for each district
from the Local Data Company. Pub closures represent the proxy for testing the
‘local socio-cultural degradation’ hypothesis as the breeding ground for radical
right support. The results are unique to the community-style pubs as there is
no effect for pub chains, pubs located in the city centres and gastropubs.
Since this thesis uses observational studies with cross-sectional and longi-
tudinal datasets, I cannot unpack the causal mechanisms between local dynam-
ics and radical right support. It is difficult to establish a causal chain because
context is likely to be endogenous to the locality and individuals decide where
to live. For instance, one may not disentangle social deprivation from material
degrading conditions because these factors can go hand-in-hand: materially de-
prived towns cumulate economic and social deprivation and the closure of pubs
may reflect the degrading material conditions of the local communities. I am
therefore not able to isolate which of the economic, cultural and social variable,
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or which of their interaction, causally affects radical right voting. Experiments
are also not an obvious solution to draw causal inferences about context because
they most likely show individuals’ attitudinal and behavioural change from text
cues rather than from contextual cues.
Identifying these economic, cultural and social associations are nonethe-
less crucial because it shows that the potential relationships between local con-
text and radical right behaviour are real before establishing causal patterns.
This leaves researchers more confident in making causal assertions about the
true nature of the relationships they found. For instance, knowing that a local
socio-cultural factor also plays a role in explaining radical right support pushes
researchers to consider causal mechanisms that capture this feature. Testing
various covariates (economic, cultural and social factors) also enables to have a
more precise estimation of the predictor coefficient. In order to reduce omitted
variable bias, I include regional fixed effects and municipality fixed effects in my
first and second paper respectively. I use regional fixed effects with clustered
standard errors at the district level in my third paper to observe the local vari-
ations of radical right support while taking into account the fact that there are
multiple respondents in each district.
1.3 Defining the Radical Right
Before embarking on the summary of each research paper, it is useful to define
what I mean by radical right parties. Multiple terms can be used to categorise
these parties, such as ‘extreme right-wing’, ‘far right’ or ‘populist radical right’.
However, this thesis follows Norris’ oft-cited and widely used conceptualisation,
‘radical right parties’ (Norris, 2005), because the core of the thesis addresses
the factors behind support for these parties instead of debating their ideology.
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I understand radical right parties as parties with a nativist policy agenda,
which is reflected in an anti-immigrant and nationalist stance (Mudde, 2007; Ha-
likiopoulou et al., 2012). Examples of radical right parties include the Italian
Lega Nord , the Austrian Party for Freedom, the Belgian Vlaams Blok and Front
National, the Dutch Freedom Party, the French Front National, the Norwegian
Progress Party and Alternative for Germany. Despite their diverse ideologi-
cal appeals, organisational structures and leadership rhetoric, these parties all
prioritise a vision of an idealised homogenous nation over individual rights and
equality. Non-native groups are identified typically on the basis of cultural traits
such as race, ethnicity, or religion, but can also include minorities from within
the native ethnic group, such as homosexuals, as well as sections of the interna-
tional community. This ethno-nationalist stance can be expressed by proposing
the exclusion of immigrants or stronger immigration controls, or by prioritising
social benefits and employment for the native group (for more discussion on
welfare chauvinism, see more in Schumacher and Kersbergen, 2014 and Roth et
al., 2017).
Radical right parties count as ‘radical’ because their platforms reject core
ideals of liberal democracy, albeit without threatening the constitutionality of
the state (Mudde, 2004; 2007). Unlike extreme parties (i.e. Britain First and
Golden Dawn in Greece), radical right parties openly distance themselves from
historical fascism by refusing to display any affinities with fascist legacies (Ig-
nazi, 2010). They remain within the country’s political and electoral system and
express formal loyalty towards the democratic regime (Mudde, 2007). Radical
right parties are not totally hostile (Eatwell, 1983) to representative democracy
but present themselves as anti-system parties that challenge the establishment.
They are willing to break with mainstream policies and traditional party compe-
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tition but they do not intend to tear down the political system (Givens, 2005:20).
Radical right parties also share another feature: authoritarianism. These par-
ties are loyal to a central authority figure who is perceived as embodying the
popular will and capable of asserting control hierarchically. They also respect
law and order and are known to value and respect authorities (Adorno et al.
,1969).
While recognising different party systems and social contexts in Eastern
and Western Europe, radical right parties share similarities in their approach
towards immigrants and the valorisation of a cherished national past among
radical right parties, which enables them to be studied from a pan-European
perspective. Building on Mudde’s 2007 classification, this thesis will first start
with a regional comparison of radical right parties in 19 European countries
before narrowing down to subnational variations of prototypical radical right
parties, in France and the United Kingdom. A detailed classification of radical
right parties is presented in Table 1.1. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems (CSES) expert party placement, radical right parties are positioned
between 7 to 9 out of 10.
Each of the following three articles of this thesis contributes new knowl-
edge to the study of the radical right by investigating the local context. The
following section provides a detailed overview of the findings and implications
of each article.
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Table 1.1: Classification of Radical Right Parties
(a) CSES Score: 7/9= Radical Right Parties
Country Radical Right Parties
Austria Freedom Party(FPÖ) (8/10) (1/10)
Team Stronach for Austria (7/10)
Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) (7/10)
Belgium Flemish Interest (VB) (8/10)
Front National (FN) (8.3/10)
Parti Populaire (7.2/10)
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (NV-A) (7.6/10)
Lijst Dedecker (8/10)
Bulgaria Attack (9/10) , Reformist Block (7/10)
Patriotic Front (8/10)
Denmark Danish People’s Party (DPP) (7/10)
Estonia Estonian Independence Party (EIP) (8.7/10)
Finland Finns (PS) (9/10)
Freedom Party – Finland’s Future (8/10)
France Front National (FN) (7/10)
Germany Alternative for Germany (AfD) (8/10)
Republikaner (8/10)
Great Britain UK Independence Party (UKIP) (8.2/10)
British National Party (BNP) (8.7/10)
Hungary Jobbik (9/10), Fidesz (8.7/10)
HTJP-Hungarian Truth (8.9/10)
Italy Northern League (LN) (8/10)
Tricolour Flame (8.5/10)
Latvia National Alliance
The Netherlands Party for Freedom (PVV) (7.8/10)
List Pim Fortuyn (8/10)
Poland Law and Justice (PiS) (6.2/10)
Wolność (Liberty) (7/10), Kukiz’15 (7.5/10)
League of Polish Families (7.8/10)
Congress of the New Right (7.6/10)
Slovakia Slovak National Party (SNS) (7/10)
Slovenia Slovene National Party (SNS) (7/10)
Sweden Swedish Democrats (SD) (7.6/10)
Switzerland Swiss People’s Party (SPP) (8/10)
Swiss Democrats (8.2/10)
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1.4 Paper 1: The Janus-Faced Nature of Radi-
cal Voting: Subjective Social Decline and the
Radical Right and Radical Left Support
My first paper tests the effect of status anxiety on radical right and radical left
support across 226 NUTS 2 regions in 19 European countries between 2002 and
2016. Using multiple rounds of the European Social Survey (2002-2016) and
Eurobarometer Survey, this article shows that people with steeper declines in
status relative to their parents are more likely to support a radical right or a
radical left party. The traditional attitudes of each voting group increase the
effects of social decline on radical support: it is magnified by anti-immigrant
attitudes for the radical right and by preferences for redistribution for the radical
left. This is a new finding in research on support for radical right parties.
Article one has important implications for the study of the radical right
and party politics in general. Firstly, it broadens previous research on demand-
side approaches of the radical right by combining both cultural and economic
factors into a middle ground position with the role of status anxiety. It then
elaborates on the growing literature on status anxiety by analysing a new ref-
erence group - individuals’ relative status to their parents. Radical right sup-
porters are nostalgic for a cherished past with a homogenous nation (Mudde,
2007; Gest et al., 2018), radical left voters are nostalgic of a socialist past with
economic equality and lavish welfare provisions. The structural effects of de-
industrialisation, globalisation and automation may have particularly affected
the young, well-educated and middle-class who missed this past. As Millen-
nials entered the labour market during the financial crisis and austerity, their
pathway to adulthood has been more economically insecure than previous gen-
41
erations. Coupled with the effects of de-industrialisation and policy responses
to the financial crisis, they have experienced higher housing costs, greater work
scarcity and lower wages than their parents did at the same age. Finally, this
paper makes significant contributions to the understanding of party behaviour.
The nascent literature on status anxiety omits consideration of how this concept
could be applied to other party families. My first paper discusses how some of
the well-researched topics of economic deprivation and status anxiety can be
extended to an understudied party family, the radical left. Considerable atten-
tion has been paid to the most-studied party family within political science, the
radical right. However, its widely explored themes may equally resonate with
other party families. Some elements of economic and cultural grievances that
are common among radical right voters can be shared with the radical left, such
as relative social decline in comparison to parents.
In a nutshell, this first article reconciles a disputed debate by focusing on
a new concept, status anxiety, develops the reference group of status anxiety,
and stresses the need to broaden the scope of widely debated theories behind
the rise of the radical right to the radical left.
1.5 Paper 2: Local Labour Market Competition
and Radical Right Voting: Evidence from
France
My second paper re-examines the economic threat of immigration with a lo-
cal perspective. The so-called ‘labour market competition’ hypothesis, which
establishes economic competition between immigrants and natives as drivers
of radical right support, has been rejected by experimental and observational
studies (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Malhotra et al., 2013; Hainmueller et
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al., 2015). It has also been mostly conducted at the individual and aggregate
levels. This paper argues that the influence of labour market competition on
radical right voting can only be identified at a local level where native workers
are directly affected by the arrival of immigrants who have similar skillsets. The
influence of immigrants on local job competition and pressure on local wages is
more likely to be reflected in individuals’ immediate surrounding and masked
in aggregated context. I find a strong and positive local labour market effect
for all types of competition, whether between natives and immigrants of low-,
medium- or high-skill levels. The effect is amplified under higher levels of un-
employment. This hypothesis therefore enables me to explain why individuals
of diverse socio-economic backgrounds, such as the middle class, are voting for
the radical right.
An important implication of this work includes paying more attention to
local variations when testing well-debated demand-side hypotheses. This paper
runs counter to existing work that disproves the relevance of the labour market
competition thesis. It does so by analysing the economic impact of immigration
on radical right voting in French municipalities, which have an average of 1,200
inhabitants. As much as cultural and status threats affect radical right voting,
direct labour market competition at a local level also matters and should be
re-evaluated by scholars specialised in the discipline. This paper reappraises
the economic anxiety thesis to explain radical right support by using accurate
variables that may reflect the competition between immigrants and natives.
One novelty of this paper is to distinguish between native workers and their
skill levels with immigrant workers and their skill levels. Most studies con-
found the share of immigrant workers with the share of native workers for each
occupational sector. These studies do not consider that occupation-specific
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employment statistics are averages which ignore the large variations between
immigrants and natives with respect to the occupational categories. This con-
sideration enables me to assess what types of immigrants are more likely to fuel
radical right support than other. This paper captures the reality of the labour
market by acknowledging that the labour market access is likely to vary between
immigrants and natives. Given the specificities of the host country market, im-
migrants are facing greater disadvantages in getting a job that matches their
skill levels. The language barriers, lack of connections, and qualifications of
the host country are all factors that prejudice against immigrants. This thesis
therefore defends and shows that immigrants with medium- or high-skilled skills
will be more likely to threaten natives’ jobs.
1.6 Paper 3: Pissed! Local Socio-Cultural Degra-
dation and Radical Right Support: The Case
of British Pub Closures
My third paper revisits the social isolation theory with a local contextual per-
spective. It argues that the socio-cultural degradation of the community sym-
bolised by the decline of local socio-cultural places boosts radical right support.
This ‘local socio-cultural degradation’ hypothesis captures the loss of sense of
community and the decline of cultural identity embodied in these socio-cultural
places. To test this hypothesis, I investigate the relationship between the de-
cline of community-style pubs, as opposed to pub chains, gastropubs or pubs
located in city centres, and UKIP support at the individual and district level.
Community-style pubs define the local community by existing for years in the
area and are representative of the white working class. I find that the decline of
these particular pubs contributes to the rise of UKIP over the last year, unlike
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the other types of pubs. The closure of each community pub relative to the
total number of pubs in the district leads to the increase of individuals’ propen-
sity of UKIP support by 1.63 percentage points. This effect is magnified under
conditions of economic deprivation.
These findings call into question some of the implications highlighted in
the existing research on the radical right. Contrary to previous research, when
a social component is combined with a local sociotropic account it influences
the way that people see their political interests and vote. The social grievances
linked to the local decline of socio-cultural heritage should not be ignored in
the overall understanding of the radical right support. This focus on original
spatial factors that potentially influence people’s voting preferences highlights
the implications of using empirical operationalisations of political geography on
the study of political behaviour. This paper has particular implications for the
white working class as a social group. The use of community pub closures in a
British context perfectly captures the erosion of white working-class identity as
these places embody the distinctive traditions and rituals of this social group.
This paper also brings more nuance to the understanding of the social isola-
tion thesis. By reporting the gradual decline of socio-cultural hubs since 2013,
it distinguishes between people who have always felt isolated and those who
have become isolated after experiencing local decline. The former will be more
likely to abstain from voting whereas the latter will be more sensitive to radical
right parties. This distinction enables me to explain why this newly socially
isolated group is more inclined to cast a radical right ballot than to abstain,
whereas standard social isolation theory allows for both of these possibilities
(Kornhauser, 1959; Hirschman, 1978).
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1.7 Road Map
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: each of the chapters in-
cludes one paper, which is a self-contained piece of research. Chapter two
analyses the effect of status anxiety on the radical right and radical left of 226
NUTS 2 regions in 19 European countries. Chapter three examines the rela-
tionship between local labour market competition and radical right support in
France. Chapter four evaluates evidence of the impact of local socio-cultural
degradation on radical right support in the United Kingdom. In the final chap-
ter, I discuss the theoretical and policy implications of the papers, address some
general limitations of the thesis, and highlight avenues for future research.
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2 | The Janus-Faced Nature of Rad-
ical Voting: Subjective Social
Decline at the Roots of Radi-
cal Right and Radical Left Sup-
port
Abstract
While a growing literature examines the effect of the relative social
and economic decline of the white working class on radical right par-
ties, few studies reflect on this psychological phenomenon on radical
left parties in Europe. Yet, the young, well-educated middle class
is likely to perceive relative decline in comparison to their parents
given the rising levels of unemployment and social inequality, and
declining income. These structural changes may eventually push
them to favour a party which stresses rising income inequality, a
catchcry of the radical left. Drawing on multiple rounds of the Eu-
ropean Social Survey (2002-2016) and the Eurobarometer survey,
probit models show strong and positive association between lower
levels of Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status (PRSSS) and sup-
port for right- and left-wing radicalism at the regional level (NUTS
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2) in 19 European countries. The traditional attitudes of each vot-
ing group magnify the effects of social decline on radical support: it
is reinforced by anti-immigrant support for the radical right and by
preference for redistribution for the radical left. This study shows
the relevance of including social decline relative to the parents as
a reconciling factor among radical right and radical left supporters
despite diverging socioeconomic and attitudinal features.
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2.1 Introduction
The rapid rise of radical right and radical left parties has led to a wave of
public and scholarly interest in recent decades. While there has been a wealth
of research studies on the electoral fortunes of radical right parties (Lubbers and
Scheepers, 2002; Ivarsflaten, 2008), few analyses focus on the growth of radical
left parties. Yet, the recent triumph of the Left Bloc in the governing coalition
in Portugal, Syriza in Greece and the breakthrough of Podemos in Spain, to
name a few, are all signs of radical left emergence.
The studies that compare the radical right and radical left together often
place them in opposition. The radical right parties embrace nativism, reject-
ing non-native individuals who pose a threat to the nation (Mudde, 2007),
whereas the radical left parties endorse the egalitarian interests of the common
working man against the interests of the business elite (March, 2007:74). The
rare articles that align radical left and radical right together have looked at
their common characteristics. These parties share Eurosceptic (De Vries and
Edwards, 2009), nationalist (Burgoon, 2013; Halikiopoulou et al., 2012), anti-
elitist traits (Mudde, 2004; Otjes and Louwerse, 2013) and populist traits in
which they represent the ‘virtuous and unified population’ against the corrupt
political establishment (Taggart, 2000:95; Mudde, 2007).
Meanwhile, the literature on the radical right has largely devoted its at-
tention to debating the economic versus cultural drivers behind its electoral
success. The economic anxiety thesis advances that globalisation and techno-
logical change have created economic losers who later express their economic
fear by casting a radical right ballot (Dancygier and Donnelly, 2013; Malhotra
et al., 2013; Ford and Goodwin, 2014). The cultural backlash argument posits
that the recent and rapid surge of immigration has threatened the alleged ho-
mogeneity of the nation and its cultural heritage which is eventually translated
into radical right support (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Hainmueller and His-
cox, 2010; Shayo and Harel, 2012; Goldstein and Peters, 2014; Hainmueller et
al., 2015).
While no consensus over these determinants has been found, a growing
literature is now turning to the psychological phenomenon of subjective social
decline to overcome the dilemma (Gest et al., 2018; Gidron and Hall, 2017;
Kurer, 2018). It states that absolute material hardship does not matter as
much as the relative deprivation of the current status individuals are entitled
to. This fear of status decline is characterised by the perceived shift of the once-
dominant white working class, the radical right supporters, to the periphery of
the social order in comparison to the emerging ethnic groups. It is eventually
translated into anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right voting support. Yet,
this subjective sense of social decline can also be felt among another voting
group. The young and well-educated middle-class may perceive status anxiety
since the present economic and social circumstances are not as favourable as
past ones. Rising levels of unemployment, social inequality and declining income
may eventually push this group to turn their back on the mainstream left and
support a party that embodies such concerns: the radical left.
Reconciling the radical left and radical right into a unifying theoretical
framework that goes beyond the ‘economic versus cultural’ dichotomy, this pa-
per draws on the understudied psychological factor of status anxiety that is
commonly shared by radical leftists and radical rightists. My theory builds
on and incorporates existing approaches from political psychology and social
hierarchies to formulate an individual-level theory of perceived relative depri-
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vation to explain radical left and radical right support. I argue that radical
right and radical left voters, despite belonging to different social groups, share
a subjective sense of decline compared to their parents. Combining the Euro-
barometer Survey on Inter-Generational Mobility with the multiple rounds of
the European Social Survey, I use probit models to show that a declining sense
of social status relative to the previous generation is associated with radical left
and radical right support at the regional level in 19 European countries from
2002 to 2016. The radical right voters are mainly young white working class
men with low education and the radical left supporters are mainly young highly
educated individuals from the middle class. Moreover, traditional attitudinal
determinants of each voting group— anti-immigrant attitudes for the radical
right, and pro-redistribution attitudes for the radical left—reinforce the effect
of declining subjective social status for each radical party. My results are unique
to radical voting and robust to a variety of alternative specifications (using so-
cial placement in general, comparing between Eastern and Western Europe) and
modelling choices.
The contribution of this paper is fourfold. Firstly, it sheds light on a
rarely studied concept, i.e. status anxiety. While the concept has been explored
in qualitative ethnographic studies (Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2016), evidence
of its use in comparative politics is still very scarce. This cross-sectional study
uses an original measure to broaden the scope and understanding of the impact
of relative social deprivation to a large set of Western and Central European
countries. Secondly, I conduct a cross-regional analysis of 226 NUTS 2 regions
in 19 countries between 2002 and 2016, which allows me to capture effects
that might evade both individual- and country-level analyses. While previous
research usually focuses on single case studies, this study relies on extensive
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and reliable data to provide a pan-European comparative analysis at the finest
grain. Thirdly, I show the strong electoral base of each radical party. While
there has been an abundance of studies on white working class men as important
voters for the rise of the radical right, the political affiliation of the young, well-
educated and middle-class to the radical left has been understudied. Finally, by
incorporating the nascent literature on subjective social status into an analysis
of radical left support, I show similarities between the radical right and radical
left supporter bases. The structural effects of de-industrialisation, globalisation
and automation can also lead to subjective social decline among the young,
well-educated and middle-class. As the source of radical support is common,
solutions to limit its ever-growing appeal may require similar policy and social
reforms.
The paper is structured as follows. After reviewing the literature on
status anxiety, radical right and radical left voting, I outline the hypotheses
and present the data, models and variables. I then comment on the estimation
tables and finally draw limitations and conclusions.
2.2 Similarities: Status Anxiety, Radical Right
and Radical Left Voting
Cultural and economic changes have produced uneven development trajecto-
ries within European states. Despite the wide range of studies on their po-
litical consequences for the rise of radical right voting, there is still an ongo-
ing debate about the radical right’s electoral success. The lack of consistent
evidence in favour of economic explanations and the dominance of seemingly
cultural drivers in experimental analyses have led some to claim that ‘it’s not
the economy stupid’ (Mudde, 2007). However, more recent studies called for a
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re-conceptualisation of economic factors with a closer look into the regional and
local dynamics of trade and ethnic competition (Colantone and Stanig, 2018a,
2018b). Economy and culture cannot simply be regarded as independent and
competing explanations of radical right voting since individuals use intertwined
frames of economic and cultural explanations to interpret the social world which
surrounds them (Walsh, 2012; Hochschild, 2016).
A growing literature is suggesting an approach that goes beyond the
debate between economic and cultural factors, and instead focuses on anxiety
about social status (Gest et al., 2018; Gidron and Hall, 2017; Kurer, 2018).
Drawing on the psychology and social status literature, this understudied con-
cept refers to the subjective positioning of a person within the social hierarchy.
Individuals subjectively rank their level of social esteem or respect that society
is according to them. Subjective social status is a relational variable because
it measures where people stand in comparison to the full social order. It also
reconciles both cultural and economic arguments by capturing the personal per-
ception that is not reducible to one factor or the other. It has been suggested as
a mechanism through which economic developments, such as globalisation, de-
industrialisation, or technological change, and cultural developments, as man-
ifested by high-profile waves of migration, translate into radical right voting
behaviour (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Kurer, 2018).
Initially advanced by Lispet (1955) and relayed by Gest et al. (2018) and
Gidron and Hall (2017), ‘social status anxiety’ forms the conceptual basis for a
compelling theoretical argument to explain radical right voting. There are two
main reasons why ‘social status anxiety’ is linked to radical right support. The
first is instrumental. Individuals who feel that their social status has suffered
along with their material circumstances are more inclined to support radical
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right parties. These individuals are most likely to belong to the working class.
And because these working-class individuals desire an alternative to the parties
that have altered their socioeconomic conditions, the anti-establishment appeals
that radical right leaders make may be especially attractive to these voters
(Gidron and Hall, 2017). The second reason why ‘social status anxiety’ boosts
radical right support is emotional. Since threats to an individual’s social status
evoke feelings of hostility to outgroups (Tajfel et al., 1978; Leach and Spears,
2008; Gidron and Hall, 2017), individuals who feel that their social status is
threatened may be sensitive to the anti-immigrant discourse of radical right
parties. Appeals that evoke threats to the status of white men for more gender
or racial equality may have parallel power. Hence, white working class men
who perceive a loss of social status are especially drawn to radical right parties
(Gidron and Hall, 2017; Gest, 2016, 2018).
Gest et al. (2018) used original survey data that measured individuals’
sense of economic, political and social deprivation in the United States and the
United Kingdom to demonstrate that greater perceived threat of relative depri-
vation, which they called ‘nostalgic deprivation’, explains radical right voting
better than absolute economic deprivation. Gidron and Hall showed with the
International Social Survey that the loss of perceived social status is largely
associated with radical right support in 19 developed democracies (Gidron and
Hall, 2017). They add that the radical right supporters are not the individuals
at the bottom of the economic ladder but the ‘declining middle’ a few rungs
up. The fear of losing established status is indeed prominent among those with
some status to defend. Their higher social positions make them more inclined
than others to defend the social boundaries that separate them from groups
they consider socially subordinate, e.g. immigrants.
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Drawing from these readings, I explore the relevance of status anxiety to
radical left voters. Gest et al. (2018) qualify nostalgic deprivation as ‘the dis-
crepancy between individuals’ understandings of their current status and their
perceptions about their past’. Here I contend that radical right supporters are
nostalgic about a unified and ethnically homogenous heartland. They are at-
tracted by the radical right discourse which promotes the values of an idealised
past where blue-collar workers used to be valued as crucial pillars of society.
Yet, there is no theoretical reason to uniquely associate nostalgic deprivation
to the radical right. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2018a) argue that almost
all political parties, and especially populists, use nostalgic rhetoric to sell their
political ideas. Their discourses often construct a cherished and mystified heart-
land where uncomplicated and non-troublesome politics cohabit. Radical left
supporters could also be nostalgic of a socialist past with larger welfare spending
and economic equality. Some studies have already linked left-wing radical vot-
ing with greater support of economic equality (Akkerman, Zaslove and Spruyt,
2017; Salmela and Scheve 2017). European countries have experienced increased
levels of unemployment, precarity, economic inequality, and declining income in
recent years. For example, the top 20 per cent of Europe’s population by in-
come received 5.2 times as much income as the bottom 20 per cent (with some
cross-national variations ranging from 3.6 in Finland to 8.2 in Bulgaria) (Euro-
stat data, 2017). These kinds of trends may contribute to the sense of relative
deprivation among middle class left-wing radical supporters. The identification
of these trends in the rhetoric of radical left parties across Europe, moreover,
may attract voters who perceive their subjective status declining alongside their
economic situation. This leads to my first hypothesis:
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H1: Individuals who perceive subjective social decline compared to their par-
ents have a higher probability of supporting radical right or radical left
parties.
Dissimilarities: Two Different Voting Groups
Despite sharing status anxiety in relation to the previous generation, radical
right and radical left supporters belong to different socioeconomic groups. Rad-
ical right supporters are expected to be white men with low levels of education.
Their profile has been widely examined in the literature (Arzheimer, 2009) and
is in line with the psychology literature that has shown that threats to a person’s
social status evoke feelings of hostility to outgroups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979;
Leach and Spears, 2008). The transformation of the economy has contributed
to the gradual disappearance of decent and secure low-skilled jobs in manufac-
turing sectors and the rising demand for highly-skilled employees with higher
education (Gidron and Hall, 2017). It has relegated low-skilled white work-
ers to the fringes of the social order. Meanwhile, demographic changes from
successive and rapid waves of immigration have fueled a sense that they must
compete with immigrants over scarce economic and welfare resources (Scheve
and Slaughter, 2001; Pardos-Prado, 2011; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013).
Loss of status inspires a diffuse cultural resentment against those perceived to
have displaced them in the social hierarchy. This resentment is channeled into
a radical right vote, since these individuals are responsive to the conservative
radical right rhetoric which scapegoats immigrants and takes the side of manual
workers.
By contrast, a relatively unexplored topic is the socioeconomic charac-
teristics of the radical left electorate across European countries. There is a
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growing consensus that the highly educated, young, urban and male population
is more sensitive to the radical left discourse in Southern Europe (Bordignon
and Ceccarini, 2013; Vezzoni and Mancosu, 2016 in Italy; Fernández-Albertos,
2015; Orriols and Corderos, 2016; Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2016 in Spain). This
study will include Eastern and Northern European countries to assess whether
this hypothesis is tenable across a larger number of European countries. The
aftermath of the economic crisis has created higher levels of unemployment
and declining incomes which have mainly affected the well-educated but inex-
perienced young population (March and Mudde, 2015, 2018). It has pushed
them to endorse riskier career trajectories with self-employment jobs and short
contracts (e.g. bartenders, Deliveroo bikers, etc). Their precarious situation,
coupled with disenchantment from lack of work opportunities appropriate to
their educational attainment, have led them to feel worse off than their parents’
generation. Their parents’ lives were synonymous with economic mobility, the
rise of the middle class (Crafts and Toniolo, 1996; Marglin and Schor, 1992),
and a wave of political cohesiveness (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) in the second
half of the 20th century.
By contrast, the young generation may perceive themselves worse off be-
cause their parents used to earn higher, unionised wages that are mostly out
of reach today. They feel a relative decline in comparison to their previous
generation since their aspirations are paralleled to their parents’. I would ex-
pect that this parent-relative social subjective status decline mostly concerns
a young population who belongs to the middle class because these structural
changes have mostly affected middle class households. The following figure,
which presents the mean values of social placement in comparison to their par-
ents for each generation, confirms that the Millennials, those born after 1980,
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perceive themselves to be in the lowest social position relative to their parents’
situation (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Mean Values of Social Placement in Comparison to their Parents
for Each Generation
Source: Eurobarometer, 2017
As a result, radical left parties appeal to this segment of the population1
by predominantly focusing on problems of social inequality and welfare cuts
while providing anti-neo-liberal economic policies (March and Mudde, 2015).
These parties campaigned on anti-austerity policies, like expanded welfare and
public spending, which were ignored or triangulated away by the centre left or
the Greens (Bremer and McDaniel, 2019). Recent anecdotal evidence has sug-
gested a ‘youthquake’ in the radical left, with Mélenchon’s ‘Unbowed France’
being the most popular party among 18-25 year olds in the 2017 French presi-
1It is important to remember that I do not try to prove that all radical left voters are
the young, well-educated and middle class nor that all these voters support the radical left
(Roodjuin et al., 2017; Visser et al., 2014 show radical left voters are from the working class)
but rather that they constitute a strong electoral base for the radical left.
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dential election, and with the youth-led grassroots movement, Momentum, con-
tributing to the large Labour support in the 2017 UK election. These parties
are particularly attractive to highly-educated Millennials who are less prone to
blame immigrants for the decline in their social status, unlike radical right sup-
porters. A recent study has demonstrated the causal effect of higher education
on increased tolerance towards ethnic minorities (Cavaillé and Marshall, 2018).
High education has socialised the values of equality and democracy to students
and has contributed to the cosmopolitan embrace of egalitarian treatment of
immigrants.
One particular sociodemographic feature that radical right and radical
left voters share is that men are more likely to vote for radical parties than
women (Mayer, 1995; Kimmel, 2009, 2013; Spierings and Zaslove, 2017). Gidron
and Hall linked status anxiety and gender by arguing that the rise of women’s
status in society and in the workplace contributed to the declining subjective
social status of men with no education, which is eventually translated into radi-
cal right support (Gidron and Hall, 2017). Economic and cultural developments
all led to the increase of social status of women relative to men. Between 1980
and 2010, the share of women between the ages of 25 and 54 in gainful employ-
ment rose from 54 per cent to 71 per cent across the OECD (OECD data); and,
in many countries, women are taking a growing share of well-paid occupations
whereas men who move into occupations previously dominated by women are
moving mainly into lower-paid jobs (Roos and Stevens, 2017). The cultural de-
velopments relate to mainstream shifts towards greater gender equality, which
trigger action in governments, social organisations and firms (i.e. gender quotas)
(Dobbin, 2009).
Yet, more should be done to understand the gender gap in radical left
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parties or, more generally, the mechanisms behind why women are less prone
to support radical parties. One explanation that could explain the predomi-
nantly male radical right and radical left electorate relates to a gendered nature
of radical support (Mudde, 2007). It is known that political socialisation is
gendered in the sense that women and men tend to be socialised differently
(Sapiro, 1983; Trevor, 1999). Parents and society reward different behaviours
by girls and boys, and different examples are set about ‘correct behaviour’ in
many fields including political behaviour. For instance, the media depict female
and male politicians differently as women are often portrayed as less aggressive,
more consensus-seeking and friendlier (Ross and Sreberny, 2000; Sawer, 2002;
Van Zoonen, 2001).
These differences in gender representation is reflected in political atti-
tudes and can explain certain political behaviours. For instance, Golebiowska
(1999) shows that women are more politically tolerant than men. Verba et al.
(1997) attempt to explain why men are more engaged in politics than women
and note that considerations that are normally associated with political en-
gagement (such as education or income) do not explain the gender gap. Rather,
the authors claim that, on average, it appears that men and woman may have
different ‘tastes for politics’. Fish (2002) makes the differences even more tan-
gible, arguing that men are more prone to conflictual politics and women prefer
consensus-seeking. Mudde goes one step further by arguing that the radical or
even extreme image of the parties may explain the gender gap in radical right
and radical left parties (Mudde, 2007). Since the women often have lower levels
of political efficacy and lower levels of political interest, they are more likely to
vote for ‘established parties’ (Mudde, 2007). Thus, the genderedness of politi-
cal socialisation provides a compelling justification for the predominantly male
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radical right and radical left electorate.
I therefore argue that:
H2: White working class men with low education and occupational status have
a higher probability of supporting radical right parties.
H3: Young, well-educated and middle class individuals have a higher proba-
bility of supporting radical left parties.
2.3 Additive Attitudinal Effects on Status
Anxiety
Attitudinal determinants that are traditional characteristics of each radical
party should be expected to reinforce the effects of declining social status.
While the radical right and radical left share economic vulnerabilities, they
are expected to express the sentiments associated with their respective main-
stream counterparts with respect to (non)-egalitarian and (non)-altruistic values
(Visser et al., 2014; Rooduijn et al., 2017). Anti-immigrant attitudes are usually
associated with radical right support (Lubbers et al., 2002; Ivarsflaten, 2008;
Arzheimer, 2009) whereas preferences towards redistribution are linked to rad-
ical left support (March and Mudde, 2015). Such socio-political attitudes are
known to strongly determine voting preferences and different electorate com-
position for the radical right and radical left (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007;
Rooduijn et al., 2017). As a result, I posit that:
H4: The probability of supporting radical right parties is magnified when in-
dividuals’ declining social status compared to the previous generation is
combined with anti-immigrant attitudes.
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H5: The probability of supporting radical left parties is magnified when in-
dividuals’ declining social status compared to the previous generation is
combined with preferences towards redistribution.
2.4 Data
Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status as a Measure of
Status Anxiety
The theoretical understanding of subjective social status is operationalised by
constructing a measure of status anxiety from the Eurobarometer Survey. This
survey, entitled the 2017 Fairness, Inequality and Inter-Generational Mobility
Survey, includes a question on social status: individuals’ social position rela-
tive to their parents in their country (‘Where would you place your parents
on this ladder in comparison to you in your country?’)2. This measure, which
I call Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status (PRSSS), tests how people are
doing compared to the standard of living of their parents’ generation for rad-
ical right and radical left support. The larger the value, the better off people
rank their parents compared with themselves, and thus the larger the perceived
social decline compared to their parents’ generation. I hypothesise that indi-
viduals who assign themselves relatively low social status in comparison with
their parents will be more susceptible to support radical right or radical left
parties. This measure offers more cross-national comparability and greater in-
dependence from political context than alternate measures that ask respondents
to identify as part of the working or middle class.
2The data has another measure linked to subjective social status: individuals’ placement
on social ladder (‘Where would you place yourself on the social ladder in your country?’) but
I only include this in the appendix because it does not fully capture the social decline relative
to the past generation.
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Previous studies on social status did not meticulously differentiate indi-
viduals’ identity from their group’s identity in their surveys. By asking respon-
dents ‘where they thought people like them were situated one or two generations
ago’, Gest et al. (2018) measured people’s expectations of relative group posi-
tion over time—in this case, white people—instead of the individual’s position.
This question therefore wrongly assumes the loss in group position to be equal
to the loss in one’s own interpersonal-relative position over time. Respondents’
self-understandings and perceptions of the past are conflated with the groups’
understandings. This could explain why Gest et al’s measurement of nostalgic
deprivation specifically correlates with radical right-wing support: respondents
are strongly disposed to assimilate themselves into the white working class. By
including individual-level survey data in which individuals are asked to com-
pare they themselves and not people like them, my study avoids this problem of
having to interpret the ‘self’ in terms of one’s group identity.
The mean values of this PRSSS measure are calculated from the distribu-
tion along higher, neutral or low values of each status variable for each country.
The mean values are then combined with individuals’ data from the cumulative
file data of the eight rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) (2002-2016).
I allocate each individual in the European Social Survey to their corresponding
subjective social status (obtained from the Eurobarometer Survey) according
to their year of birth and country. There are seven year-categories: 1900-1941,
1942-1951, 1952-1961, 1962-1971, 1972-1981, 1982-1991 and 1992-2001. The
categorisation by age enables me to better capture status anxiety in relation to
past generations (Figure 2.1). It was also the common variable shared between
the two datasets with the largest number of categories (8 age groups) to provide
63
more empirical variation in the result3. Age is included as a control variable to
ensure the PRSSS measure is solely capturing status anxiety.
Figure 2.2 displays the distribution of the PRSSS variable in the 19
countries in this analysis. More people place themselves in the middle of this
social ladder relative to their parents, which proves that this is a good measure
as the majority of people would position themselves in the middle of society in
comparison to their parents. There is also a significant number of people who
report lower subjective social status relative to their parents, and my premise is
that those who place themselves on lower rungs of this ladder believe that they
have a more lower social position relative to their parents than those located
higher up on it.
Figure 2.2: The distribution of Social Distance to Parents across the full sample
and by occupational class
3There was no data available by year of birth but only by age group in the Eurobarometer
Survey.
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It is important to observe the relationship between the PRSSS variable
and standard objective socioeconomic status indicators to validate this measure
as an indicator of status anxiety. In Table 2.1, Model 1 reports the results of
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with region, year and round fixed
effects in which the dependent variable is our PRSSS measure of status anxiety,
and the main independent variables are the respondent’s income decile, level of
educational achievement, and occupational class. Age is the strongest predictor
of PRSSS as expected: the younger you are the more likely you feel subjec-
tive social decline relative to your parents. Being an ethnic minority and only
having primary education also boost PRSSS decline. Interestingly, although
levels of PRSSS are generally lower among unskilled workers, even individuals
within other occupational groups, such as small business owners or skill work-
ers, can feel that they have lower PRSSS than higher-grade service workers, as
Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1 indicate. Income does not show any correlation with
PRSSS Income does not show any correlation with PRSSSS and will therefore
not be included in the main analysis.. These results indicate that together the
three standard components of socioeconomic status (income, education and oc-
cupational class) explain only a limited amount of the variance in subjective
social status. The PRSSS measure is therefore not simply a proxy for objective
socioeconomic status variables but it also captures more subjective features.
Other Variables
Other classic variables need to be included in my analysis as they are liable to
influence individuals’ subjective social status. The way people see themselves
as central or marginal members of society is likely to be mediated by the social
esteem that society as a whole assigns to the social roles those people occupy.
65
Table 2.1: Predictors of Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status
Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status
Age -0.012***(0.000)
Female -0.000(0.000)
Income Decile 0.000(0.000)
Class (0=Higher-Grade Service)
Lower-Grade Service -0.000(0.000)
Small Business Owners -0.001**(0.000)
Skilled Workers -0.001*(0.000)
Unskilled Workers -0.000*(0.000)
Ethnic Minority -0.001***(0.016)
Education (0=Primary)
Secondary 0.002***(0.000)
Vocational 0.002***(0.000)
Tertiary 0.002***(0.000)
Constant 0.393***(0.004)
Observations 84,670
Number of Countries 19
Number of Regions 226
Region, Year and Round FE Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p
< .001.
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Objective measures of social status like education, income and occupation con-
fer certain positions within a social hierarchy (Marmot, 2004). Lower levels of
educational attainment, lower incomes and manual routinised occupations usu-
ally convey a lower level of ‘objective’ status within society. I include education
and occupational class based on Oesch’s (2006) class scheme in my analysis.
Age is included since the social comparison relative to parents is likely to be
affected by age, as seen earlier. Gender is also included since I expect a larger
support of men for the radical right and radical left, as explained previously,
(Mudde, 2007; Gidron and Hall, 2017; Spierings and Zaslove, 2017) despite the
recent decline of the gender gap (Mayer, 2015).
Attitudinal determinants are also strongly linked with radical right or
radical left support. There is consensus in the literature that anti-immigrant
attitudes are associated with radical right support (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Arzheimer,
2009) whereas redistribution and social equality are associated with radical left
support (March and Mudde, 2015). The strongest predictor of radical right
support in the European Social Survey is unsurprisingly anti-immigrant atti-
tudes with regards to the cultural heritage of the nation. The best attitudinal
predictor of radical left support is respondents’ opinions on redistribution (on
whether the government should reduce income inequality). Those in favour of
redistribution are likely to lean more to the radical left. I therefore use these
two variables as proxies for the main attitudinal determinants of each respective
radical party (other alternative variables are used as a robustness check in Table
A.6, see Appendix).
Three other socioeconomic, individual-level features can mediate sub-
jective social status: location, ethnic minority status, and financial prospects.
People living in less prosperous regions compared to residents of economically
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vibrant regions (Jennings and Stoker, 2019), or who are ethnic minorities are
likely to have lower levels of subjective social status (Gidron and Hall, 2017).
By the same token, people’s future’s financial situation is worth considering
since secure material conditions can increase people’s social esteem (Miyakawa
et al. 2012) and economic risk can be linked to status loss (Kurer, 2018). To
account for these mediating factors, I use, respectively, regional fixed effects, a
dummy variable that accounts for whether an individual is a member of an eth-
nic minority, and a variable that captures individuals’ perception of their future
financial prospects to the classic socioeconomic variables. I also include con-
textual variables at the regional level that are likely to influence radical right
and radical left support: unemployment rate, immigration stock and income
inequality (Gini Index).
When appropriate weights are applied, each survey provides a represen-
tative sample of the adult population, usually based on 1,270-1,570 respondents
for each country, but the sample size varies from 900 to 2000 respondents. 19
countries from Western and East Central Europe available in both surveys are
included in my analysis (see Appendix)4. I rely on the standard literature to
classify the radical right and radical left parties because of its controversial na-
ture (Mudde, 2007; March and Mudde, 2015; Van Kessel, 2015). I also test the
position of radical right or radical left parties on the left-right spectrum from the
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data (see Appendix). There
are 36 radical right and 38 radical left parties in total.
4I include countries that featured in all survey years.
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2.5 Empirical Strategy
I combine individual-level survey data from the eight rounds (2002-2016) of the
European Social Survey with data on individuals’ Parent-Relative Subjective
Social Status (PRSSS) provided by the Eurobarometer Survey on 19 European
countries. I employ probit models5. My baseline specification is:
P (RadicalRightil) = F (αil + β1SocialStatusil + Lil + Zil + il), (2.1)
where i indexed regions and l individual respondents. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if individuall declares sup-
port for a radical party. I run separate regressions for the radical right voters
and the radical left voters. In respect of the radical right regressions, the indi-
cator variable takes value 1 if individual l supported a radical right party in the
last election, and value zero if the individual supports any other party (includ-
ing a radical left party). In respect of the radical left regressions, the indicator
variable takes value 1 if individual l supported a radical left party in the last
election, and value zero if the individual supports any other party (including
a radical right party). Lil is a vector of individual variables that account for
gender, education, occupation, and future financial situation. Zil is a vector
of contextual variables that include immigration, unemployment and income
inequality. il is an error term.
The baseline model is a probit model with year, ESS round and region
fixed effects and standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. This low level
of analysis is the most appropriate level of analysis for several reasons. Firstly,
it is able to detect effects that might go unnoticed by individual or country-level
5Robustness checks include hierarchical linear probability models which show similar re-
sults.
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analyses. For instance, regional unemployment will be directly felt by individ-
uals who live in the region. By contrast, individual unemployment status can-
not capture the effect of the threat of unemployment to those still employed,
while country-level unemployment is likely to mask this effect by pooling regions
within the same country. Secondly, using regional data is a more accurate basis
for comparative analysis because they involve units of comparable size and pop-
ulation density. Regional level data also permit observation of within-country
variation in immigration, unemployment and inequalities which will enrich the
demand-side explanations behind radical political support. Finally, operating
at such a low level enables me to control for unobservable time-invariant socioe-
conomic factors which are often difficult to measure quantitatively. Controlling
for region-specific heterogeneity reduces omitted variable bias and bolsters the
robustness of my results.
Radical parties are classified following the academic consensus regarding
this party family (Mudde, 2007, for radical right parties and March, 2011, and
March and Rommerskirchen, 2015, for radical left parties). Communist, Post-
Communist and Left Socialist parties are included among radical left parties
because they propose radical changes in the mode in which capitalist market so-
cieties and economies are organised. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems (CSES) expert party placement, radical right parties are positioned be-
tween 7 to 10 out of 10 on the left–right ideological dimension, whereas radical
left parties are ranked between 1 to 3 out of 10 on this scale. Tables A.1, A.2
and A.3 in the Appendix include the descriptive statistics, the codebook and
the classification (with the CSES left-right score) of radical right and radical
left parties for each country.
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2.6 Results
Table 2.2: Status Anxiety, Radical Right and Radical Left Support
Radical Right Support Radical Left Support
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Decline Compared to Parents 2.090***(0.585)
1.647**
(0.718)
4.316***
(0.916)
2.339**
(0.357)
Immigration Attitudes (0=Agst) 0.625***(0.033)
0.584***
(0.040)
-0.247***
(0.043)
-0.273***
(0.067)
Redistribution Preferences (0=Agst) 0.113*(0.049)
0.078*
(0.066)
0.551***
(0.080)
0.482***
(0.112)
Age -0.006***(0.001)
-0.007***
(0.001)
-0.012***
(0.001)
-0.011**
(0.002)
Female -0.105***(0.032)
-0.061
(0.040)
-0.111***
(0.039)
-0.084
(0.066)
Class (0=Higher-Grade Service)
Lower-Grade Service -0.043(0.064)
-0.015
(0.069)
-0.051
(0.062)
0.059
(0.104)
Small Business Owners 0.123**(0.061)
0.065
(0.076)
-0.213***
(0.082)
-0.103
(0.148)
Skilled Workers 0.224(0.056)
0.183
(0.073)
0.134**
(0.065)
0.268**
(0.113)
Unskilled Workers 0.233***(0.109)
0.192**
(0.123)
0.035
(0.002)
0.143
(0.126)
Ethnic Minority -0.208*(0.114)
-0.215
(0.203)
-0.042
(0.167)
0.134
(0.253)
Education (0=Primary)
Secondary 0.048(0.057)
0.075
(0.081)
0.014
(0.067)
-0.048
(0.107)
Vocational 0.236***(0.080)
0.246**
(0.100)
0.133
(0.080)
0.001
(0.124)
Tertiary -0.323***(0.080)
-0.348**
(0.098)
0.220**
(0.079)
0.061
(0.129)
Constant -3.745***(0.528)
-4.542***
(0.543)
-3.954***
(0.578)
-4.938***
(0.532)
Observations 87,670 82,210 86,500 81,613
Number of Countries 19 19 19 19
Number of Regions 226 226 226 226
Region, Year and Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contextual Variables No Yes No Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
Table 2.2 reports results from the estimations of radical right and radical
left support. Columns 1 and 3 refer to the probit estimation of radical right and
radical left support with clustered standard errors, individual covariates, region,
year and round fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 report findings with contextual
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variables. In line with my expectations, it shows that individuals’ lower sense
of PRSSS is largely associated with support for radical right and radical left
parties rather than any other party. The results suggest that the probability
of respondents supporting radical right parties increases by 0.554 percentage
points (0.436 with contextual variables) as the PRSSS variable changes from its
minimum (0.195) to its maximum (0.46) value. The probability of supporting
radical left parties increases by 1.144 percentage points (0.620 with contextual
variables) as the PRSSS variable changes from its minimum to its maximum
value. This provides support for hypothesis 1. Multilevel models in Table A.9
of the Appendix show similar results.
Figure 2.3 corroborates the hypothesis by showing increasing predictive
values of radical right and radical left party support as PRSSS declines. As
in Table 2.2, the effect is bigger for radical left support. This steeper effect
can be explained because the data is classified along age which is a measure
that inevitably captures the intergenerational differences of status. Radical
left support is particularly triggered among young voters who feel generational
social immobility, as shown with the moderate negative coefficient of age. Age
is also negatively associated with support for the radical right, although the
effect is less strong than for radical left support. This result is more surprising
as the radical right electorate either has no particular age categories (Ford and
Goodwin, 2014) or tends to be older (Mayer, 1995). However, one may assume
that young working class men might be more inclined to the radical right as
they could not aspire to the same status expectations than their parents once
benefited from as blue-collar workers (e.g. coal-miners). This finding highlights
another (unexpected) similarity between radical right and radical left supporters
: their young sociological profile.
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Figure 2.3: Predicted Values of Social Distance Relative to Parents on Radical
Right and Radical Left Voting
Table A.4 (see Appendix) also demonstrates that higher levels of social
status with no reference point to parents leads to negative radical right or radical
left support, which confirms that status decline is positively related to radical
right and radical left voting. However, since its effects are not as strong as
they are when using the status decline relative to parents, the latter is used in
the main analysis. This also shows that it is subjective social decline relative
to parents that drives radical support, which is in line with previous findings
(Gidron and Hall, 2017; Gest et al., 2018).
The results also hold when I exclude Eastern European countries, which
have more extreme right parties than radical right parties6, or when I exclude the
Scandinavian countries, which are likely to have more generous welfare systems
6Extreme right parties work outside the country’s political and electoral system, can share
some fascist lineage and intend to tear down the current political system. By contrast, radical
right parties remain within the country’s political and electoral system and express formal
loyalty towards the democratic regime (Mudde, 2007).
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(see table A.7 of the Appendix). Table A.8 of the Appendix shows the effect
of the two measures of social decline on mainstream parties or Green parties
(=1) versus other parties (=0). While the association is insignificant between
status decline and Green support, the negative correlations of the right- and
left- wing parties mean that status anxiety decreases the probability of sup-
porting mainstream parties. This provides evidence that status anxiety is only
shared among radical right and radical left supporters. In line with Roodjuin
et al’s 2017 study, radical right and radical left supporters share discontent
and economic difficulties, which explains their disaffection from their respective
mainstream parties.
Despite similar levels of status anxiety in relation to their parents, some
socioeconomic features differentiate radical right and radical left sympathisers.
Table 2.2 confirms that radical right voters are white men with no college edu-
cation who come from lower socioeconomic positions, as with previous studies
(Lubbers et al., 2002; Werts et al., 2013; Rooduijn et al., 2017). Small busi-
ness owners and unskilled workers are more likely to vote radical right rather
than individuals in the higher-grade service class (financial managers, public
administrators). This provides confirming evidence for hypothesis 2. Radical
left supporters are also more likely to be skilled workers than higher-grade ser-
vice workers, which confirms that the young individuals who suffer from loss of
PRSSS belong to the middle class. This provides evidence for the hypothesis
37.
Table 2.2 also shows the divergent ideological attitudes of radical right
and radical left supporters. While anti-immigrant attitudes are strongly asso-
7I also find that radical left voters are also more likely to belong to the higher-grade service
class than the small business class. However, the effect is small, only significant at the 0.05
level and is insignificant in other models.
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ciated with a radical right vote, support for a more egalitarian system largely
predicts radical left support. Both effects are large and statistically significant.
Radical left support is negatively associated with anti-immigrant attitudes, as
found in previous studies (March, 2011; Rooduijn et al., 2017). However, re-
distribution preferences are also linked to radical right support, albeit at 0.05
confidence level. This can be justified on the grounds that radical right vot-
ers also share redistribution preferences since radical right parties have adopted
a protectionist economic agenda in the 2010s that is in favour of government
spending to increase social subsidies for natives (Schumacher and Kersbergen,
2014; Roth et al., 2017). These parties have attracted a larger electoral base
that is concerned about economic inequalities. The most economically insecure,
low-skilled workers are sensitive to this welfare chauvinist discourse (Bornschier
and Kriesi, 2012; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016). Other traditional radical
left and radical right attitudes are strongly correlated with support for each
respective radical party (see table A.6 in Appendix).
Table 2.3 presents the interaction terms between subjective social status
and attitudinal determinants for each party and Figure 2.4 demonstrates the in-
teraction effects. The columns 1 and 3 show the reinforcing effect of traditional
attitudes of each respective radical party family when combined with declining
social status. The probability of supporting radical right parties increases by
0.22 percentage points for individuals whose declining PRSSS is combined with
anti-immigrant attitudes in comparison to individuals with declining social sta-
tus but no anti-immigrant attitudes. The probability of supporting radical left
parties is magnified by 0.13 percentage points for individuals with a declining
PRSSS and pro-redistribution attitudes in comparison to individuals with a de-
clining social status and anti-redistribution attitudes. This supports hypotheses
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Table 2.3: Interaction Effects
Radical Right Support Radical Left Support
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Decline Compared to Parents -1.473*(0.866)
2.052
(0.591)
-3.613
(2.334)
3.092**
(0.718)
Immigration Attitudes (0=Agst) -0.272***(0.067)
-0.584***
(0.043)
-1.110***
(0.078)
0.027
(0.290)
Redistribution Preferences (0=Agst) 0.092*(0.067)
0.088*
(0.049)
-1.899**
(0.789)
0.557*
(0.320)
Social Decline ×
Immigration Attitudes
3.968***
(0.715)
-2.616***
(0.259)
Social Decline ×
Redistribution Preferences
-0.419**
(0.900)
8.154***
(0.630)
Age -0.003***(0.000)
-0.004***
(0.000)
-0.012***
(0.001)
-0.012**
(0.001)
Female -0.061*(0.043)
-0.062**
(0.043)
-0.084*
(0.064)
-0.083**
(0.064)
Class (0=Higher-Grade Service)
Lower-Grade Service -0.026(0.078)
-0.030
(0.077)
0.138
(0.096)
-0.023
(0.095)
Small Business Owners 0.062(0.083)
0.122*
(0.065)
-0.016*
(0.130)
-0.153*
(0.065)
Skilled Workers 0.188(0.073)
0.229
(0.083)
0.275***
(0.100)
0.201***
(0.060)
Unskilled Workers 0.227***(0.085)
0.246***
(0.066)
0.151
(0.113)
0.142
(0.085)
Ethnic Minority -0.417**(0.168)
-0.432***
(0.124)
0.110
(0.229)
0.099
(0.124)
Education (0=Primary)
Secondary -0.018(0.079)
-0.076
(0.059)
-0.055
(0.102)
0.021
(0.036)
Vocational 0.312**(0.112)
0.328***
(0.085)
0.054
(0.140)
0.157
(0.079)
Tertiary -0.355***(0.097)
-0.472***
(0.077)
0.044
(0.129)
0.140*
(0.076)
Constant 4.812(0.536)
-2.976***
(0.574)
1.954
(0.660)
-3.275***
(0.592)
Observations 87,670 82,210 86,500 81,613
Number of Countries 19 19 19 19
Number of Regions 226 226 226 226
Region, Year and Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contextual Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p
< .001.
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4 and 5. While both radical right and radical left supporters share discontent
and economic difficulties, as manifested by status anxiety, they still express
attitudes and sentiments that are commonly associated with their respective
mainstream parties.
It is even the case that radical right support decreases for individuals
with higher social decline who favour immigration, while individuals with higher
social decline and anti-redistribution attitudes are less inclined to support a rad-
ical left party. Placebo tests, shown in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.3 and Figure
2.5, demonstrate that status decline and traditional attitudes of the opposite
radical party are not attributable to more radical right and radical left support.
Whereas pro-redistribution attitudes and status decline have a negative effect
on radical right voting, anti-immigrant attitudes and higher PRSSS are nega-
tively associated with radical left support. As Figure 2.5 shows, the traditional
attitudinal determinants of each respective radical party decrease the overall
support for the other radical party. This corroborates previous findings that
showed voters who hold a left-wing ideology are more likely to vote for a radical
left party whereas voters with a right-wing ideology are more inclined to vote
for a radical right party (Roodjuin et al., 2017).
The explanation for such divergent ideology comes from these individ-
uals’ different socioeconomic features, as explained above, but also from their
different levels of educational attainment. In line with previous studies (Werts
et al., 2013; Roodjuin et al., 2017), my results show that radical left voters
are highly educated whereas radical right voters are more likely to have pri-
mary or vocational rather than tertiary education. This provides evidence in
support of hypotheses 2 and 3. A recent study by Cavaillé and Marshall has
for the first time shown that education causally reduces anti-immigration atti-
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Figure 2.4: Interaction Effect of Attitudinal Factors and Social Placement on
Radical Right and Radical Left Voting
tudes and contributes to cultural openness and tolerance (Cavaillé and Marshall,
2018). Highly educated individuals are also more inclined to support egalitarian
and altruistic attitudes by socialising political values of equality and democracy
among university students (Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf, 2004; Stubager,
2008; Roodjuin et al., 2017).
With regard to other socioeconomic determinants, my data show that
radical right supporters are less likely to be an ethnic minority whereas there
is no effect among radical left supporters. In line with the hypotheses, both
radical right and radical left voters tend to be men. The image of radical right
and radical left parties as more radical and extreme parties may explain the
predominantly male electoral base of the two party families, as defended in the
theory section. This argument of genderedness of political socialisation deserves
more empirical investigation in future research.
The socioeconomic and attitudinal profile of radical right supporters ex-
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Figure 2.5: Placebo Tests
plains why their subjective sense of declining status is translated into radical
right support. Their position as white working class makes them more sensitive
to the racialised discourses of radical right parties who construct this category of
‘white working class victims, losers of globalisation’ in opposition to the emerg-
ing ethnic diversity of their society. The myth of the long-lost golden age of
sovereign nation-state with cultural and racial homogeneity from past genera-
tions resonates with members of this class, making them more likely to cast a
radical right ballot as a result.
By the same token, the sociological and attitudinal portrayal of the radi-
cal left supporters explains how the subjective sense of declining status relative
to their parent is eventually expressed through a radical left vote. Highly-
educated young individuals from the middle class with egalitarian attitudes
who feel a decline in their social status are more responsive towards the radi-
cal left political rhetoric of rising social and income inequality and a shrinking
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welfare state.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper shows the importance of considering individuals’ psychological ex-
perience of declining social status compared with their parents as a common
feature among the radical right and radical left. The investigation of status
anxiety relative to the previous generation captures more subtle differences in
the social order than social placement with no reference group. By systemati-
cally examining the effect of declining social status in 19 Western and Central
European countries, I demonstrate that lower levels of subjective social status
are associated with radical right and radical left support. I also show that
socioeconomic attributes differentiate radical right and radical left supporters.
The former are white men from the working class without education, as largely
defended in the literature. The latter are young, highly educated individuals
from the middle class. Finally, attitudinal determinants that are traditional to
each respective radical party (and its core supporters) reinforce the effect of so-
cial decline. While anti-immigrant attitudes increase the effect of status anxiety
on radical right support, status anxiety boosts radical left support when it is
combined with pro-equality attitudes.
This paper has some limitations. It would be interesting to empirically
link people’s status anxiety with the environment they live in. Although this
paper accounts for regional disparities, it does not include whether respondents
live in rural or urban areas due to data unavailability. However, a recent study
by Haerteveld et al. (2018) has shown that radical right support (less about rad-
ical left) is rooted in context-specific manifestations of social change that induces
anxiety differently between urban and rural areas. While the presence of many
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immigrants explains the radical right success in urban areas, the decline in social
and transport services and the exodus of young people are better indications
of radical right support in rural areas. This resonates with qualitative ethno-
graphic studies that show that the radical right topics in rural and middle-sized
political arenas are mainly emerging from the local mismanagement of social
and political infrastructure rather than national issues of immigration (Cramer,
2016; Hochschild, 2017; LSE report, 2018). This leads to the consideration
that further studies should look at the theoretical association between status
anxiety and feelings of neglect. There is a need to go beyond the ‘left-behind’
catch-all terminology, which is associated with a limited set of socioeconomic
contextual indicators, and to measure a broader set of objective indicators of
deprived areas.
This paper also cannot infer causal claims about whether immigration
attitudes (redistribution preferences) cause radical right (radical left) support
and vice versa. Given the observational nature of the study, with the use of
cross-sectional data, the reverse causality cannot be rejected. It is worth men-
tioning that parties can equally influence individuals’ political attitudes with
their anti-immigrant rhetoric (for radical right parties) and pro-redistribution
messages (for radical left parties). In particular, studies have shown how ethno-
nationalist frames are instrumental in influencing voters to support radical right
parties (Rydgren, 2003; Mudde, 2007; Elgenius and Rydgren, 2019). The lat-
ter frame their discourses by portraying immigrants as illegitimate competitors
over scarce resources, such as jobs and housing; by pitting the supposed costs
of immigration against welfare state benefits that could have been enjoyed by
the native citizens (i.e. welfare chauvinism); and by depicting immigration as
a threat to the ethno-national identity of the majority and as a major cause of
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criminality and other kinds of social insecurity (Rydgren, 2003). That is why,
while this paper has focused on the demand-side, supply-side factors should also
be acknowledged. This paper recognises that radical right and radical left voters
can develop their anti-immigrant attitudes and pro-redistribution preferences as
a response to the narratives of these parties that tap into these issues.
This paper has important implications for scholars, policy-makers and
pundits alike. It complements and enriches demand-side explanations behind
radical support by investigating the subjective social effect, perceived economic
and cultural threat at the regional level. Status anxiety is a powerful measure
with the potential to bridge the seemingly large differences between supporters
of radical right and radical left parties. Since some of the roots of radicalism
prove to be similar at both ends of the political spectrum, patterns to counteract
them might require similar policy and societal responses.
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3 | Local Labour Market Compe-
tition and Radical Right Vot-
ing: Evidence from France
Abstract
How do the economic threat of immigration affect radical right
support? The evidence in support of the labour market competition
theory—which posits that the economic threat posed by immigration
to jobs and wages leads to radical right voting—has been mixed. On
the one hand, individual-level surveys underreport economic drivers
because of social desirability bias. On the other hand, contextual
studies show contradictory findings due to an over-reliance on units
of analysis that are too aggregated to meaningfully capture the com-
petitive threat posed by immigrants. This paper identifies the in-
fluence of labour market competition on radical right voting at a
local level in contexts where native workers are directly affected by
the arrival of immigrants who have similar or higher skillsets. Using
an original longitudinal dataset of fine-grained municipal electoral,
demographic and economic data from France over the 2002–2017
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period, the paper provides empirical evidence of local contextual in-
fluences of economic competition between natives and immigrants
of any skillset. Under local conditions of material deprivation, mea-
sured by the local unemployment rate, the effect of labour market
competition on municipalities’ radical right vote share is amplified.
Moreover, higher radical right support is observed in municipalities
with a higher share of any one of the following groups: low-skilled na-
tives; medium-skilled immigrants; or high-skilled immigrants. This
supports the hypothesis that immigrants with higher qualifications
are compelled to accept lower-skilled jobs, and are thus perceived
as a competitive threat to low-skilled natives. By reconciling rad-
ical right contextual studies and research on the political economy
of immigration policies, this paper highlights the importance of a
local analysis in detecting the effect of labour market competition
on radical right support. This paper also explains why some local
areas are more prone to radical right support than others over time.
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3.1 Introduction
The rise of the radical right1 in Western Europe has generated a wide range of
theoretical explanations behind its electoral appeal2. These range from demand-
side theories, with the study of microlevel processes of individual and attitudi-
nal determinants (Evans, 2000; Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005; Arzheimer
and Carter, 2006; Ivarsflaten, 2008), to supply-side theories with the investiga-
tion of political opportunity structures and electoral systems (Kitschelt, 1995;
Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). Most seminal studies conclude that immigra-
tion and economic hardship are major predictors of radical right performance.
Structural changes of de-industrialisation and globalisation have weakened the
economic situation and status of low-income voters who are (or are perceived to
be) in direct competition with immigrants for jobs or wages3, and who eventually
respond to such threat by supporting the anti-immigrant and anti-globalisation
radical right parties.
While this labour market competition (LMC) theory has been commonly
reprised by scholars, journalists and policy-makers, most studies have tested
its validity at the individual- or macro- levels (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001;
Arzheimer, 2009; Golder, 2016; Pardos-Prado and Xena, 2019). On one hand, a
large group of individual-level survey studies has consistently rejected the eco-
nomic argument that native workers who share similar skills with immigrants
are more inclined to support anti-immigrant radical right parties (Hainmueller
and Hiscox, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Hainmueller et al., 2015). On
1See more on the choice of the terminology in section 2.
2While this paper recognises alternative hypotheses behind radical right support, it specif-
ically aims to revisit the labour market competition hypothesis by adopting an innovative
empirical investigation at the local level with more accurate indicators.
3Competition can also occur over public resources but this is beyond the scope of labour
competition and hence of this paper (see more in de Koster et al., 2013).
the other hand, contextual studies have found mixed evidence linking ethnic
groups’ economic competition with radical right support (Golder, 2003; Lub-
bers and Scheepers, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2005). However, both sets of studies
have significant limitations inherent to their respective observational scales: the
former are more likely to detect a cultural effect by basing their studies on
self-reported radical right respondents, whereas the latter rely on aggregated
geographical units and variables that mask the potential competition between
groups.
Little scholarly attention has been given to the impact of immigration in
the local labour markets of native residents. Yet this is the ideal scale at which
to test the LMC theory because it is the context in which residents interact
with immigrants in their day-to-day lives. Native workers are directly exposed
to and affected by labour market changes in their immediate surroundings. The
presence of immigrants is likely to increase local job competition and suppress
local wages for similar skill groups in some areas to an extent that is somewhat
masked in aggregate indicators.
Following this hypothesis, this paper aims to investigate the effects of
labour market competition on radical right voting from a local contextual per-
spective. Does local exposure to immigration affect natives’ radical right voting
differently, depending on the level and type of labour market competition?
To answer this question, I use a unique panel dataset which accounts
for the French census data to test the impact that the skill composition of the
French-born versus the foreign-born population has on the French vote share of
Front National (FN), France’s main radical right party, in four presidential elec-
tions (2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017) by municipality. I examine intra-municipality
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variation in the skills-based composition of immigrants and natives while con-
trolling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity4.
I find consistent results that confirm the presence of labour market com-
petition at a local level. This effect is strong and positive for any type of
competition, whether it is between natives and immigrants of low-, medium- or
high-skill levels. The effect of labour-market competition on the vote share of
the radical right is amplified in more economically deprived areas. I also show
that the composition of immigrants and natives in municipalities can explain
local variations in radical right support over time. Municipalities with a higher
share of low-skilled natives or of medium-skilled or high-skilled immigrants, are
more likely to register a higher radical right vote share because these immigrants
are compelled to take up low-skilled natives’ jobs.
The contribution is five-fold. Firstly, this paper adopts a close inves-
tigation of contextual factors at the lowest administrative level available, the
municipalities. Such a fine-grained level of analysis allows the evaluation of local
contextual effects that directly affect voters, avoiding the need to infer local ef-
fects from national or sub-regional aggregated levels and thus minimising issues
of ecological fallacy.
Secondly, this paper extends the analysis of contextual effects on rad-
ical right voting by operationalising economic circumstances with indicators
other than unemployment rate and immigrant population size. Most of the
macro-economic aggregate indicators mask considerable variation in the types
of immigration and therefore do not adequately capture labour market compe-
4Although alternative theories of radical right voting can be specifically attributed to the
French case, such as local supply factors to explain the different radical right support between
the North and the Southeast part of the country, this paper rather focuses on the intra-
municipal factors (and not inter-municipal factors) with regards to the ethnic composition
behind radical right vote share over time in light of testing the LMC theory.
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tition. The local unemployment rate or size of the immigrant population may
be irrelevant for natives working in occupations facing little competition from
immigrant workers. Despite the large concentration of immigrants, certain areas
might register a low radical right vote share because most natives are not in di-
rect economic competition with immigrants. Moreover, most labour economics
studies use proxy variables like education that cannot directly assess the labour
market dynamics. Although education is surely associated with people’s skill
level, it is also correlated with cultural tolerance and cosmopolitan attitudes
(Nie et al., 1996; Chandler and Tsai, 2001). Cultural intolerance may not di-
rectly come from the labour market competition between workers of similar skill
level but rather from the fact that lower-educated individuals are on average
more culturally intolerant of foreigners than highly-educated individuals. By
focusing on the economic activity and job security of immigrants and natives,
this study contributes to the missing link between immigration and economic
conditions in studies of radical right voting.
Thirdly, this paper brings evidence that actual economic threat related
to job competition impacts radical right voting. Through isolating the eco-
nomic threat according to the skill levels of natives and immigrants, I control
for the cultural predispositions of immigrants using education and job activity.
Without denying that cultural factors may affect the relationship between im-
migration and electoral preferences, the economic threat I find on radical right
voting stress the need for scholars and policy-makers to be less quick to dismiss
economic considerations.
Fourthly, this paper provides an explanation for the socio-economic diver-
sity of the radical right’s voting base, which typically includes both blue-collar
workers and the middle class. Yet the existing literature contains few thorough
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explanations of why this may be the case. By highlighting that local labour
market competition occurs between immigrants and natives of similar skillsets,
I identify one such explanation.
Finally, this paper sheds light on how and why the radical right’s ap-
peal in national elections varies considerably within municipalities over time.
This fine-grained longitudinal analysis of the skills-based composition of immi-
grants and natives from 2002 to 2017 shows that municipalities with a higher
concentration of medium- or high-skilled immigrants are more likely to regis-
ter higher radical right share. This complements previous research studies that
mostly focused on the composition of the native population, unemployment or
immigration while neglecting the specific skillset of immigrants.
This paper is organised as follows. I first briefly introduce the radical
right party family, and place the present study in the context of recent trends
in the evolution of its electoral platforms and voting base. I then provide an
overview of the labour market competition thesis, summarise the extant litera-
ture on contextual features and radical right voting, and outline my hypotheses.
I then lay out my data, research design, results and robustness checks. The final
section of the paper discusses the limitations and potential implications of my
findings.
3.2 The Radical Right
Within the wealth of scholarly research on the radical right in Europe, multiple
labels have been advanced to define this party family. They range from ‘extreme
right’ (Ignazi, 2003), ‘far-right’ (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016), ‘populist
radical right’ (Mudde, 2007) and ‘radical right’ (Norris, 2005). What unites
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such parties is their nativist policy agenda, which is expressed by a strong anti-
immigrant and nationalist stance (Mudde, 2007; Halikiopoulou et al., 2012).
The Front National (aka the National Front; hereafter FN) in France—whose
support base is the subject of this article—is prototypical in this regard. This
party counts as ‘radical’ in virtue of its opposition to key features of liberal
democracy: it advances an idealised ethnically and culturally homogenous na-
tion at the expense of individual rights and equality. It is however not ‘extreme’
because it does not share any lineage with the fascist parties (Norris, 2005).
More recently, radical right parties have combined their traditional na-
tivism with an interventionist economic agenda (Roth et al., 2017). Despite
initially supporting economic liberalism and espousing deregulatory beliefs in
the 1980s and 1990s (Kitschelt, 1995), over the last decade these parties have
gradually adopted a domestic economic agenda focused on government spending
to expand public services for natives (Schumacher and Kersbergen, 2014) and
have incorporated protectionist economic positions in their platforms (Roth et
al., 2017). Moreover, most radical right parties have actively scapegoated im-
migrants as responsible for taking natives’ jobs and suppressing natives’ wages.
By aligning their economic positions with a nativist viewpoint, radical
right parties have expanded their voting base into new socioeconomic demo-
graphics, in particular attracting economically left-leaning supporters (Kitschelt,
1995; Roth et al., 2017). In the 1980s, it was the anti-state petite bourgeoisie
that constituted the main electoral base of radical right parties (Norris, 2005).
But with the recent tacking onto the economic left, they have gained support
among the most economically insecure individuals (Arzheimer, 2009). Low-
skilled workers and those who are most vulnerable to the rise of unemployment
are more sensitive to the radical right’s ethno-nationalist and anti-immigrant
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rhetoric. Interestingly, the radical right’s electoral base also includes middle-
class groups: those who are not in the lowest income stratum but rather a
few rungs up (Bornschier and Kriesi, 2012; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016).
One explanation for support among such groups is that they perceive a decline
in their socio-economic position relative to that in the past and/or relative to
other groups (e.g. immigrants) (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Gest et al., 2018). This
article highlights an additional explanation for radical right support among
socio-economically diverse groups of voters: local labour market competition
between natives and immigrants.
3.3 Local Labour Market Competition and Rad-
ical Right Voting
The LMC theory has been one of the most common explanations for the emer-
gence and sustained success of the radical right. It posits an interest-based
form of threat to ‘native’ residents from the arrival of immigrants, which is
characterised by the fear of losing jobs and wages (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001;
Pardos-Prado, 2011; Pardos-Prado and Xena, 2019). Echoing social psychol-
ogy’s ‘group conflict theory’ (Blumer, 1958; Tajfel and Turner, 1979), the LMC
theory holds that the economic competition between natives and foreign-born
workers of similar skills pushes the former to cast a radical-right ballot. It thus
implicitly assumes an in-group bias in which natives will always prefer giving a
job to natives rather than to immigrants5. Some variants of the LMC theory
have been developed with an identity-based form of ethnic threat rooted in the
fear of losing cultural resources (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Sniderman et
5Although one may find examples in which natives may not necessarily have an in-group
preference, these examples cannot be shown using the methodology of the present study. This
paper therefore relies on the in-group bias assumption at the core of the LMC hypothesis.
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al., 2004; Inglehart and Norris, 2016) and more recently with a status-based
form of threat that arises from the loss of subjective status following economic
and cultural change (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Gest et al., 2018).
Yet, while the LMC has been extensively discussed, the economic deter-
minants of ethnic competition have been supported by weak empirical evidence.
The individual-level studies have concluded that the cultural form of ethnic
threat has more explanatory power (Hainmueller et al., 2014) whereas macro-
contextual studies have yielded inconclusive findings (Golder, 2016). This paper
argues that these results stem from an over-emphasis on individual and macro-
level studies that cannot account for labour competition, which plays out at the
local level.
On the one hand, individual-level survey data fail to adequately capture
natives’ actual labour market exposure to immigrants. Survey studies base their
results on a selected sample of radical right voters who are more likely to rep-
resent the most radicalised voters because they have to self-identify as radical
right sympathisers. Oesch finds that only 11.4 per cent of the respondents to
the 2002/2003 wave of the European Social Survey acknowledged having voted
for the Front National while the party registered 16.9 per cent of valid votes in
the first round of the 2002 presidential election (Oesch, 2008). Oesch demon-
strates that self-identified radical right supporters tend to hold the strongest
xenophobic sentiments and to disregard economic considerations. Although
this ‘social desirability bias’ is less important nowadays given the success, and
hence mainstreaming, of radical right parties and the use of online surveys, it
was a significant phenomenon during the earlier part of the period covered by
the present study (2002–2017), and thus remains a relevant point of comparison.
In addition, the absence of attention to the local factors in which electoral deci-
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sions are made, e.g. satisfaction with the local environment and public services,
can also result in biased estimates in individual-level analyses.
On the other hand, macrolevel studies, because of their aggregated level
of analysis, cannot meaningfully depict local lived experiences of competition
between natives and immigrants. Not only do they include large geographical
units like national, regional or district levels which mask local dynamics (Je-
suit et al., 2009; Golder, 2016), but they also mostly focus on two large-scale
macro indicators, immigration and unemployment, which fail to produce con-
sistent findings. Journalistic discourses and conventional wisdom would assume
that areas with a large concentration of immigrants and high unemployment
rate are traditional radical right strongholds. Yet, while the effect of immigra-
tion seems unequivocal (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002; Golder, 2003;
Arzheimer and Carter, 2006), findings on the effects of unemployment and its
interaction with immigration are mixed. While Golder (2003) shows that high
levels of immigration and unemployment lead to larger radical right vote share,
Arzheimer (2009) finds that the effects do not reinforce each other and Lubbers
et al. (2002) report no significant effect of unemployment.
Instead, this paper draws on theory that highlights the importance of
lived experiences between immigrants and natives in a local environment. Any
actual direct economic threat is most likely to be experienced by natives in their
municipality. Immigration at a national level is unlikely to have substantially
affected the wage or job prospects of the average native-born worker. However,
if immigrants are concentrated in small spatial units, then native-born workers
in those geographic areas with similar skills to foreign-born workers might be
affected by their arrival. Local immigration increases the supply of labour com-
peting for local jobs and may therefore increase local labour market pressure
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(Card, 2001). Small labour markets influence the relationship between local
wages and employment. Since individuals are more likely to vote according
to the changing socio-economic structure in their immediate environment, it is
necessary to investigate panel data at a low level of analysis.
Also, the economic impact of immigration on radical right voting should
be tested while differentiating between, on the one hand, native workers and
their skill levels and, on the other hand, immigrant workers and their skill levels
(Dancygier and Donnelly, 2013). Few studies demarcate the share of immigrant
workers relative to native workers for each sector. Yet, occupation-specific em-
ployment statistics are averages which often mask considerable variations across
occupation-types with respect to the relative share of natives and immigrants.
For instance, there is a gap between the foreign-born unemployment rate and
the native one in Europe (INSEE). Similarly, very few studies specify that ac-
tual economic competition affects individuals differently according to their skill
level. Some rare exceptions have shown material self-interest behind radical
right voting, but this has been limited to the national aggregates (Scheve and
Slaughter, 2001) and industry sectors (Dancygier and Donnelly, 2013); none of
these have looked at the local level.
Malhotra et al. (2013) find that labour-market concerns only drive anti-
immigration voting behaviour when actual economic competition between na-
tives and immigrants is present. Immigration is expected to have very differ-
ent impacts on natives’ risk exposure on the labour market depending on how
immigrants affect competition within their occupational category. Thus, differ-
entiating the native-born and foreign-born populations according to their skill
level is useful to test more accurately the economic competition between the
in-group and out-group, in line with the LMC theory. This leads me to develop
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two primary hypotheses.
The first hypothesis focuses on low-skilled natives. The economic threat
of immigration on radical right voting is likely to vary according to how secure
native workers feel in their jobs, and it is workers in the lowest-skilled, most
routine jobs that are least secure. Their employers can more easily replace
them, and they also tend to have lower income-earning potential. Studies on
labour market outcomes in western democracies have detected negative effects
of immigration inflows on local wages only among low-skilled workers (Card,
2001). That is why I expect municipalities with a higher share of low-skilled
natives to exhibit higher radical right support, all else equal.
However, it does not necessarily follow that a larger concentration of
low-skilled immigrants would increase a municipality’s radical right share. The
economic threat of immigration on radical right voting is also likely to vary
according to immigrants’ labour market access. Indeed, due to language bar-
riers, lack of connections, and qualifications that are insufficiently specific to
the host country market (INSEE, 2009), immigrants are more likely than other
sociodemographic groups to have higher qualifications than those required by
their jobs (Quintini, 2011) and thus tend to compete with lower-skilled natives.
For instance, countries tend to have distinctive legal traditions and restrictive
regulations on who can practice law, which pose barriers to the entry of immi-
grant lawyers into a host country’s market for legal services. I therefore expect
that areas with a large share of medium- or high-skilled immigrants will be more
likely to threaten low-skilled natives’ jobs.
Accordingly, my first hypothesis is as follows:
Labour Market Access Hypothesis: Municipalities with a higher
share of any of the following three groups are more likely to register
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higher radical right vote shares: low-skilled natives; medium-skilled im-
migrants; or high-skilled immigrants.
My second hypothesis focuses on similarities among the skill levels of
natives and immigrants.
Local Labour Market Competition Hypothesis: Municipalities
with larger shares of natives and immigrants of similar skills are more
likely to register higher radical right vote shares.
My third hypothesis considers the contextual effect of economic depriva-
tion. The positive effects of immigration on radical right voting are expected
to be compounded when economic resources are scarcer. Halla et al. (2017)
have found that labour market competition intensifies when unemployment is
high. Poorer economic circumstances are likely to increase job competition and
scapegoating of immigrant populations by natives, as suggested by the ethnic
competition thesis. Higher unemployment also heightens the risk of unemploy-
ment to those workers on temporary contracts as their perceptions of insecurity
increases when market conditions deteriorate (de Witte, 1999; Halikiopoulou
and Vlandas, 2016). As a result, I expect that a combination of a larger con-
centration of immigrants (no matter their skill level) with higher background
unemployment is likely to increase radical right voting. Accordingly, my third
hypothesis is:
Contextual Hypothesis: Municipalities with larger shares of immi-
grants and higher levels of economic deprivation, i.e. more unemploy-
ment, are more likely to register higher radical right vote shares.
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3.4 Data and Research Design
The main novel contribution of this paper is to combine municipality-level radi-
cal right vote share with information about skill levels and influx of migrants in
France over a fifteen-year period (2002-2017). This analysis differs from past re-
search by (1) focusing on the actual economic threat by differentiating between
the various types of occupational activities of immigrants6, (2) applying a skill
level classification based on job security and ease of labour market entry, and
(3) examining the interaction between workers of similar skill level to directly
assess local labour-market competition when such threats exist.
Case Study
Including local observations for a closer examination from a single country helps
to avoid ideological and programmatic idiosyncrasies between radical-right wing
parties in different countries and keep institutional factors constant (Kestilä
and Söderlund, 2007). Contradictory contextual determinants of labour market
competition also result from the local idiosyncrasies of cross-national studies
which ignore the national institutional arrangements and the history of each
radical right party (Mudde, 2007).
The choice of France is justified by its obvious pragmatic reasons of
data availability, but there are also more substantive considerations. As the
third political force in France, the Front National (FN) is a thriving party that
has proven to be successful in national, regional and departmental elections
since 2002. Its leader, Marine Le Pen, has managed to garner more electoral
support in the past five years by softening the openly racist discourse of her
6In light of testing the LMC theory, this paper aims to capture the effect of actual economic
competition without discounting the importance of perceived economic threat behind radical
right support. See Stockemer, 2015, for more information on this debate.
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father (Evans and Ivaldi, 2013). Despite having retained most of its core au-
thoritarian, nativist, protectionist and anti-immigrant policies (Stockemer and
Barisione, 2017), the recent FN and Marine Le Pen’s ‘de-demonisation’ strategy
has contributed to FN’s unprecedented electoral gains. Not only has the FN
increased its vote share from 11.2 per cent to 19.1 per cent in the first round
of the presidential elections from 2007 to 2012 but it came second in the 2017
presidential race (second round) with 21.7 per cent.
The FN is thus an emblematic successful radical right party that benefits
from a long-lasting and growing success. It has been the prototypical party
commonly used by researchers to explain theoretical patterns of the emergence
and sustained electoral support of radical right parties (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt,
1995; Mudde, 2007). Although radical right parties differ in terms of their
precise ideologies, they pertain to the same party family (Arzheimer and Carter,
2006). In spite of their inconsistent findings, all cross-national studies have
included the FN as part of the West European radical right party family, along
with parties from the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and, to a lesser extent,
the United Kingdom (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2002, 2005; Arzheimer, 2009;
Golder, 2003). The FN traditionally embodies a successful radical right party
among this party family. One instance of its wider implications for the West
European radical right party family was its ideological refinement of combining
ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-political establishment populism in 1984,
which was later reprised by the majority of West European radical right parties
(Rydgren, 2005). The findings of this study of the FN may therefore have
important implications for understanding the local electoral success of other
radical right parties in Western Europe.
Moreover, the case of France is particularly relevant to test the local LMC
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theory. Firstly, the recent large immigration influx in France allows us to test
the effect of recent immigration on radical right electoral support. Immigrants
represented 8.9 per cent of the French population at the beginning of 2013 com-
pared with 7.3 per cent in 2000 (INSEE, 2016b). This recent surge explains why
the radical right party has centered its narrative on immigration. As the ar-
rival of distinct ethnic populations with varying skill levels has skyrocketed, the
potential for political protest against ethnically distinct newcomers to translate
into radical right support becomes more likely (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004).
The focus on the economic occupations of the immigrant population has been
endorsed by Le Pen’s rhetoric since the early years of the party. Jean-Marie
Le Pen’s xenophobic resentment was initially expressed in economic terms in
1972 when he stated “two million immigrants equals two million unemployed
people”. Despite a recent ideological focus on the religious attributes of the re-
cent non-European immigrants, the socio-economic features of the foreign-born
population constitute a major issue dimension among FN voters (Evans and
Ivaldi, 2013).
Not only has immigration increased in recent years but there has been a
rise in qualification levels of immigrants since 2008. 63 per cent of the immi-
grants who arrived in 2012 had at least a high school diploma (INSEE, 2017a).
As of 2015, 10.4 per cent of immigrants were manual labourers and 11.4 per cent
were unemployed, but 14.6 per cent were public servants, private administrative
employees, commerce employees, and people working in the personal services
sector or CEOs (INSEE, 2016b). France has recently witnessed a rise of foreign
workers in IT services, especially from the Northern African and former French
colonies. This influx was facilitated by France’s immigration and integration law
in 2007, which encouraged high-skilled migration in fields experiencing profes-
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sional shortages, like the IT sector. The work permit Passeport Talent, created
in 2016, has also facilitated the arrival of entrepreneurs, engineers and man-
agers by extending the duration of residence to four years for ten categories of
high-skilled immigrants. In addition, recent immigration has included highly
qualified Spaniards and Italian workers who fled their home country after the
economic crisis (INSEE, 2016b). This case study therefore enables us to test
the LMC theory for all skill levels.
Labour market competition is expected to be particularly acute in France
since most immigrants take jobs in regulated sectors. As over 20 per cent of im-
migrants in the labour force are blue-collar workers or lower grade white collar
workers (INSEE, 2017a), their presence is more likely to increase unemploy-
ment because wages in these sectors cannot be suppressed below the regulated
minimum. If they were more numerous in the unregulated sector, like in the
United Kingdom, the effect would have been directly felt on wages as no mini-
mum wage is applied. Manual labourers also tend to face more job insecurity in
France than in any other European countries as around one third of them hold
a temporary contract, whereas permanent contracts are predominantly awarded
in medium-and highly-skilled jobs (INSEE, 2017a). These factors contribute to
unemployment risk among low-skilled natives during immigration inflows.
It is also relevant to use the French example because the FN puts the
economic consequences of immigration at the forefront of its agenda. The party
has regularly addressed anti-immigrant positions from an economic perspective
as well as from a cultural one. Since 2012, under the leadership of Marine
Le Pen, the FN has departed from its previously rightist economic platform
of small government and tax cuts, and has endorsed an economic protectionist
agenda that prioritises government spending for natives (Stockemer and Bari-
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sione, 2017). Marine Le Pen has explicitly blamed immigrants for taking over
natives’ jobs and suppressing natives’ wages.
France is also a very practical case study to test the economic competition
at a local level given the availability of data at a very granular scale. Not only
does this allow this study to have dramatically more observations than any other
studies for a long period of radical right electoral success (N = 117,872), but it
increases the theoretical relevance of the findings, since municipalities are very
small geographic areas that are directly relatable to inhabitants. There is an
average of 1,200 inhabitants for each municipality. This means that, if a certain
municipality is characterised as having a large share of high-skilled immigrants,
one can safely assume that most residents of this municipality will live close to
high-skilled immigrants. Of course, it is worth acknowledging that there is still
some risk of ecological fallacies despite the fine-grained analysis. I cannot draw
conclusions about individual-level behaviour from this subnational study.
Lastly, economic competition is intensified in France because residential
mobility is low. Indeed, the relevance of the local context depends on indi-
viduals’ low mobility. If individuals are very mobile and easily move between
municipalities, then economic competition will be attenuated. In the 2006-
2013 period, the share of households that moved residence decreased by seven
percentage points from 17.8 per cent to 10.8 per cent (INSEE, 2017b). This
general mobility decline is similar among all types of housing status (landlords
and tenants)7.
7One might assume that the level of mobility might vary across skill levels: low skilled
workers are less likely to travel for employment than those with higher skills because of
high moving costs (Amior, 2015). While acknowledging this fact, I examine whether the
competition between immigrants and natives happens more frequently for certain skills than
for others. Rather, I test the effect of competition between workers of similar skills on radical
right support when the competition happens.
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Data
The hypotheses are tested with the statistical model in equation (1).
γit = αit + β1X1it + β2X2it + β3X1itX2it +  (3.1)
The dependent variable γ is the vote share of the FN of votes cast in the
first round per municipalityi in the presidential electionst of 2002, 2007, 2012
and 2017. The data is drawn from the French Ministry of Interior. In the first
round of France’s presidential elections8, tactical voting is less prevalent than in
the second round (where many vote for the lesser of two evils). The model which
includes the registered FN vote share along with all blank and invalid votes for
each municipality presents similar findings (see in the robustness checks sec-
tion). I only account for the presidential electoral results because they exclude
the vote share of the immigrant population, which would have biased the esti-
mates (immigrants can only vote in local or European elections). Presidential
elections are also more appropriate than parliamentary elections to conduct a
fine-grained analysis of local contextual factors because data on the latter are
only available at the voting district level, which is an aggregated measure of
combined municipalities (there are only 577 voting districts by comparison to
35,287 municipalities). In addition, detailed demographic data of the compo-
sition of immigrants and natives according to their skill level is only available
at the municipal level. Four presidential elections are included to control for
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. α is the constant term.
The municipal scale of analysis is the finest aggregation level available,
and enables a precise accounting of local contextual effects on electoral out-
8French presidential elections are based on the two-round system where voters cast a single
vote for their preferred candidate in the first round and the two best candidates compete in
the second round if no single candidate receives the absolute majority in the first round.
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comes. Municipal characteristics are taken from population census data (IN-
SEE). They include the whole French population and minimise measurement
issues. There were 35,287 municipalities (called communes) in mainland France
in 2017. Since the municipalities are registered for four consecutive presidential
elections, the number of observations amounts to 117,872 with 29,709 munici-
palities9. Because of their size, big cities like Paris, Lyon, Marseille and Lille will
be defined according to their arrondissements (neighbourhoods). The number
of inhabitants per municipality (including neighbourhoods) varies from 200 to
22,000 with a mean of 8,100. The contextual characteristics correspond to the
2007 Census for the 2002 and 2007 elections, and to the 2014 Census for the
2012 and 2017 elections. The electoral results are between zero and five years
from a census (for the 2002 presidential elections). Year and municipal fixed
effects are included to control for the over-time changes and between-municipal
variation10. They enable identification of within-municipality changes in the
composition of immigrants and natives over time.
X1it measures the varying job qualifications of immigrants per municipalityi
in presidential elections t. I sort the socio-economic situation of immigrants from
the national skill and job cell approach available in the French National Statis-
tics to measure the distribution of labour market status. I classify job occu-
pations of immigrants according to their economic status, hierarchical position
and job security. It includes continuous variables of (i)the low-skilled position,
manual labourers, domestic helpers, plumber heating contractors, and routine
9The number of municipalities who remain the same over time accounts to 29,709, which
represents 15.8 per cent of missing values. It originates from the merging of towns and cities
over time.
10Using municipal fixed effects enables me to hold constant the average effect of the local
municipality-level variables so that none of these variables can affect my analysis. A robustness
check that includes local control variables confirms that these additional variables do not
change my results (Table 3.3).
103
non-manual employees such as account clerks, sales workers and personal assis-
tants with the lowest pay and status and weakest employment protection, (ii)
the medium-skilled position, the white-collar workers like clerical, administrative
and management workers with higher work security, income and prestige, (iii)
the high-skilled position, composed of managers, administrators, supervisors and
professionals with higher educational attainment, career security, salaries and
status who are more likely to have permanent and ‘protective’ contracts than
any other labour position and (iv) the unemployed. The detailed classification
of occupations according to skill levels are set out in Table B.2 of the second
Appendix.
The status of immigrants includes those who are born a foreigner and
abroad but reside in France. Those who were born abroad but who are of French
nationality and live in France are not counted. Those counted as immigrants
will remain immigrants despite acquiring French nationality unlike the category
of foreigners registered in the census data. It is the country of birth and not
nationality at birth that is registered. This allows me to include individuals
that eventually obtained the French nationality according to the “right of soil”
after fifteen years of permanent residence, unlike foreigners. It also enables me
to avoid any compositional effects by excluding the immigrants with French
nationality who can vote. However, it does not capture the second or third
generation of immigrants that are born in France but can be perceived a threat
by the native population and targeted by radical right parties in their anti-
immigrant narrative.
The local sectoral composition of occupational activities is drawn from
the French National Statistics. The low-skilled immigrant rate is calculated as
the share of low-skilled immigrants aged 18-64 relative to the immigrant labour
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force in each municipality. In the same vein, the medium-skilled, high-skilled
and unemployed immigrant rates are obtained from the share of immigrants
aged 18-64 in the immigrant labour force.
X2it represents the shares of the occupational activities of natives per
municipalityi for each presidential electiont. These demographic control vari-
ables are classified similarly for immigrants along low-skilled, middle-skilled,
high-skilled and unemployed status.
Empirical studies of immigration have obvious endogeneity concerns given
that immigrants themselves choose where to live. Voters who feel uncomfort-
able with the social and political atmosphere in their neighbourhood may also
choose to move elsewhere, to more politically like-minded surroundings. White
progressive residents might have chosen an ethnically dense residential location
whereas white conservative individuals might have decided to move to more
homogenous places to live. But few recent studies attempt to account for ge-
ographical sorting through an instrumental approach of immigrant historical
settlement patterns (Halla et al., 2017), or share of housing stock (Harmon,
2017). The choice of instruments remains questionable since they are likely to
violate the exclusion restriction by affecting the outcome variable.
Also, the origin of the ethnic composition of immigrants is known to
affect radical right voting differently. The recent wave from the Middle East
and North Africa by a large new Muslim population has been perceived as
threatening the lifestyle and culture of the in-group. Most leaders of far-right
parties have adopted anti-immigrant political strategies that specifically target
Muslims. 30 per cent of the foreign-born population is from Maghreb (INSEE,
2016b). Savelkoul et al. (2017) identify that not only is ethnic minority den-
sity positively associated with the likelihood to vote for the Party of Freedom
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in the Netherlands but the relationship is also even more significant towards
non-Western migrants who do not mingle with their ethnic neighbours. While
recognising the significance of the origin of the ethnic composition in determin-
ing far-right voting, this study cannot include this ethnic composition variable
due to a lack of data availability at a local level. A French law passed in 1978 has
prevented individuals from being counted by race or ethnicity on the grounds
that it is contrary to the Republican principle of equality.
X1itX2it represents the interaction terms between the different skill levels
of natives and immigrants per municipalityt. They first help to evaluate the di-
rect competition of natives and immigrants of similar skill level (low/medium/high)
under varying levels of local labour market conditions. They then measure the
conditional effect of unemployment and the different occupational categories of
immigrants on FN vote share. This helps to test the contextual hypothesis that
immigrant populations (no matter their skillset) are likely to boost radical right
support when unemployment is high.  is the error term.
3.5 Results and Discussion
Local Labour Market Competition and Radical Right
Voting
I first investigate the Market Access Hypothesis in Table 3.1 which presents the
linear fixed effect regression of the effects of labour market competition between
natives and immigrants according to their skill levels on the FN vote share in the
2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017 presidential elections. The first model shows that the
different local employment compositional factors are able to explain why certain
municipalities have a higher share of radical right votes than others over time.
Having a higher share of any of the following groups boosts the radical right
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Table 3.1: Local Labour Market Competition and Radical Right Voting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Immigrants’ Skill Levels
Low-Skilled 0.011(0.025)
-0.195***
(0.057)
0.011
(0.025)
0.016
(0.025)
0.005
(0.025)
Medium-Skilled 0.073**(0.033)
0.076**
(0.033)
-0.035
(0.064)
0.064*
(0.033)
0.077**
(0.033)
High-Skilled 0.086**0.036
0.084**
(0.037)
0.088**
(0.036)
-0.521***
(0.059)
0.074**
(0.036)
Unemployed -0.493***(0.126)
-0.493***
(0.126)
-0.458***
(0.126)
-0.440***
(0.118)
-1.306***
(0.461)
Natives’ Skill Levels
Low-Skilled 0.019***(0.005)
0.013***
(0.005)
0.019***
(0.005)
0.018***
(0.005)
0.019***
(0.005)
Medium-Skilled -0.014**(0.006)
-0.014**
(0.006)
-0.017***
(0.006)
-0.014***
(0.006)
-0.014***
(0.006)
High-Skilled 0.085***(0.036)
0.085***
(0.037)
0.086***
(0.036)
0.063***
(0.059)
0.084***
(0.036)
Unemployed -0.086***(0.023)
-0.086***
(0.023)
-0.086***
(0.023)
-0.086**
(0.023)
-0.151***
(0.027)
Low-Skilled Immigrants ×
Low-Skilled Natives
0.010***
(0.002)
Medium-Skilled Immigrants ×
Medium-Skilled Natives
0.011*
(0.006)
High-Skilled Immigrants ×
High-Skilled Natives
0.066***
(0.004)
Unemployed Immigrants ×
Unemployed Natives
0.291***
(0.085)
Constant 16.382***(0.183)
16.503***
(0.186)
16.399***
(0.183)
16.583***
(0.184)
16.580***
(0.193)
Within R-sq 0.670 0.670 0.670 0.671 0.670
Between R-sq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overall R-sq 0.343 0.344 0.343 0.341 0.342
Municipal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 117,872 117,872 117,872 117,872 117,872
Number of Municipalities 29,709 29,709 29,709 29,709 29,709
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
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support in a municipality: low-skilled natives; medium-skilled immigrants; or
high-skilled immigrants. A one percent increase of medium-skilled immigrants
in a municipality leads to an increase of 0.073 percentage points of the mu-
nicipality’s radical right vote share, and a one percent increase of high-skilled
immigrants leads to an increase of 0.086 percentage points of the municipality’s
radical right vote share. In addition, the effect of low-skilled immigrants is in-
significant while the presence of unemployed immigrants strongly decreases the
radical right vote in a municipality.
These findings corroborate the Market Access Hypothesis that medium-
or high-skilled immigrants, and not low-skilled or unemployed immigrants, rep-
resent a direct economic threat to low-skilled natives. One telling illustration
is the comparison between Neuwiller and Villing. These two rural municipal-
ities of less than 1000 inhabitants are from neighbouring departments in the
north-east of France, and both register a majority of low-skilled natives. They
both share low unemployment rates and a high immigrant stock (immigrants
comprise above 30 per cent of the local population in each municipality). Yet in
Villing FN registered a 40 per cent share of the vote share in the first round of
the 2017 election, by comparison to a 16.1 per cent share for the FN in Neuwiller.
The skill levels of the immigrant labour force provide a valid justification for
different radical right electoral results. While medium- and high-skilled work-
ers together comprise 40 per cent of the immigrant labour force in Villing, they
comprise only 4 per cent of the immigrant labour force in Neuwiller. This shows
that it is not immigration per se but rather the immigrants’ position within the
labour market that affects the radical right’s electoral support in an area. Unlike
previous contextual literature which used the macro indicator of immigration
(Lubbers et al. 2002; Golder, 2003), my model provides a more detailed un-
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derstanding of the types of immigration that drive radical right support at the
municipal level over time.
Model 1 also confirms the diverse socio-economic backgrounds of radical
right voters. Larger concentrations of low-skilled and high-skilled natives lead
to an increase in radical right vote share within municipalities. Areas with
a one percent increase of low-skilled natives register a 0.019 percentage points
increase of their radical right vote share whereas the increase is 0.085 percentage
points with a one percent increase of high-skilled natives. This finding is in
line with individual-level survey studies that show similar ethnic threats among
low- and high-skilled natives (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Malhotra et al.,
2013). Outer suburbs, where blue-collar and low to medium service workers
are concentrated, are FN bastions. For example, in the first round of the 2017
election FN received 31.85 per cent of the vote in Meaux and 24.7 per cent in
Melun. Surprisingly, Model 1 also shows that a larger concentration of medium-
skilled immigrants decreases the FN vote share. However, this finding is only
tentative since it has not been supported by all models (see robustness check
section)11. Areas with more unemployed natives are also likely to register a lower
FN vote share. This is in line with recent studies that show stronger radical
right support among people a few rungs from the bottom of the occupational
hierarchy who perceive a threat to their position (Bornshier and Kriesi, 2012).
Because the unemployed natives have no job to defend, they are less likely to
perceive immigrants as a threat.
Models 2, 3 and 4 of Table 3.1 test my second hypothesis. They look at
the interaction effects of economic competition between immigrants and natives
11One may argue that medium-skilled workers have less direct competition with immigrants
because their jobs mostly involve service-based occupations which are more difficult for im-
migrants to obtain because they will need to speak and understand the language of the host
country.
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Figure 3.1: Marginal Effects of Local Labour Market Competition for each Skill
Level on Radical Right Voting
for low-, medium- and high-skilled workers on radical right voting. The signif-
icant and positive interaction terms for each skill level suggest that local eco-
nomic competition between natives and immigrants of similar skills compounds
the positive effects on radical right support within municipalities12. This cor-
roborates the local LMC hypothesis. Figure 3.1 shows the interaction effects
of local labour competition between natives and immigrants for each skill level.
It evinces the positive marginal effects of immigrants on municipalities’ radical
right support as the share of the native population with a similar skill level
to immigrants increases. There is a positive effect for all skill levels, but it is
12Although the interaction term is not significant for the medium-skilled workers, the figure
still shows a positive conditional effect, which corroborates my hypothesis for this skill level
too.
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particularly strong among high-skilled workers13. Brousse is an example of a
municipality in which a large concentration of native and immigrant workers
with similar skill levels (61.2 per cent of the total local labour force in 2017) is
associated with higher support for the radical right: in the first round of the
2017 election, FN came first, receiving 27.7 per cent of the vote.
Local Labour Market Competition, Economic Deprivation
and Radical Right Voting
Table 3.2 examines the third hypothesis concerning the intervening effects of
scarcer economic resources on municipalities’ FN vote share as the population
of immigrants increases (for each respective skill level). The effect is strong and
significant no matter the immigrants’ skill level. Not only does it corroborate the
contextual hypothesis but the finding is also in line with the current literature
that demonstrates the additive effect of unemployment on radical right support
(Golder, 2003; Malhotra et al., 2013; Halla et al., 2017). Figure 3.2 shows
the impact of different shares of low-, medium- and high-skilled immigrants on
radical right voting as economic deprivation increases. This finding is in line
with the contextual hypothesis because it shows a strong and positive trend of
immigrant influx (for each skill level) on radical right voting, conditional on the
shares of unemployment increasing. Areas with scarcer economic resources have
more local labour market competition for all skill levels of immigrants14.
13Interestingly, the effect is strongest among high-skilled workers. This result is unpredicted
by the theories I have considered. If similar research bears out this effect, these theories will
need to be supplemented with additional explanation.
14Even areas with more unemployed immigrants are likely to register increased radical right
support in the presence of higher overall local unemployment because the latter captures the
local workforce as a whole, which for all municipalities in my study is composed of a majority of
unemployed natives. The data show that, although it is the case that, for most municipalities,
the majority of the immigrant population is unemployed, there are in all municipalities more
unemployed natives than unemployed immigrants among the total labour force.
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Table 3.2: Local Labour Market Competition, Economic Deprivation and Rad-
ical Right Voting
(1) (2) (3)
Immigrants’ Skill Levels
Low-Skilled -0.305***(0.030)
0.005
(0.025)
0.006
(0.025)
Medium-Skilled 0.088**(0.033)
-0.351***
(0.056)
0.047
(0.033)
High-Skilled 0.028(0.037)
0.025
(0.037)
-0.544***
(0.073)
Natives’ Skill Levels
Low-Skilled 0.019***(0.005)
0.020***
(0.005)
0.020***
(0.005)
Medium-Skilled -0.012*(0.006)
-0.012*
(0.006)
-0.013**
(0.003)
High-Skilled 0.082***(0.006)
0.081***
(0.006)
0.082***
(0.006)
Unemployment -0.384***(0.023)
0.318***
(0.022)
0.343***
(0.023)
Low-Skilled Immigrants ×
Unemployment
0.118***
(0.008)
Medium-Skilled Immigrants ×
Unemployment
0.152***
(0.016)
High-Skilled Immigrants ×
Unemployment
0.196***
(0.025)
Constant 17.338***(0.186)
17.173***
(0.186)
17.272***
(0.186)
Within R-sq 0.672 0.671 0.672
Between R-sq 0.003 0.003 0.003
Overall R-sq 0.337 0.338 0.337
Municipal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 117,872 117,872 117,872
Number of Municipalities 29,709 29,709 29,709
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
112
Figure 3.2: Marginal Effects of Local Labour Market Competition and Economic
Deprivation on Radical Right Voting
This result follows previous findings that difficult economic circumstances
positively impact the anti-immigrant effect on radical right voting (Golder, 2003;
Malhotra et al., 2013). In my study, it plausibly explains the radical right
strongholds like Hénin-Beaumont or Liévin in Pas-de-Calais, which have expe-
rienced difficult economic transitions after the shutdown of coal-mining indus-
tries and subsequent attraction of white-collar workers during the reconversion
of these cities into service-based areas. The local residents in these areas are
predominantly low- and medium-skilled workers. In the context of high local
unemployment, competition for jobs with immigrants has escalated, and this
has translated into strong electoral support for the FN, with Le Pen receiving
over 60 per cent of the vote in these towns in the 2017 election.
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3.6 Robustness Checks
As a last step, I address some questions that might be asked of the presented
results with several robustness checks. The first model of Table 3.3 shows that
my findings do not hinge on the exact specification of the dependent variable.
The results are similar if I change the expressed FN vote share per municipality
(excluding blank and invalid votes) to the registered FN vote share per munici-
pality including blank and invalid votes. Including blank and invalid votes does
not affect my results.
The second model of Table 3.3 presents the squared term of the immigra-
tion inflow to test whether the relationship between the inflows of immigration
and radical right support follows a curvilinear pattern, as one study previously
found a threshold at which the arrival of foreigners becomes negatively associ-
ated with radical right vote share (Charitopoulou and Garcia-Manglano, 2018).
These authors posit a non-linear effect since the radical right vote in a mu-
nicipality may decrease when there are large inflows of immigrants provided
that a majority of the immigrant population supports a party that is not anti-
immigrant. On the contrary, I obtain a positive but insignificant effect of the
quadratic term, which indicates that my models are not biased by any poten-
tial curvilinear effect. This is probably due to the fact that the immigrant
population cannot vote in French presidential elections.
The third model of Table 3.3 shows the effects of various immigrants’
occupations relative to the population of each occupation, and not the whole
labour force, on municipalities’ radical right voting. The findings are very sim-
ilar to my previous models, which corroborate my previous estimates.
Finally, one might be concerned that my estimates are biased by un-
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Table 3.3: Robustness Checks
Registered FN Non-Linear By Additional
Vote Share Effect Occupation Variables
Immigrants’ Skill Levels
Low-Skilled -0.011(0.019)
0.030
(0.026)
-0.033
(0.152)
0.008
(0.025)
Medium-Skilled 0.029(0.027)
0.079**
(0.033)
0.005***
(0.001)
0.103***
(0.033)
High-Skilled 0.099***(0.030)
0.084**
(0.037)
-0.002**
(0.001)
-0.065*
(0.037)
Unemployed -0.427***(0.109)
-0.474***
(0.123)
-0.014***
(0.002)
-0.530***
(0.126)
Students 0.811***(0.058)
Retired -0.019(0.022)
Natives’ Skill Levels
Low-Skilled 0.014***(0.004)
0.018***
(0.005)
-0.049
(0.046)
0.010***
(0.005)
Medium-Skilled -0.008(0.005)
-0.014**
(0.006)
-0.022***
(0.006)
-0.025***
(0.006)
High-Skilled 0.055***(0.005)
0.085***
(0.006)
0.089***
(0.006)
0.101***
(0.015)
Unemployed -0.063***(0.019)
-0.087***
(0.023)
-0.067***
(0.022)
-0.108***
(0.022)
Students -0.084***(0.008)
Retired -0.041***(0.006)
Immigration -0.039***(0.001)
Net Immigration2 0.000(0.001)
Urbanity Score
Towns and Suburbs 0.819(0.659)
Villages 0.620(0.600)
Economic Activity
Service-Based -0.177(0.209)
Residential -0.273(0.194)
Number of Mosques 0.192***(0.026)
Constant 12.167***(0.149)
16.469***
(0.186)
16.835***
(0.134)
16.938***
(0.704)
Within R-sq 0.668 0.670 0.670 0.674
Between R-sq 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000
Overall R-sq 0.352 0.345 0.338 0.374
Municipal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 117,872 117,872 117,872 117,872
Number of Municipalities 29,709 29,709 29,709 29,709
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001. The
baseline for Urbanity Score is Cities. The one for Activity is Industrial Areas.
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observed compositional and contextual features. The last model of Table 3.3
addresses this concern by including segments of both the native and immigrant
populations that are not part of the labour force, namely students and retired
persons, and local contextual variables. I include categorical variables about
the level of urbanisation (cities; middle-sized towns or suburban areas; and ru-
ral areas), the predominant type of economic activity (classified as industrial,
service-based or residential areas) and the share of Mosques (only available at
the departmental level) from INSEE administrative data. Although munici-
palities with higher-skilled immigrants now perceive a lower FN vote share,
the other results are not affected by the addition of these variables. Among
the compositional features, only having a higher number of student immigrants
in a municipality has a statistically significant and positive effect on the FN
vote share. This finding suggests an effect—beyond the scope of the LMC the-
ory—consistent with the finding that international students represent a symbolic
and realistic threat to natives (Charles-Toussaint and Crowson, 2010). The neg-
ative and significant effects of retired natives and student natives are consistent
with the economic logic of the LMC theory in that these segments of the pop-
ulation are less likely to perceive that they are in direct economic competition
with immigrants. As for the contextual features, only the share of Mosques is
statistically significant, which confirms the independent importance of cultural
factors on radical right support (Dancygier, 2010).
Another objection that might be raised is the lack of consideration of
the effects of changing local dynamics on support for the radical right. The
temporal variations in immigration and unemployment levels have been proven
to affect radical right parties’ performance. Kaufmann (2017) has recently found
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Table 3.4: First Difference Model
(1)
Election Years (t2 - t1) ∆2017 − 2002
Immigrants’ Skill Levels
Low-Skilled 1.113(0.862)
Medium-Skilled -1.513(2.464)
High-Skilled 1.062***(0.958)
Unemployed -1.976**(0.955)
Natives’ Skill Levels
Low-Skilled 0.079(0.099)
Medium-Skilled 0.072(0.227)
High-Skilled 0.155(0.323)
Unemployed 0.471(0.295)
Constant 9.341***(3.386)
Within R-sq 0.072
Between R-sq 0.004
Overall R-sq 0.041
Municipal Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 36,162
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p
< .001. The baseline for Urbanity Score is Cities. The one for Activity is
Industrial Areas.
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that ethnic change is likely to increase radical right support in the UK but
higher rates of ethnic minorities have the opposite effect. Table 3.4 therefore
explores a first difference model, depicting the effect of changes in the shares of
immigrants and natives of each skill level over time on changes in radical right
voting from years 2002 to 2017. This cyclical approach can eventually estimate
causal relationships between variables. While most variables are insignificant,
the effect of unemployed immigrants on the performance of the radical right is
strong. A one percent increase of unemployed immigrants from the years 2002
to 2017 decreases the radical right support by 1.976 percentage points within
municipalities. Despite the lack of other significant coefficients, this finding
corroborates my previous results.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper provides a novel empirical investigation of the way immigration af-
fects radical right voting at a local level using the skill composition of immigrants
and municipal fixed effects. It contributes evidence of an economic dimension
to radical right voting.
Using French electoral results and census data over a fifteen-year period
from 2002 to 2017, this study finds empirical evidence of the impact of local
contextual influences of economic competition on radical right vote share at
the local level for immigrants and natives’ skills. A greater correspondence
between the skills of native and immigrant workers in a municipality has a
positive effect on the municipality’s support for the radical right. Moreover,
the conditioning effects of material deprivation, measured as unemployment,
increases the labour market competition effect on municipalities’ radical right
support; radical right electoral fortunes are likely to be boosted in areas where
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the immigrant population (no matter its skill level) increases and economic
conditions become poorer. But this paper also shows that some local areas are
more immune to radical right vote share than others over time, based on their
demographic composition. Municipalities with a higher concentration of any of
the following groups register higher radical right support: low-skilled natives;
medium-skilled immigrants; or high-skilled immigrants.
There are some limitations to this study. The lack of local data on the
composition of both natives and immigrants remains a concern since ethnicity
can be correlated with the skill level of immigrants, as found in previous studies
(Savelkoul et al., 2017). Future contextual studies in other countries should
take this aspect into consideration where data is available. Moreover, actual
economic threat could also take the different form of competition for social
welfare provision as distinct from labour market competition. Further studies
could usefully elaborate on this welfare-based source of immigrant-native eco-
nomic competition. Furthermore, some institutional variables with a focus on
party competition and the role of the local institutions could also play a role in
radical right voting. Arzheimer and Carter (2006) have examined the political
opportunity structures and found that political institutions have some impact
on radical right voting, but no study has been undertaken at the local level.
This study has important implications for our understanding of the rela-
tionship between immigration and radical right voting. It reinforces the impor-
tance of labour market competition as one source of anti-immigrant radical right
voting behaviour which should not be dismissed. As much as perceived cultural
and status threats affect radical right voting, actual labour market competition
at a level more proximate to individuals matters too. Material considerations
are still worth putting front and centre of future research on radical right vot-
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ing. The measurement of economic competition in multiple units of analysis and
across different occupation and industry levels deserves further investigation.
This study also has important implications for policy-makers in light
of the politics of immigrant integration. Without discounting the cultural di-
mension, local labour market competition and resource scarcity are the breed-
ing grounds for radical right parties to crystallise ethnic competition in their
narratives to garner support. Highlighting the economic issues behind ethnic
conflict lends urgency to state politics to prompt immigration integration poli-
cies in economically deprived localities. This concern is particularly acute in
immigrant-receiving societies after the migration crisis.
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4 | Pissed! Local Socio-Cultural
Degradation and Radical Right
Support: The case of British
Pub Closures
Abstract
While individual and macro factors behind radical right voting are
well understood, little is known about the local drivers that may
shape people’s choice to support the radical right. Although recent
studies have focused on material deprivation, this paper advances
the theory that the degradation of local socio-cultural hubs is linked
to radical right support by contributing to the loss of a sense of com-
munity and cultural identity. I examine the social sources of radical
right support in Britain by exploiting an original dataset on commu-
nity pub closures, which serves as a novel empirical indicator. It is
proposed that the disappearance of community pubs triggers social
isolation and signals the decline of the British working-class condi-
tion, which is associated with UKIP support. Combining district-
level Office for National Statistics (ONS) data with individual-level
data using the multi-wave UK Household panel data from 2013 to
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2016, logit and hierarchical models provide evidence of the effect of
community pub closure on radical right support. Individuals living
in districts that experience one additional community pub closure
(relative to the total number of pubs in the community) are more
likely to support UKIP than any other party by around 1.63 percent-
age points. The effect is substantial in its size and magnified under
conditions of material deprivation. Overall, this paper highlights the
theoretical and empirical significance of local socio-cultural degra-
dation as a mechanism that complements material deprivation to
explain radical right support.
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4.1 Introduction
The sustained and growing electoral successes of radical right parties in sev-
eral Western European countries has provoked extensive media coverage and
widespread public concern. The question of how to explain such parties’ elec-
toral support has also been the subject of intense academic study, including by
scholars such as (Evans, 2000; Lubbers et al., 2000; Norris, 2005; Arzheimer and
Carter, 2006; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Kitschelt, 1995), among others. Drawing from
cross-sectional or individual-level survey data, the majority of studies have fo-
cused on the macro-level and individual-level factors behind. It is theoretically
and empirically agreed that radical right supporters are socially conservative
individuals who live in countries experiencing rapid changes in immigration
and high levels of material deprivation, mostly measured as unemployment rate
(Mayer, 1998; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006).
Yet, the individual and macro factors fail to explain all variation in rad-
ical right support. On the one hand, contextual studies restrict themselves to
aggregate national or regional indicators that ignore local variations and po-
tential ecological fallacies (Golder, 2003). On the other hand, individual-level
data are detached from any local contextual dynamics and suffer from an under-
reporting of radical right supporters in surveys due to social desirability bias.
Studies that combine the two units of analysis mostly use hierarchical models
with cross-sectional data consisting of a handful of attitudinal measures and a
set of simple sociodemographic variables from which causal claims cannot be
warranted (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). The rare exceptions have investigated
the role of local economic shocks and austerity in driving radical right nation-
alism (Colantone and Stanig, 2018b) and Brexit (Colantone and Stanig, 2018a;
Fetzer, 2019). While these studies bring important causal evidence of economic
factors behind radical support, their focus is limited to material deprivation.
I advance in this paper that another significant motivator pushes indi-
viduals to support a radical right party: the decline of local socio-cultural hubs,
which increases the sense of social isolation and status anxiety among the af-
fected community. I develop what I call the ‘local socio-cultural degradation’
thesis, building on two existing theoretical sources: the social isolation the-
ory, which links people’s lack of connectedness in their community with radical
right support at the individual level; and the local sociotropic literature, which
stresses the importance of people’s local socio-cultural hubs in shaping their
political behaviour. The closure of social places that are at the heart of a local
community sparks a sense of social marginality among the people who used to
frequent these places, residents, causing them to question their place in their
society. For many such people, these closures also mark the disappearance of
their cultural heritage, and experience a loss of cultural identity as a result.
These two processes, I propose, ultimately lead these individuals to vote for
radical right parties, whose rhetoric and ideology tap into precisely such social
and cultural grievances (Norris, 2016; Gest, 2016).
In my study, I aim to provide accounts of the role of local socio-cultural
degradation in driving radical right support by using a novel empirical indicator:
community pub closures in the United Kingdom. Community pubs are a focal
point of local communities in Britain, through which social connections are
established and sustained. My study focuses on community pubs because they
embody the traditional ‘working-class white’ identity, meaning their decline is
likely to foster the processes of social isolation and cultural identity loss that
eventually translate into radical right votes. Combining the UK Household
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panel study with a pub closure ratio—the ratio of the number of community pub
closures per year to the number of pubs per district— I examine vote preferences
for individual voters with logit and hierarchical models. I use year, wave and
regional fixed effects in order to observe the intra-regional variability of radical
right support while keeping time and wave constant. Conditional on individual
and contextual variables, I find that individuals living in districts more affected
by the closure of community pubs are more likely to vote UKIP. The propensity
for an individual to support UKIP increases by around 1.63 percentage points as
the pub closure ratio increases by one percent over time. In addition, the effect
of social deprivation is amplified under conditions of local material deprivation
at the district level. My results are robust to controlling for several pub types,
district characteristics and alternative dependent and independent variables.
The contribution of this study is twofold. It proposes a new theory
behind radical right support, the local socio-cultural degradation theory, that
builds on and improves the social isolation and status anxiety theories by incor-
porating a spatial dimension. It does not simply consider individual isolation in
a vacuum but highlights the importance of socio-cultural places as subjectively
experienced and geographically bounded communities whose closures reinforce
feelings of social exclusion and cultural identity loss, which eventually shape
radical right support. Empirically, it employs an original empirical variable
which goes beyond the unreliable and undetectable social capital indicators.
The closure of community pubs provides a powerful explanatory variable of lo-
cal socio-cultural degradation by capturing both the effects of social isolation
and cultural identity of the white working class in Britain. Finally, this study
offers an analytic way to integrate the role of local social factors over time,
while still considering the importance of material considerations in the study of
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radical right voting.
The paper is organised as follows. I first give an overview of the social
isolation and radical right voting literature to highlight its theoretical and em-
pirical limitations and advance the local socio-cultural degradation hypothesis.
After introducing community pub closures as a new indicator of this hypothesis,
I lay out my data, empirical strategy, results and robustness checks. The final
section of the paper discusses the potential implications of my findings.
4.2 The Local Socio-Cultural Degradation
Theory
I draw from the social isolation thesis, the local sociotropic account and status
anxiety literature to develop the local socio-cultural degradation theory. The
social identity theory highlights social factors behind radical right support. It
derives from the mass society theory which links structural changes of mod-
ernisation with the rise of the radical right. It proposes that a new form of
society, characterised by growing atomisation and loss of community, is more
likely to embrace new radical ideologies (Kornhauser, 1959). Following processes
of globalisation and de-industrialisation, the modern individual is lacking local
bonds and is becoming increasingly detached and alienated from her commu-
nity (Gusfield, 1962; Putnam, 1993). The absence of involvement in voluntary
associations, which used to give meaning to communal existence, renders indi-
viduals less secure and less able to establish interpersonal relations. A sense of
belonging is gradually replaced by unfulfilled needs for a community identity
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and a distanced and distrustful relationship to the country as a whole1 (Gusfield,
1962).
This, in turn, is said to lead to a rise in radical right support. The
diminished role of community structures—families and local voluntary or pro-
fessional organisations—offers an opportunity for charismatic leaders to lure
atomised individuals (Gusfield, 1962; Kornhauser, 1959). A thriving radical
right movement or party then provides local loyal ‘quasi-communities’, which
fill the void left by decaying identities (Kornhauser, 1959). It also prevents
individuals from responding to isolation through political disengagement (Ko-
rnhauser, 1959; Hirschman, 1978). A telling example is the large decline of
trade unions and local working-class organisations which removed significant
affinities with the white working class and eventually contributed to a growing
support of former blue-collar and low-skilled workers for radical right parties
(Mayer, 1998). The radical right has managed to tap into some elements of
white working-class angst. US President Donald Trump proved successful in
parts of the so-called ‘rust belt’ in the United States, while in Britain the for-
mer leader of the far-right English Defence League, Tommy Robinson, poses as
a kind of working-class hero.
While the mass society theory has largely been explored in ethnographic
studies (Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2016; Gest, 2016), it has not been widely
substantiated with empirical evidence- a problem exacerbated by a lack of sat-
isfactory indicators. Although the theoretical underpinnings sound intuitively
1Theories rooted in the mass society tradition and reinforced by the mainstream social
capital literature predict that higher social bonding will reduce radical right support. However,
the few available “dark-side social capital” accounts, mostly developed in social psychology,
highlight the opposite effect: higher social interactions related to the attachment to the local
area may engender defensive and extremist political behaviour (see more on this debate in
Fitzgerald, 2018). Empirical evidence of this effect is still scant. While acknowledging this
potential theoretical pattern, I do not develop it further given that my results do not provide
evidence of this trend.
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convincing, only a few quantitative studies have empirically tested the claimed
link to radical right voting. These studies operationalised the relationship be-
tween social isolation and radical right support using either an objective indi-
cator of social isolation, such as (lack of) friendship relations, (weak) family
structures, (no) membership in civil society organisations (Fennema and Tillie,
1998; Rydgren, 2009; Coffe et al., 2007; Veugelers, 2005), or measures of people’s
subjective feelings of social isolation, such as feelings of loneliness, alienation,
and distrust (Shils, 1996; Fennema and Tillie, 1998). Yet, these studies fail to
show consistent results since the direction of the effect is variously negative,
positive or null. They also often conflate social sources of radical right support
with economic parameters, as with Jesuit et al. (Jesuit et al., 2009), who used
an indicator of economic equality to assess the role of regional social capital on
radical right voting. This tendency illustrates just how vague the term “social
capital” is. It has become a catch-all, umbrella term rather than a clear con-
cept. In addition, the lack of fine-grained systematic investigation of its links to
radical right over time has prevented researchers from identifying local dynamic
patterns.
The social capital literature also does not take into consideration the
theoretical importance of place. Feelings of insecurity, attachment and belong-
ingness do not occur in a vacuum but can be heightened by individuals’ local
surrounding. The link between social isolation and radical right voting is incom-
plete without considering people’s connection to their local place and the way
this shapes their political attitudes and voting behaviour. That is why I advance
the ‘local socio-cultural degradation’ hypothesis in line with the nascent liter-
ature on ‘local sociotropic’ accounts of voting (Enos, 2017). It contextualises
the social isolation theory by considering the declining social-cultural hubs of
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people’s lived experiences as a trigger for radical right support. These hubs
are gathering places in which people meet to socialise. They can be bowling
leagues, sports bars or pubs to name a few, and are signs of a healthy and
cohesive community.
More importantly, these socio-cultural hubs form an integral part of peo-
ple’s sense of socio-cultural identity which, when lost, triggers not only the
individual pain of losing something valued but a sense of one’s distinctive social-
cultural group (and its distinctive traditions and values) become marginalised
and abandoned (while other groups ascend). These social places are not only
functional enablers of social interaction; they also convey historical, geographi-
cal and social meanings that their inhabitants internalise and re-enact in their
daily interactions within such spaces. They develop a distinctive character, and
become associated with distinctive traditions, for a specific social group, which
has been described in sociology as a ‘communal ethos’ (McQuarrie, 2017). In
turn, people come to feel a sense of belonging in, and develop attachments to,
these places, groups and traditions; they become a part of their inhabitants’
cultural identity. The subjective cultural identification with these social places
explains why their closure may be experienced as a loss of cultural identity of
what it means to be the white working class.
The local socio-cultural degradation thesis incorporates elements of the
growing literature on status anxiety (Gest et al., 2018; Gidron and Hall, 2017).
It highlights the strong effect of individuals’ sense of relative deprivation with
the disappearance of these socio-cultural hubs on radical right support for a par-
ticular segment of the population, the white working class. Gest et al. (2018)
and Gidron and Hall (2017) stress how this class has perceived they are shifting
to the periphery of their society relative to a new dominant white class of profes-
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sional elites, amid rising immigration and economic crises. The transformation
of the economy has contributed to the gradual disappearance of low-skilled, de-
cent and secure jobs in manufacturing sectors and the rising demand for highly
skilled employees with higher education (Gidron and Hall, 2017). It has rel-
egated low-skilled white workers to the fringes of social order. Low levels of
status inspire a diffuse cultural resentment against the previously established
dominance in the social hierarchy, which is then translated into a radical right
vote. This white working class is inclined to respond to such threat by support-
ing radical right parties that evoke a sense of nostalgia and pledge to return to
an idealised image of the past characterised by its social cohesion and cultural
homogeneity.
In addition, the local socio-cultural degradation thesis focuses on the
relative decline of community and cultural identity with a dynamic pattern.
Drawing from the nascent theoretical argument that adverse (economic) change
over time drives radical right support (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Gest et al., 2018),
it proposes that it is the deterioration of these socio-cultural places that plays a
role in shaping radical right support. Being exposed to a community in decline,
manifested by the gradual disappearance of everyday socio-cultural experiences,
can contribute to people’s sense of social isolation because people typically com-
pare their experience to that which they have had in the past—and have come
to expect—but now see ‘others’ as having. Local inhabitants who are witness-
ing the gradual decline of vibrancy in their community experience disappointed
expectations relative to their own prior social circumstances. This disappoint-
ment, in turn, leaves them open to radical right appeals, given that these parties
invite reactionary nostalgia for earlier times. People who feel disillusioned with
the decline of community cohesion are more inclined to reject mainstream par-
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ties who appeal to the status quo—or to a form of “progress” with which these
groups do not identify—and to support a party that celebrates a return to lost
traditions. Recent ethnographic studies have endorsed this link, documenting
people’s feelings that their local communities had deteriorated and suggesting
that this has contributed to radical right support (Hochschild, 2016; Cramer,
2016), though quantitative studies of dynamic changes have, as noted earlier,
focused mostly on economic factors (Colantone and Stanig, 2018a, 2018b).
In that sense, the local socio-cultural degradation thesis does not predict
that who experience this kind of socio-cultural marginalisation will abstain from
voting. Rather, unlike the social isolation theory, it distinguishes between those
who have always felt isolated and those who have become isolated after expe-
riencing a decline of activity in their local area. People who have always felt
isolated, as assumed in the social isolation theory, could equally respond with
a radical right vote and an abstention. The relative loss of social interactions
compared to the expectations is what leads to radical right support. This sense
of relative decline provides fertile ground for the nostalgic rhetoric of radical
right parties and figures (e.g. “Make America Great Again”) (Norris, 2016; Gest
et al.,2018). Following these assumptions, I theorise:
Local Socio-Cultural Degradation Hypothesis: The decline of lo-
cal socio-cultural spaces increases the propensity for an individual to
support a radical right party.
Finally, I argue that the impact of the local socio-cultural degradation
on radical right support can be amplified under certain contextual conditions.
Individuals can be influenced by changes in their local environment and express
their resentment through a radical right vote. Previous studies argue that local
change either in terms of relative economic decline or increased migration can
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have positive effects on radical right support (Golder,2003; Golder, 2016). Pro-
ponents of an economic variant of this view posit that a rise in immigration can
put economic pressure on local residents’ jobs and wages (Scheve and Slaugh-
ter, 2001; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013; Pardos-Prado and Xena, 2019), while
others posit that right-wing radicalism emerges in response to threats to natives’
cultural heritage (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; McLaren, 2002; Sniderman et
al., 2004). However, the local socio-cultural degradation specifically looks at
dysfunctional local conditions that translate an internal threat caused by the
national structural changes rather than an external threat caused by the arrival
of newcomers. Of course, one could assume that the radical right supporters
may conflate the two threats and easily scapegoat immigrants for downward
social changes, especially as the radical right parties would actively participate
in this blaming strategy. Yet, the reality might be different. While the wors-
ening economic conditions may degrade the social conditions of local residents
(unemployment reinforces social isolation for instance), the actual number of
immigrants is unlikely to affect the closure of community pubs. Indeed, social
places that are characterised by a ‘communal ethos’ with a distinctive cultural
identity are for that reason less likely to attract other social groups. For in-
stance, community pubs in the UK are unlikely to attract large numbers of
Muslim immigrants because of distinctive cultural or religious practices in re-
lation to alcohol consumption2. As a result, local socio-cultural degradation
is likely to be affected by the economic circumstances only. Following these
assumptions, I therefore hypothesise:
2I do not deny that the perceived threat of rise of immigration might interfere in the
local socio-cultural degradation effect but the actual immigration influx is unlikely to do
so. Unfortunately, my dataset does not have a question on individuals’ attitudes towards
immigration to test this hypothesis.
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Material Deprivation Hypothesis: Higher local levels of economic
deprivation increase the effect of local socio-cultural degradation effect
on individual’s propensity to support a radical right party.
4.3 Data, Case Study and Research Design
Closures of Community Pubs as indicators of Local Socio-
Cultural Degradation in Britain
Pubs in the United Kingdom represent a compelling indicator of social-cultural
hubs that defines the place-rooted way of life of its residents. Being the central
element of peoples’ social life at the local level, they are the platforms through
which social connections are established. They are channels in which ‘people
formulate their preferences not just as individuals, but also as part of a broader
social community, rooted in a particular geographic locale and set of cultural
practices and everyday experiences and interactions’ (Enos, 2017). Dunbar et al.
(2017) have shown that frequenting a local pub can directly affect people’s social
network size and how engaged they are with their local community, which in
turn can affect how satisfied they feel in life. As a focal point of community, they
represent a routinised way to maintain bonds with a local community. This is
even the case for individuals who go to pus alone. ‘Old folks who could sit quietly
and enjoy the ambiance and be accepted as part of the furniture, they were alone,
but they were never lonely’ (Gest, 2016: 48). Dunbar and his research team even
consider a biological effect of alcohol as triggering the endorphin system, which
promotes social bonding (Dunbar et al., 2017). Like other complex bonding
systems such as dancing, singing and storytelling, alcohol consumption has often
been adopted by large social communities as a ritual associated with bonding.
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Pubs play a unique role in offering a social environment to enjoy a drink with
friends in a supervised community setting.
This paper is particularly looking at community-style pubs since they
serve as one of the last bastions of British culture for the white working-class
identity. Their closure not only induces a loss of community but also a loss
of cultural identity, as proposed in the local socio-cultural degradation thesis.
Community pubs are pubs that have been existing in the community for more
than a decade and connect individuals together in a ‘deep horizontal comrade-
ship’ around traditions and values which are representative of the British iden-
tity (Gest, 2016). In my empirical analysis, they are pubs which are not owned
by chains, are not located in city centres and are not gastropubs. Gest reports
from his ethnographic fieldwork of pubs in deprived and gentrified areas of East
London that community pubs are channels for working class whites ‘to convene
in a relatively homogenous environment to meet, crack inside jokes, make ob-
scure references, and retell stories of each other and, in doing so, to preserve a
situated sense of solidarity’ (Gest, 2016:48). They replace the lost trade union
community centres to become a venue for the development of working-class con-
sciousness. Community pubs manage to recreate the norms of reciprocity and
implicit solidarity that the regulars like to think once existed in their local area.
The barman of a community pub in East London says of her community pub:
‘We don’t really get any strangers in here. It’s a community, and don’t get me
wrong, we serve anyone. But all these guys are on the estate. It’s like a family’
(Gest, 2016:48).
Community pubs are attended mainly by a particular segment of the
population: white male, low educated with low disposable income (Gest, 2016).
Gest reports a remark by 18-year-old Terry Hammonds: ‘People come to the
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pub to have a rest from the outside. This is where they have their time to-
gether. They’re just looking for a beverage and a chat with other Englishmen.
They can’t get that outside. Here, you can play darts, watch sports, and talk.’
(Gest, 2016:49). By contrast, gastropubs are frequented by the middle-class
and ethnically diverse communities in gentrified areas at the expense of local,
deeply-rooted white working-class communities, and tourists and larger groups
go to pub chains and pubs in the city centers (Dunbar et al., 2017). Dunbar et
al. (Dunbar et al., 2017) also showed that those who drink at community pubs
tend to socialise in smaller groups, which encourages whole-group conversation,
while those drinking in city-center bars tend to be in much larger groups, and
participate much less in group conversation. The symbolic role of the commu-
nity pub has been reprised by the radical right leader himself, Nigel Farage,
who identifies himself as ‘a man of the people who like to drink beer in the local
pub’3.
As a result, the disappearance of community pubs signals both the ero-
sion of local social bonding (loss of community) and the marginality of the
working-class white population in Britain (loss of cultural identity). Their clo-
sure reflects the degrading conditions of local neighbourhood. More than 25 %
of pubs4 have closed since 2001 (ONS data) due to the increase of the cost of
beers after a wave of government taxes on alcohol, the 2007 national smoking
ban, housing price inflation and the decline of manufacturing work that made
3Farage frequently uses pubs on the campaign trail as a platform to convey his radical
views. He considers that ‘every pub is a parliament’. One might think that this might indicate
that the closure of pubs should retard the spread of UKIP ideas and support. However, this
kind publicity is a PR tactic: when broadcast via the media and UKIP campaign materials,
the occasional pub visit is enough to communicate the intended message without actually
going to many pubs to actively foment support. In reality, Farage only appears in pubs on
rare occasions, in a few places and closer to elections. By contrast, the closure of community
pubs is a much more generalised phenomenon that has occurred over the past twelve years
and has affected large segments of the British population.
4I mean total pubs.
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Figure 4.1: Mean of Community Pub Closures per Year for each Region in
Britain
Figure 4.2: Pub Closures (left) and Community Pub Closures (right) since 2003
the working class less able to spend money on pints. Figure 4.1 shows the rise
of community pub closures from 2003 until 2015 (data is drawn from the Local
Data Company). The maps in Figure 4.2 demonstrate that all pub closures
and closure of community pubs are scattered across Britain5. Community pub
5Unfortunately, the study is only investigating England and Wales as data is not available
in Northern Ireland and Scotland. However, the two regions are considered outliers because
the UKIP support is very low (the UKIP discourse mostly raises the importance of the English
identity).
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closures range from 1,718 in the North East to 6,951 in London. It implies that
the effect can be felt by all residents, no matter their place of residence.
The local socio-cultural degradation thesis predicts that community pub
closures would trigger both processes of social isolation and loss of cultural
identity and can eventually lead to radical right support, as suggested by the
local socio-cultural degradation thesis. The disappearance of social spaces to
bond with the closure of community-style pubs would affect the well-being of
their ‘communal ethos’ and increase their resentment towards the status quo
and mainstream governing parties. They can therefore translate their desire
to ‘take back control’ of their vibrant community with a radical right support.
The local socio-cultural degradation thesis also predicts that community pub
closures would particularly affect the white working class given its perceived
shift to the periphery of social order.
The rise of UKIP as a Radical Right Party
The United Kingdom provides a relevant case study to examine radical right
voting given the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) as an
emblematic radical right party in Western Europe. From being a fringe party led
by a London School of Economics (LSE) academic (Alan Sked), UKIP became
the third national party in terms of popular support in the period of 2013– 2016.
Nigel Farage, its charismatic leader from 2006 to 2016 (with the exception of an
11-month period), managed to attract large media attention to promote anti-
EU, anti-immigrant and anti-establishment issues that deeply affected the UK
political landscape (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Evans and Mellon, 2019). These
socio-cultural political concerns are commonly raised by the radical right parties
of Western Europe, to which UKIP belongs to (Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2009).
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UKIP also appeals to traditional radical right supporters6. Substantial support
is heavily concentrated among the white, working-class, low-educated men who
live in declining industrial towns, and who feel threatened by local Muslim com-
munities and hostile to the political establishment (Ford and Goodwin, 2014;
Evans and Mellon, 2019). They represent the ‘left-behind’ losers of economic
and cultural globalisation (Arzheimer, 2009; Betz, 1994; Mayer, 1998). More-
over, UKIP offers programmatic positions which appeal to a sense of Britishness,
nostalgia and community that are resonating in light of the decline of commu-
nity pubs. By having Farage stressing the importance of the local pub, UKIP
not only invokes a lost sense of community, but also a sense of threatened white
working-class identity.
Beyond traditionally embodying the West European radical right party
family, UKIP’s sustained success from 2013 to 2016 makes it interesting to study.
The party garnered approximately 15.6% of the electorate in the 2013 local
elections, became Britain’s largest party in the European Parliament as of 2018
(with 26.6% of votes and most seats in the 2014 EU parliamentary Elections)
and 13% of the popular vote in the 2015 British General Election. UKIP’s
apogee occurred with the victory of the Leave vote in the 2016 referendum on
Britain’s membership of the EU— a watershed moment for the radical right
force in the country. UKIP was crucial in making the referendum possible
and fiercely campaigned for the Leave vote. Although the UK’s Brexit vote
should not be equated with UKIP support or radical right voting, studies have
shown that UKIP support is strongly predictive of the Leave vote (Hobolt, 2016;
6Although the segment of the population under investigation in this paper is the working
class, I do not deny that UKIP supporters also include the professional and managerial middle
classes (see more in (Evans and Mellon, 2019). The focus is on the working class because it
is the segment of the population that is expected to be the most affected by the decline of
community pubs.
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Jennings and Stoker, 2017). UKIP has lost considerable political power after
the Brexit victory as a result of Farage’s resignation following the referendum
and internal leadership disputes. It currently has no Member of Parliament in
the House of Commons. As result, despite using year dummies, I do not expect
strong differences between years since my analysis covers the successful years of
UKIP from 2013 to 2016.
Data
Local Socio-Cultural Degradation is measured by the pub closure ratio - the
ratio of community pub closures to the number of pubs for each local authority
district in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 20167. Data are drawn from the Local Data
Company, are only available for England and Wales and their lowest scale avail-
able is the district level8. It registers pub closures that are not replaced by any
other pubs9. Figure 4.3 displays the distribution of the community pub closure
ratio in the districts. The variable is normally distributed as there are fewer
outliers on the high and low ends of the data range and the majority of pub
closure ratio occurs in the middle of the data range. The available data en-
ables me to distinguish community pubs from city centre pubs, pub chains and
gastropubs. The robustness section shows no effect of these other pubs, which
confirms the singular impact of closure of community-style pubs on radical right
voting.
7Other examples of local socio-cultural hubs in other countries are cafés, bars and beer
halls
8There are 317 districts in Britain, including 32 London Boroughs. The population goes
from 53,800 in Eden to 545,500 in the City of Manchester. Although districts do not represent
a single local community, it is the lowest administrative level available.
9Pubs counted as having closed on this measure have either been replaced by other restau-
rants, cafes and shops or have been converted or demolished for residential use. They have
not been replaced by other pubs. Pubs which have changed ownership but have remained
pubs are not counted.
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Figure 4.3: Normal Distribution of Community Pub Closure Ratio
I then combine this pub data with the multi-wave panel individual-level
survey data of the UK Household Longitudinal Study (also known as Under-
standing Society) using the district of respondents. The panel data allows me
to assess the gradual decline of community cohesion over time. All adult mem-
bers of Understanding Society households and the British Election Study (since
2010), who form a representative sample of the population, are interviewed each
year; original sample members are followed if they leave their original household
and new (or newly eligible) members of the Understanding Society household
are also added to the survey. Only interviewees who respond in waves 5 (2013-
2014), 6 (2014-2015) and 7 (2015-2016) are included in the analysis (N=44,157).
It is important to evaluate whether the community pub closure ratio is
a good proxy for the sense of loss of community and cultural identity. To as-
sess this, I examine the relationship between this measure and indicators that
tap into these proposed mechanisms. Unfortunately, the UK Household Lon-
gitudinal Study only has one variable that relates to these channels and that
variable is only available for one wave (2014-2015): Buckner’s neighbourhood
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cohesion scale. This instrument measures three latent constructs: attraction to
neighbourhood, neighbouring and psychological sense of community. It exam-
ines perceptions of trust and mutual-reliance among community members based
on the quality, frequency and variety of their communications and social con-
tacts. This continuous measure is coded from 1 (distrust of the neighbourhood,
no mutual reliance among community members) to 5 (active neighbourhood
organisation with multiple and trustworthy social networks). The higher the
number the stronger the neighbourhood social cohesion. Table 4.1 reports the
results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with region and year fixed
effects in which the dependent variable is our pub community closure ratio and
the main independent variable is the Buckner’s neighbourhood cohesion scale.
I find a significant and negative relationship between the two variables which
indicates that the larger the closure of community, the lower the neighbourhood
cohesion. Despite not directly measuring loss of community and of cultural
identity, this validity check proves that the community pub closure ratio is a
good proxy for measuring loss of a sense of community and cultural identity.
Table 4.1: Community Pub Closures and Community Cohesion
Community Pub Closures
Buckner’s Neighbourhood Cohesion Scale -0.305*(0.014)
Constant -4.135***(0.150)
Observations 10,159
Region, Year FE Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
The question on respondents’ vote, which asked for ‘Which party re-
141
spondents will vote for tomorrow ?’ and is available in all waves10, is the binary
dependent variable. It takes value 1 if a respondent declares support for UKIP
and 0 for any other party. Other dependent variables that include not only
UKIP but also either the British National Party (another radical right party)
or test the closeness of UKIP (the survey question is ‘Which party do you feel
the closest to ?’) relative to others are included in the robustness section.
Using information about the place of residence of the respondent, I allo-
cate each individual to a local authority district with its corresponding yearly
closure of community pubs. The assignment of individuals to community pub
closure per district is completed for each year. Since the interviews are com-
pleted within two years, I assign each individual to their year of interview, and
not their year of wave completion11. The longitudinal study also contains infor-
mation on demographic characteristics: gender, ethnicity, and education. Age,
occupation and urbanity (rural or urban areas) are not used because they show
no correlation.
Finally, I add contextual variables of each individual’s district from the
2001 and 2011 Census Data available from the Office for National Statistics
(ONS). They include the share growth of EU Migrant population from 2001
to 2011, the share growth of non-EU migrant population from 2001 to 201112,
the share of residents older than 60 years old13 and the 2015 index of multiple
10Checks on support before 2013 cannot be done because the survey only started to ask
about respondents’ support for UKIP in 2013.
11This means that a respondent who was interviewed in 2013 (despite being included in the
2014 Wave 5) will be allocated the community pub closures/number of pubs in 2013.
12It is important to dissociate the effects of EU resident members and non-EU members as
UK voters, including Leavers and UKIP voters, as UKIP cares more about reducing non-EU
immigration than reducing EU immigration (Hix et al., 2017). The levels of immigration are
also included in the robustness section but inflows are preferred as previous literature has
shown a larger positive effect of rapid inflow of immigrants on UKIP support than levels of
immigration (Kaufmann, 2017)
13I include this variable because the older generation is expected to be more directly affected
by the decline of trade unions and community pubs.
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deprivation14. The unemployment rate from the Annual Population Survey/
Labour Force Survey is also included. Other contextual variables are tested in
the Robustness section.
Empirical Strategy
I use three-wave individual-level survey data that combine yearly closure of
community pubs and other control contextual variables to conduct logit models.
The baseline specification for these estimations is :
P (UKIPil) = F (αil + βCommunityPubClosuresil + Lil + Zil + il), (4.1)
where i indexes district and l individual respondents. The dependent
variable UKIP takes value 1 if individual l declares to support the UKIP party
and 0 if individuall declares to support any other party 15. I include a vector of
individual variables, Lil, accounting for gender, ethnicity, education and types
of jobs and a vector of contextual variables, Zil. I perform a logit estimation
with region, year and panel wave fixed effects as well as random effects varying
across individuals. Standard errors are clustered by district, since I have multi-
ple respondents within each area. District clusters also enable me to take into
consideration the local variations of radical right support. I then use a hierar-
chical logistic model to take into account the fact that individuals are nested
in districts and waves. I estimate a model consisting of two levels, one is the
respondent, and the other is the district*wave level. il is the error term.
14This measure includes levels of deprivation with regards to income, employment, health,
education, skills, barriers to housing, crime, and living environment. Each separate factor
will be tested in the robustness section.
15Don’t know and non-responses are coded as missing values.
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4.4 Results and Discussion
Main Results
Table 4.2 displays the baseline estimate of equation 1 with logit and hierarchical
models. I first look at the individual-level effect of closure of community pubs
on UKIP support without including any control variables (Models 1 and 2).
Models 3 and 4 present the effect with individual characteristics while Models 5
and 6 add both individual and contextual characteristics. All the specifications
include regional and year dummies, and standard errors are clustered at the
district level. The coefficient on the community pub closures is statistically
significant and positive across the board, regardless of the estimation method.
This result corroborates my socio-cultural degradation hypothesis.
How strong is the effect of community pub closures? Individuals who
are exposed to one more community pub closure per number of pubs in their
district are .999 more likely to support UKIP than any other party, while includ-
ing individual and contextual control variables (exp (6.509)/ 1+ exp(6.509)).
This implies that a change in the closure of community pubs/pub closure ra-
tio from the minimum(0) to the maximum (0.25) would induce an increase in
the probability of a person supporting UKIP by around 1.63 percentage points
(6.509*0.25). The effect is strong given that the average UKIP vote share is
5%. This provides evidence of a social-cultural deprivation as a driver of radical
right support in Britain.
Models 3 and 4 corroborate the sociological profile of the traditional
radical right voter. The logit and hierarchical models confirm that the UKIP
supporter is more likely to be male, of white ethnicity, with a General Certificate
of Secondary Education (GCSE) or equivalent or no qualification (rather than
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a higher degree) and a routinised or intermediate job rather than a managerial
position. These results are in line with previous studies on UKIP voters (Ford
and Goodwin, 2014; Evans and Mellon, 2019), Brexit voters (Jennings and
Stoker, 2019) and radical right voters in Western Europe (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt,
1995; Ivarsflaten, 2005). The closure of community pubs particularly affects
the most vulnerable segment of the population. This result is also expected
given that white, male individuals with low qualifications are those who most
usually frequent community pubs (Gest, 2016). In Table C.3 of the Appendix, I
replicate the data with entropy balancing in order to reweight the survey sample
to known characteristics from the target population, that is to say the white
working class. The results are unaffected by using the entropy balancing model
that reweight the sample to a white working-class population (see the Appendix
for more information on this point).
Models 5 and 6 include local contextual variables behind radical right
support that are commonly defended in the literature. Local change either
in terms of relative economic decline or increased migration can have positive
effects on radical right support. While the unemployment rate and changes
of EU or non-EU migrant population shares are insignificant, an increase in
the index of multiple deprivation has positive effects on individual support for
UKIP in the logit models. This means that only economic deprivation, and
not immigration, amplifies the socio-cultural decline. This constitutes evidence
for the contextual hypothesis and corroborates previous findings that material
deprivation matters in detecting radical right support (Colantone and Stanig,
2018a, 2018b; Fetzer, 2019; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Pardos-Prado and
Xena, 2019; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013). Table C.5 of the Appendix, which
uses new data collected in 2017-2018, shows a correlation between negative
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Table 4.2: Local Social Degradation and UKIP Support
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Community Pub Closures 5.512**(2.389)
4.617**
(1.939)
5.270**
(2.199)
5.088**
(2.259)
6.509**
(2.937)
4.754**
(2.346)
Female -0.313***(0.097)
-0.314***
(0.094)
-0.388***
(0.146)
-0.286***
(0.098)
White British 2.130***(0.256)
1.966***
(0.236)
2.652***
(0.327)
2.065***
(0.253)
Education (0=Higher Degree)
High School or Vocational -0.413(0.412)
-0.611
(0.394)
-0.380
(0.537)
-0.249
(0.425)
GCSE or Equivalent 0.729***(0.118)
0.724***
(0.114)
1.066***
(0.195)
0.777***
(0.120)
No Qualification 0.630***(0.149)
0.563***
(0.140)
0.888***
(0.231)
0.685***
(0.148)
Job (Managerial and Professional)
Intermediate 0.748***(0.136)
0.746***
(0.133)
0.987***
(0.207)
0.708***
(0.139)
Routine 0.729***(0.138)
0.686***
(0.126)
0.981***
(0.209)
0.699***
(0.132)
EU Migrant Population Growth -0.247(5.429)
2.522
(3.375)
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth -1.108(4.149)
0.693
(2.685)
Population 60 and Older 5.705*(2.984)
3.836**
(1.801)
Unemployment Rate 0.073*(0.041)
0.046
(0.031)
Index of Multiple Deprivation -0.008(0.016)
-0.011
(0.009)
Constant -6.092***(0.292)
-4.179***
(0.118)
-6.623***
(0.384)
-6.606**
(0.295)
-11.119***
(1.047)
-7.407**
(0.540)
N (Individuals) 40,784 44,157 22,465 24,414 21,024 21,024
N (Groups) 1,026 956 812
Region, Year, Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Models Logit Hierarchical Logit Hierarchical Logit Hierarchical
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
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perceptions of the neighbourhood and radical right support, and confirms this
result.
Interaction Effects
Table 4.3 and Figures 4.4 and 4.5 present the interaction terms of community
pub closures with individual demographic determinants to evaluate who is in-
clined to vote UKIP when faced with closures of community pubs. Table 4.3
reports a statistically significant effect for the interaction with ethnicity and
type of jobs. This shows that the white British respondents are more likely
to support UKIP as the closure of pubs increases. The same goes for respon-
dents with jobs with routinised tasks, by comparison to those with managerial
or intermediate positions. This confirms that the relation between community
pub closures and UKIP support is a white working-class phenomenon which is
similar to the socio-demographics of community pub attendees and UKIP sup-
porters (Evans and Mellon, 2019). Table 4.3 also includes the gender interaction
(model 3) as I would expect men to be more affected by these pub closures since
they go to the pub much more than women. 34% of men say that they go to the
pub once a week or more by comparison to 12% of women (Camra Data, 2009).
The effect is in the right direction but is, however, not significant. This result
could be due to the fact that pubs have become more family-friendly after ac-
cepting the presence of children in the last years, which may have increased the
attendance of women in pubs. Not having many observations to work with since
so few women support UKIP in the first place could also explain the absence of
a gender effect.
Table 4.4 and Figure 4.6 present the interaction terms of pub community
closures with local contextual drivers to test the material deprivation hypoth-
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Figure 4.4: Interaction Effects: White population
Figure 4.5: Interaction Effects: Working Class
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Table 4.3: Interaction Effects (Individual Features)
(1) (2) (3)
Community Pub Closures 0.992(0.732)
0.439
(1.336)
3.744*
(1.968)
White British -0.824***(0.073)
-2.6***
(0.141)
2.075***
(0.198)
White British ×
Community Pub Closures
4.622***
(1.788)
Jobs (Managerial and Professional)
Intermediate -0.002***(0.060)
Routine -0.301***(0.060)
Intermediate Jobs ×
Community Pub Closures
0.340
(0.374)
Routine Jobs ×
Community Pub Closures
3.939**
(1.976)
Female -0.091***(0.031)
-0.076*
(0.043)
-0.214**
(0.078)
Female ×
Community Pub Closures
-0.412
(2.115)
Education (0=Higher Degree)
High School or Vocational 0.018(0.118)
-0.105
(0.156)
0.008
(0.300)
GCSE or Equivalent 0.344***(0.041)
0.362***
(0.050)
0.833***
(0.103)
No Qualification 0.347***(0.045)
0.290***
(0.063)
0.834***
(0.115)
EU Migrant Population Growth 1.341(1.170)
-1.063
(1.411)
1.993
(2.794)
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth -1.742*(0.933)
-2.840**
(1.172)
-4.730**
(2.316)
Unemployment Rate 0.009(0.011)
0.019
(0.013)
0.019
(0.025)
Index of Multiple Deprivation 0.000(0.003)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.005
(0.008)
Constant -2.081***(0.074)
-2.044***
(0.103)
-5.989***
(0.758)
N 36,220 22,150 36,220
Region, Wave, Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
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esis. Table 4.4 reports a statistically significant effect for the interaction with
economic local drivers. This confirms the material hypothesis in line with the
local socio-cultural degradation hypothesis. Figure 4.6 shows strong and posi-
tive marginal effects of economic local conditions on UKIP support. This means
that individuals who are exposed to both an increase of unemployment (or to
an increase of material deprivation in general) and community pub closures
in their district are more inclined to support a radical right party. This is in
line with previous studies which highlight the compounding effects of economic
deprivation on radical right support (Golder, 2003; Jennings and Stoker, 2017).
Figure 4.6: Marginal Effects
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Table 4.4: Interaction Effects (Contextual Features)
(1) (2)
Community Pub Closures -4.231(4.652)
-9.209
(7.830)
Female -0.288***(0.103)
-0.393***
(0.148)
White British 2.098***(0.265)
2.688***
(0.333)
Education (0=Higher Degree)
High School or Vocational -0.274(0.414)
-0.380
(0.546)
GCSE or Equivalent 0.791***(0.127)
1.081***
(0.200)
No Qualification 0.672***(0.159)
0.905***
(0.236)
Job (Managerial and Professional)
Intermediate 0.720***(0.141)
1.004***
(0.212)
Routine 0.713***(0.146)
0.994***
(0.215)
EU Migrant Population Growth -0.905(3.896)
-0.501
(5.579)
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth -0.507(3.160)
-0.641
(4.179)
Population 60 and Older 4.014*(2.050)
5.921*
(3.024)
Unemployment Rate 0.030(0.032)
0.068
(0.042)
Index of Multiple Deprivation -0.005(0.011)
-0.016
(0.015)
Unemployment Rate ×
Community Pub Closures
1.611**
(0.727)
IMD ×
Community Pub Closures
0.847**
(0.413)
Constant -7.452***(0.593)
-11.153***
(1.064)
N 21,024 21,024
Region, Wave, Year FE Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
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Robustness Checks
As a last step, I address some concerns that might be raised to the presented
results with several robustness checks. The first four models of Table 4.5 show
that the community-styles pubs are uniquely affecting UKIP support given the
insignificant effects of other types of pubs. The logit models show no effect for
pub chains, pubs in the city centres and gastropubs. This can be explained by
the fact that those types of pubs attract another part of the population who
is not supportive of UKIP. Indeed, this corroborates previous findings which
showed that middle- or upper-class voters with higher education and more ethnic
diversity, as well as tourists, are more likely to frequent pubs in the city centre
and gastropubs (Gest, 2016).
The last column of Table 4.5 presents the logit model with additional
independent variables. The closure of community pubs is still significantly and
positively affecting UKIP support, which aligns with my previous results. New
control variables include other immigration variables that focus on stock of EU
migrants and non-EU migrants in order to test the effect of levels, and not
change, of immigration on radical right support. The absence of significant ef-
fects is consistent with previous studies that show an effect of rapid changes
in ethnic diversity but not of immigration stocks (Kaufmann, 2017). The last
model also adds other economic variables at the district level that may play a
role in boosting radical right electoral support. The quantum of EU structural
funds per capita16, the growth in the share of low-skilled workers and the num-
ber of total fiscal cuts from 2005 to 2010 are known to have predicted UKIP
and Brexit (leave) votes (Jennings and Stoker, 2017; Colantone and Stanig,
16The European structural funds provide funds to help local areas to grow. The funds
support investment in innovation, businesses, skills and employment and create jobs.
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2018a; Becker et al., 2017). However, despite the positive signs, no coefficient
is significant. Finally, I add the change of business tax rates17 in the last 10
years and other deprivation variables, which include average scores for levels of
crime, barriers to housing and services, living environment, income deprivation
(affecting old people), and health deprivation. No effect has been found and the
models remain unchanged.
Table 4.6 reports the estimation of community pub closures on UKIP
vote share (in the 2014 EU elections) at the district level. The independent
variable is the ratio of community pub closures in the last five years (2011-
2016) to the number of overall pubs in each district. District-level models show
similar results to those that use the individual level survey data: one standard
deviation increase of community pub closures in the last five years increases
the radical right vote share by 9.204 percentage points. While the effect is also
strong and significant for the number of community pub closures in the last ten
years, it is not significant for the last fifteen years. This confirms that the rapid
decline of pubs that started in 2007 with the national smoking ban provoked
a surge of radical right support, even ten years ago when UKIP was not as
successful as in recent years. This table therefore shows that changes in the
rate of community pub closures affect radical right support.
17I include business tax rates since they could privilege pub companies and harm community
pubs (by discouraging people to deposit licence to open a local pub).
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Table 4.5: Local Social Degradation and UKIP Support
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pub Chain Closures 0.802(0.568)
Closures of Pubs in the City Centre 0.209(0.452)
Gastro Pub Closures 0.056(0.490)
Community Pub Closures 4.066**(0.789)
Female -0.067***(0.032)
-0.067***
(0.032)
-0.067***
(0.038)
-0.032***
(0.044)
White British 0.710***(0.070)
0.710***
(0.070)
0.710***
(0.071)
0.410
(0.375)
Education (0=Higher Degree)
High School or Vocational -0.197(0.167)
-0.199
(0.167)
-0.198
(0.167)
-0.128
(0.133)
GCSE or Equivalent 0.268***(0.042)
0.368***
(0.042)
0.366***
(0.042)
0.212***
(0.173)
No Qualification 0.345***(0.048)
0.344***
(0.048)
0.344***
(0.048)
0.178***
(0.164)
EU Migrant Population Growth 1.389(1.284)
1.341
(1.303)
1.380
(1.303)
2.137
(1.048)
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth -0.760(1.078)
-0.721
(1.077)
-0.714
(1.080)
-0.213
(1.048)
Population 60 and Older 1.937**(2.984)
1.872**
(1.801)
1.881**
(2.984)
1.247**
(1.575)
Unemployment Rate 0.008(0.041)
0.008
(0.031)
0.007
(0.041)
0.006
(0.024)
Index of Multiple Deprivation 0.001(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
EU Migrant Population Share (2001) -10.299(6.234)
Non-EU Migrant Population Share (2001) 0.011(1.492)
EU Structural Funds per capita -0.000(0.001)
Change in Low-Skilled Workers -1.568(3.547)
Total Fiscal Cuts 0.001(0.001)
Business Rates Change (2010-2017) 0.005(0.004)
Crime-(other index of deprivation) (2010-2017) -0.228(0.189)
Housing and Services-(other index of deprivation) 0.001(0.009)
Living Environment-(other index of deprivation) 0.004(0.008)
Income (Old People)-(other index of deprivation) 2.049(1.264)
Health Deprivation -0.055(0.189)
Constant -3.245***(0.181)
-3.226***
(0.182)
-3.220***
(0.182)
-2.547**
(1.502)
N (Individuals) 31,650 31,650 31,650 30,821
Region, Year, Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
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Table 4.6: Local Social Degradation and UKIP Vote Share (2014 EU Elections)
(1) (2) (3)
Community Pub Closures (last 5 years) 9.204***(3.404)
Community Pub Closures (last 10 years) 8.630**(3.805)
Community Pub Closures (last 15 years) -0.031(0.042)
Population 60 and Older 13.463(9.236)
14.196
(9.292)
2.082
(10.323)
Share of People with No Qualification 64.236***(6.300)
63.637***
(6.282)
98.162***
(10.431)
EU Migrant Population Growth -55.605**(26.385)
-55.762**
(26.901)
-42.095*
(24.178)
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth -66.161***(15.817)
-66.791***
(15.955)
-58.950***
(14.157)
Total Economy EU Dependence 66.972***(11.918)
66.641***
(11.948)
54.062***
(12.466)
Manufacturing Employment Share Change (2001-2011) 59.907***(16.636)
58.206***
(16.612)
71.082***
(19.464)
Unemployment Rate -0.097(0.121)
-0.098
(0.120)
0.112
(0.125)
Index of Multiple Deprivation -0.326**(0.078)
-0.328***
(0.088)
-0.036***
(0.090)
Constant 3.085(2.660)
3.249
(2.669)
3.025
(3.114)
Observations 326 326 326
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
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Table 4.7: With Additional Dependent Variables
UKIP/ Closeness to Closeness to Leave Without
BNP Support UKIP UKIP/BNP Vote London
Community Pub Closures 5.366***(3.560)
5.777*
(2.279)
5.433*
(1.200)
5.153***
(2.561)
5.095***
(2.454)
Female -0.034(0.028)
-0.163***
(0.057)
-0.160***
(0.060)
-0.019
(0.050)
-0.044*
(0.027)
Education (0=Higher Degree)
High School or Vocational -0.145(0.102)
0.227*
(0.118)
0.213*
(0.119)
-0.009
(0.158)
-0.190
(0.142)
GCSE or Equivalent 0.210***(0.099)
0.242***
(0.071)
0.249***
(0.078)
0.029***
(0.250)
0.278***
(0.069)
No Qualification 0.187*(0.097)
0.326***
(0.100)
0.327***
(0.107)
0.036
(0.234)
0.252***
(0.069)
Percentage Leave Vote 0.013(0.008)
Constant -2.132***(0.786)
-2.742***
(0.538)
-2.692***
(0.573)
-0.336
(2.657)
-2.771***
(0.477)
Observations 31,650 31,650 31,650 31,650 26,554
Region, Year, Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contextual Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
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Table 4.8: Local Social Degradation and Support for Mainstream Parties
Labour Support Conservative Support
Community Pub Closures 0.947(0.625)
-0.193
(0.702)
Female 0.185***(0.024)
0.006
(0.023)
White British -0.455***(0.037)
0.084**
(0.036)
Education (0=Higher Degree)
High School or Vocational 0.066(0.076)
-0.067
(0.086)
GCSE or Equivalent 0.085***(0.027)
-0.035
(0.030)
No Qualification -0.076*(0.032)
-0.094***
(0.032)
Constant -1.420***(0.150)
-1.731***
(0.131)
Observations 31,650 31,650
Region, Year, Wave FE Yes Yes
Contextual Variables Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
Finally, I need to ensure that my results do not hinge on the exact spec-
ification of the dependent variable. The last two robustness models include
variants of the UKIP support variable. It first includes in Model 1 the indi-
vidual support for both UKIP and the British National Party (BNP), another
radical right party (of lesser popularity). Respondents who indicated they would
vote tomorrow for either UKIP or BNP take value 1 and those who indicated
they would vote tomorrow for other parties take value 0. Model 2 and 3 use
a different party identification variable that looks at respondents’ closeness to
UKIP (Model 2) or their closeness to UKIP and the BNP (Model 3). The ques-
tion asked respondents ‘Which party do you feel the closest to ?’. The findings
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are similar to previous models, which corroborate my findings. Model 4 then
includes the percentage of Brexit support in the district given the last correla-
tions of UKIP and Brexit found in previous studies (Jennings and Stoker, 2017;
Becker et al., 2017). The effect of community pub closures remains strongly
significant and positive in all models. The last column of this table tests my
model by excluding London, an outlier with its relatively large presence of non-
UKIP supporters by comparison to other regions. Results are unchanged by the
exclusion of this outlier. Finally, the last table (Table 4.8) uses logit models to
test whether the effect of community pub closures applies to other mainstream
parties. The lack of significant effect for Labour or Conservative party support
confirms that the closures of community pubs uniquely lead to UKIP support.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence of a local socio-cultural driver of radical right
voting by deploying an original empirical indicator, the closure of community-
style pubs in Britain. The presence of community pub closures is associated with
the propensity for an individual to support a radical right party. One percent
rise of community pub closure per number of pubs in the district increases the
individual’s likelihood to support UKIP by around 1.63 percentage points. The
impact is magnified under conditions of material deprivation. It is also unique
to the community-style pubs since no effect has been found for pub chains, pubs
in the city centre or gastropubs. My findings are robust to additional dependent
and independent variables, entropy balancing models and the exclusion of an
outlier (London).
Although this study applies to the UK context with its distinctive pub-
going tradition, similar empirical data can be applied to other case studies in
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Western democracies. These countries either have an equivalent to the com-
munity pub, such as bars or cafés, or are home to other socio-cultural hubs
that embody distinctive local traditions. Moreover, this study should pave the
way toward using other original local contextual drivers that also capture so-
cial capital as a socio-cultural hubs, such as the growing decline of post offices,
independent stores or recreational centres. More innovative avenues should be
considered in the future to find other empirical indicators of local socio-cultural
degradation. Future research should also evaluate the causal nature of this local
socio-cultural factor.
This study has important implications for our understanding of the re-
lationship between social capital and radical right voting. It sheds light on a
non-negligible socio-cultural component of radical right support which accom-
panies structural material changes in Western countries. The socio-cultural
dimensions of white working class marginalisation should not be neglected in
the overall understanding of the rise and success of radical right parties.
This study also has significant implications for policymakers, suggesting
the importance of initiatives to maintain vibrant local communities. Without
discounting the material dimension, the disappearance of socio-cultural hubs
provides window opportunities for radical right parties to galvanise behind a
powerful ‘left-behind’ narrative and get larger electoral gains. Highlighting the
decline of local social activity lends urgency to state policies to prompt social
cohesiveness in economically deprived localities.
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5 | Conclusion
This dissertation has argued that local context can help to explain radical right
support. The main assumption is simple: individuals’ perceptions of the world
are rooted in the everyday, lived experiences which in turn shape how they cast
their vote. While not discounting the relevance of national and individual mo-
tivators, I consider that the level of analysis in which individuals make sense
of their political preferences is the level in which they live, work and observe
change in their immediate environment. My dissertation pursued three novel
lines of enquiry. First, I examined how individuals’ evaluations of self-esteem,
which may be influenced by economic and cultural factors, impacts their po-
litical preferences. Second, I considered how the changes in immigrant skill
levels and unemployment in individuals’ local areas affect the way their frame
politics and cast their vote. Here, I found that the way individuals form an
opinion on immigration is likely to be influenced by the local level dynamics of
immigration. Third, I investigated how the disappearance of individuals’ socio-
cultural heritage in a proximate surrounding can be strongly linked to radical
right support.
In this final chapter, I summarise the empirical regularities of each in-
dividual research paper and highlight my broader contributions and comment
on the limitations of the papers. I conclude by outlining a number of potential
avenues for further research and draw out the broader theoretical, empirical and
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policy implications of this thesis.
5.1 Summary of Key Findings
The three empirical chapters of this thesis presented a series of conclusions
regarding the local context and its effect on radical right support. Drawing
from the 2017 Eurobarometer Survey, my first paper uses a novel variable,
Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status, and combines this variable with the
multiple rounds of the European Social Survey to test its effect on radical right
and radical left support in 19 countries over a fourteen-year period (2002-2016).
This paper overcomes the dilemma of attributing economic or cultural factors
to the radical right vote by considering this new status variable as combining
both economic and cultural features. This variable means that where individuals
stand in comparison to the full social order results from economic developments,
such as globalisation, de-industrialisation or technological change, and cultural
developments, as manifested by the migration crisis. A decline of an individual’s
social position eventually translates into a voting preference towards the radical
right. This paper makes two novel contributions to the political behaviour
literature. First, the paper applies this social status variable to the radical left,
since economic threat resulting from the economic crisis have affected the social
status of an overlooked and vulnerable voting group: the young well-educated
middle class. Although an exhaustive list of factors is developed to explain
radical right support, very few research studies have explored drivers of the
radical left.
Second, this paper includes a reference group to the position that indi-
viduals compared themselves vis-à-vis their parents. Instead of being asked to
compare oneself to anyone in society as existing research on social status does
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(Gest et al., 2018; Gidron and Hall, 2017), this study tests how people are doing
compared to the standards of living of their parents’ generation. This better
captures the nostalgic deprivation that radical right and radical left support-
ers may perceive. While the white working class is nostalgic for a homogenous
nation where manual labourers were crucial pillars of society, the young well-
educated middle class is sensitive to a society with social and income equality.
Using regional, year and round fixed effects, the paper finds that subjective so-
cial decline can be attributed to both the radical right and radical left parties in
19 European countries. Such effects are amplified under the traditional attitudes
of each respective party family: immigration for the radical right and redistri-
bution for the radical left. Two different voting groups support these parties.
While the unskilled and low-educated working-class men are more drawn to the
radical right, the young well-educated middle-class voters are more attracted
to the radical left. This paper therefore presents a reconciling feature between
radial right and radical left voters and provides the first cross-national compar-
ison of this feature across 19 European countries at the finest grid available, the
regional level.
My second paper uses an original longitudinal dataset of fine-grained mu-
nicipal electoral, demographic and economic data from France over the 2002–2017
period. Unlike previous research on the labour market dynamics between im-
migrants and natives, this paper has data on the respective share of immigrants
and natives per occupation, which take into consideration variations across
occupation-types between immigrants and natives. This fine-grained analy-
sis that examines the local dynamics responsible for radical right support has
reached three conclusions. First, it finds that what drives radical right sup-
port in French municipalities is not immigration and unemployment per se,
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but it is rather the actual local competition between immigrants and natives
with similar skillsets. Second, natives of any socio-economic class may sup-
port the radical right if they enter in local labour competition with immigrants
with similar skills. This finding helps explain why the socio-economically di-
versified voting base of the radical right is not restricted to low-skilled voters.
Third, the within-municipal variations shed light on the skills of natives and
immigrants that contribute to larger radical right support. While this paper
confirms the traditional low-skilled profile of the radical right voters, it also
highlights that more middle- and high-skilled immigrants fuel the rise of the
French’s Front National (FN) over time because immigrants with higher qual-
ifications are compelled to accept lower-skilled jobs, and are thus perceived as
a competitive threat to low-skilled natives. My second paper therefore offers
insights into how the economic threat of immigration still matters in people’s
radical right voting behaviour.
My second paper also demonstrates that immigration reduces radical
right support at the local level. Interestingly, net immigration has a significant
and negative impact on far-right vote share in most models, which gives credence
to the contact theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Mclaren,2002). A higher share
of ethnic minorities in a given environment can reduce negative radical right
voting by favouring positive inter-ethnic interactions. Among the 69 empirical
studies of ethnic change on immigration opinion or far-right voting since 1995,
52 tests prove that increased far-right voting or anti-immigration attitudes are
linked to ethnic change. 87 percent of those 52 studies find a significant threat
effect and only four studies demonstrate a significant contact effect.
Yet, the contact theory has been poorly operationalised because the ef-
fects of inter-ethnic contacts are only empirically detectable in small geographies
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(Della Posta, 2013) and only five per cent of these studies have been conducted
at a low level of analysis. My analysis is therefore in line with previous studies
that looked at low geographical units. It reinforces the importance of investi-
gating contextual predictors (i.e. immigration, unemployment, etc) at various
levels of analysis.
The third paper puts forward groundbreaking theoretical and empirical
evidence of an overlooked social component behind radical right support. I ad-
vance the local socio-cultural degradation hypothesis and use a new indicator
that allows for a novel and direct test of this hypothesis at a local level. I argue
that the decline of socio-cultural hubs embodies the sense of loss of community
and cultural identity and is related to more radical right vote. Using the commu-
nity pub closures as a proxy of the local socio-cultural degradation hypothesis,
the final paper shows that the increase of community-pub closures is linked to
UKIP support in Britain. This innovative indicator allows for closer mapping
between theory and empirics than has been possible in previous ethnographic
fieldwork is unable to conduct systematic investigation over time (Cramer, 2016;
Hochschild, 2016; Gest, 2016). The third paper finds that a particular segment
of the population is disproportionately affected by community pub closures: the
white working class, who are more inclined to perceive that their cultural iden-
tity has been under attack. This ‘left-behind’ feeling is exemplified through the
closure of these community hubs that defined the culture of the white working
class.
The final finding of the third paper is that the effect of socio-cultural
degradation only increases when there are more difficult economic circumstances.
This socio-cultural factor reflects an additive effect of local socio-cultural degra-
dation under conditions of material deprivation. The fact that radical right
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support does not operate solely through anti-immigrant sentiments but rather
through material worsening conditions is an important finding. This opens the
door to an appreciation of the different ways in which social identifications and
societal cleavages are established and politicised in modern politics. Cleav-
ages not only arise between natives, members of the ‘ingroup’, and immigrants,
members of the ‘outgroup’, but also between natives living in deprived areas
and other natives. These new powerful social cleavages appear to invigorate
radical right support.
5.2 Contributions
This dissertation has made significant contributions to the debates about the
factors behind the radical right support. It offers the most wide-ranging and
fine-grained study of local contextual dynamics behind radical right support to
date. When explaining factors that influence voting behaviour, most studies ei-
ther look at national or individual factors. The first view, conducted by Erikson
et al. (2002), shows that national level events, like the national economy or un-
employment, dictate people’s voting behaviour. The second view, as stated by
Fiorina (1981), Kinder and Kiewiet (1979), and Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck (2011),
argues instead that voters care more about their personal economic conditions.
This study rather defends that an under-developed account is equally impor-
tant: the local sociotropic voting account. Individuals’ voting preferences are
not formed in a vacuum but are conditioned by everyday experiences in their lo-
cal areas. By offering wider appreciation of local sociotropic accounts, this thesis
brings a new dimension that should be considered when identifying the factors
that affect individuals’ voting behaviour. This thesis addresses this ‘black box’
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of factors and shows how immigration, economic conditions and social factors
at a local level can play a huge role in influencing people’s voting preferences.
This thesis’ consideration of local sociotropic considerations also miti-
gates some key methodological concerns that attend national-level and individual-
level research on the radical right, in particular by resolving issues of ecolog-
ical inferences and offering consistency to mixed results at the national and
individual levels. The local perspective adds knowledge to the complex inter-
actions that occur at the meso-level but are usually omitted at individual or
aggregate levels of analysis. The first paper investigates results at the regional
level (in 226 NUTS 2 regions) in order to compare support for radical parties
across units of comparable size and test effects which are usually overlooked
in individual- and national-level studies. This paper also uses a concept which
refers to another key local sociotropic influence on people’s expectations and
political behaviour: Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status. This psycholog-
ical mechanism involves social comparisons between a person and his or her
parents, which helps to explain radical right and radical left support among
a younger cohort. The second paper suggests that labour market competition
can be detected if it is measured at a municipal level where natives can be di-
rectly affected by the arrival of newcomers. The third paper uses the decline of
community-style pubs per district in Britain to show that local socio-cultural
degradation also contributes to radical right support. These papers establish
that no theory should be discounted without having been investigated at vari-
ous geographical scales. This novel and more nuanced geo-political account of
the local sociotropic forces underlying individuals’ voting behaviour therefore
brings new insights to the study of voting behaviour, comparative politics and
public opinion.
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Second, this thesis engages with the fundamental debate concerning rea-
sons behind radical right support. Most scholars have identified factors behind
the radical right as pertaining to either the economic camp or to the cultural
camp. On the one hand, scholars like Norris and Inglehart (2019) and Kauf-
mann (2016) contend that cultural backlash provides the most consistent and
parsimonious explanation for radical right support. The older generation, men,
the religious, and less educated sectors of society who are or feel left behind
following progressive waves of cultural change respond to the erosion of their
predominance and privilege in the 1950s/1960s years with a radical right vote.
The change of value system in the 1970s appears to have fomented an angry and
resentful counter-revolutionary backlash today. On the other hand, other stud-
ies have shown that economic anxiety drives radical right support (Fetzer, 2019;
Colantone and Stanig, 2018a, 2018b). The worsening economic conditions have
forced vulnerable people out of their job and increased their resentment, later
expressed by radical right support. While this study speaks to both of these
camps, it offers remedies to this unhelpful dichotomy. First, this thesis chal-
lenges prominent narratives of recent radical right success as primarily a cultural
backlash that has little to do with economic grievances (Norris and Inglehart,
2019; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Kaufmann, 2016) by revealing strong and consistent
material bases underpinning radical right support (Paper 2). Second, it argues
that once the local conditions that influence voters’ political preferences are ex-
amined, the economic versus cultural arguments are complementary rather than
antagonistic. Through an emphasis on political geography and subnational level
dynamics, I show that local contextual dynamics that combine economic, cul-
tural and social features can play a role in influencing radical right support.
My first paper demonstrates that the coupling of economic difficulties and cul-
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tural arrivals can be characterised by an intervening variable, the decline of
subjective social status. My third paper identifies an important, yet neglected,
social dimension related to socio-cultural disappearances in the closure of pubs
as being linked to radical right support. Therefore, by focusing on the inter-
twined economic, cultural and social facets of the local context, this thesis adds
new insights to scholarship on how economic and cultural factors interact and
structure spatial divides in radical right voting behaviour.
Third, this thesis contributes to our understanding of political behaviour
by applying well-conceptualised approaches and well-tested factors behind rad-
ical right support to other party families. The first paper of the thesis showed
how the rich literature of the radical right can be used to understand support for
the radical left. Examining radical left political behaviour through the lens of
status anxiety reveals the strong material and economic underpinnings underly-
ing radical left voting. The analysis of subjective social status as the reconciling
factor between radical right and radical left parties reveals the need for further
research on the commonalities of these two party families. Factors that are un-
derstood to explain the rise and success of the radical right could be extended to
other new challenger or niche parties. For instance, using the literature on local
context, one may assume that the presence of natural disasters or rise of the
temperature can influence individuals’ voting preferences to the green parties.
Overall, by applying insights from political geography to puzzling polit-
ical phenonema, this dissertation not only contributes fresh knowledge to the
study of radical right behaviour in Western Europe, it also provides a general
framework for investigating the complexities of local drivers. This framework
consists of three steps. First, it involves endorsing the local sociotropic account
that local socio-cultural spaces can shape people’s political behaviour. While
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not discounting national-level and individual patterns, adopting an analysis
from a local focal point paves the way for more innovative theoretical consid-
erations. Second, it requires considering alternative options to the unhelpful
dichotomy between the economic and cultural factors behind radical right sup-
port. Third, it involves thinking about novel local data which may entail that
existing theories can be revisited in innovative ways. This paper has done so
by examining psychological factors like subjective social status or the under-
explored socio-cultural degradation. This implies analysing how such specific
local drivers can be operationalised within various European contexts.
5.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Av-
enues
The three papers in my thesis bring accounts of whether and how locally ori-
ented factors can motivate support for the radical right and the radical left,
thus inspiring further exploration of the ways in which the local connects to
the politically radical. One way to further improve our understanding implies
delving deeper into the varied and complex meanings of ‘place’. It can represent
‘objective’ factors; observable economic, political or demographic characteris-
tics at some geographical level; and ‘subjective’ understanding of geographic
communities. However, the level of analysis that ought to be relevant to best
depict these geographic communities have been rarely explored in political sci-
ence. The level can either mean higher levels of aggregation like the meso-level
with a region or lower levels like a municipality, a distinct neighbourhood, hous-
ing estate, or street corner. It is crucial for political scientists to think more
seriously about which geographies should matter, and how, to answer political
questions. Smaller measures of local context which are relatable to people’s
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daily lives could be envisaged in future studies. While I investigate regions,
municipalities and districts in my three papers, I cannot infer that effects will
be the same at other ‘local’ levels. That is why more precise units that can
capture the ‘context’ that most individuals see in their day-to-day lives should
be considered. That is also why further investigation of the way each predictor
of the radical behaviour acts at different levels of aggregation is needed (King
and Wheelock, 2007; Savelkoul et al., 2017). Accounting for different dynamics
of each effect operating at distinct geographical levels can be insightful. For
example, contact effects have been found to exist in smaller units of analysis
(Kaufmann and Harris, 2015; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010). But, as the size
of unit increases, anti-immigrant attitudes of natives and ethnic competition
are reinforced (Della Posta, 2013).
‘Local’ may also entail different theoretical understandings. The thesis
has given significance to how the contextual sense of ‘place’, materialised by local
economic competition, immigration and local socio-cultural hubs, have radical
electoral impacts. The concept of status anxiety that is tested in the first paper
refers to local context as social comparisons with parents. However, this local
meaning can be extended to people’s local entourage. Scholars advance that
‘local context’ can refer to a social network in which people communicate with
their neighbours and peers to convey ideas and political opinions (Agnew, 1983;
Cutts and Webber, 2010; Johnson and Pattie, 2006). Local context can also be
understood in policy terms; a local area is likely to be largely influenced by the
implementation of a local policy (for example, an increased budget for certain
services i.e. accommodating the arrival of asylum seekers). Further studies that
consider the impact of these variants of local factors should be undertaken. In
addition, there is a great scholarly potential to explore the connections between
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politically relevant local attachment and radical right support. A radical right
vote might be reflective of people’s feelings of attachment and belonging to
their local communities against the rise of globalisation or centralised trends.
Fitzgerald (2018) has shown early evidence of this phenomenon but we still know
very little how local attachment influences political extremism and radical right
support.
Since this thesis has shown the importance of local context to radical
right support, more research is needed to understand the effect of local context
on attitudinal determinants. A wide range of studies has looked at the link
between immigration and radical right voting but few have looked at how local
conditions can foster anti-immigrant sentiments. The influence of the local
context on individual attitudes such as the perception of neighbourhood or
perception towards immigration could lead to fruitful research in the future.
Table C.4 of the third appendix uses a new dataset to show that individuals’
perception of neighbourhood degradation in the last five years positively impacts
radical right support in the United Kingdom but more of these questions should
be systematically included in cross-national surveys. Understanding the ways
in which local contextual conditions influence people’s attitudes towards the
government, the political system, or immigrants could also be enriching.
The thesis has focused on the demand-side factors behind radical voting.
While it does it for the sake of precision, coherence and consistency between
all chapters, an analysis that can include some supply-side parameters could be
worth considering in future work. The literature recognises that both demand-
side and supply-side factors jointly determine the electoral success of the radical
right (Golder, 2016). The political opportunity structure may well interfere with
the level of radical right support by determining the extent to which demand
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is translated into radical right success (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). The first
and third papers assume that the nostalgic appeal of the radical right to the
white working class is a response to the radical right rhetoric and narrative that
precisely taps into these social and cultural grievances. In particular, if the
theme of local context is reprised, an investigation of local politics with radical
right local mayors (or local media) and how it is linked to higher levels of
radical right support could enrich our understanding of how supply-side factors
can mediate popular demands for the radical right. More progress can be made
by including the inherent interactions between demand-side and supply-side
factors.
With regards to methodology, this thesis relies on observational data that
makes it hard to claim any causal mechanisms between local factors and the
radical right being inferred. Establishing causal linkages about local contextual
factors is difficult since context is likely to be endogenous to the locality and
individuals might self-select where they want to live. However, other empirical
strategies could remedy these shortcomings. The development of new longitu-
dinal data in European countries, in addition to the German or UK household
panel studies, could enable us to better understand how attitudes and voting
preferences of individuals may change over time according to the varying lo-
cal contextual conditions. A recent cross-national funded project conducted in
the Netherlands, the UK and France that use geocoded survey data to match
electoral census data paves the way towards more innovative empirical tools to
explain the role of local context on the radical right support (SCoRE project).
Researchers might also want to use experimental designs to judge how
different local parameters are causing radical right support. For instance, one
might present different local scenarios which vary depending on the number of
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available public services, on the types of economic activity and/or on the levels
and types of immigration to see which factor(s) drive(s) radical right support.
A specific example of detecting social drivers of the radical right support is
the Wigan Deal, a social contract that has empowered communities through a
‘citizen-led’ approach to public services in the Wigan Council since 2011. This
initiative resembles a natural experiment that can assess its effect on electoral
outcomes by contrasting Wigan to other councils with a similar contextual and
compositional makeup that did not implement this policy. Quasi-experimental
designs could enlarge our knowledge of the effects of local factors on radical
right voting.
Not only would experimental techniques contribute to this research agenda,
but more data access at lower levels of analysis could also greatly advance knowl-
edge on this matter. The thesis either does cross-national comparison at the
regional level or single-case studies at the municipal level to test the various
demand-side approaches. So far, studies of radical right voting behaviour that
focus on smaller spatial units are hardly comparative due, mostly, to limitations
in getting exhaustive and reliable data for a large panel of countries. The rapid
expansion of accessible new data – many of which have been used in this thesis –
has created unprecedented opportunities to improve our understanding of sub-
national variations of the radical support. Future research should attempt to
use this data to systematically measure these variants at a lower unit of analysis
of comparable size across countries.
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5.4 Implications for Research into the Radical
Right and Political Behaviour
This dissertation generates far-reaching implications for political science, par-
ticularly in the study of radical right voting behaviour, political behaviour,
political sociology and political geography. With its innovative local dimension,
this thesis has shaped the debate on theories linking demand-side factors and
radical right voting behaviour. It extends previous research on the study of
the radical right and party behaviour by demonstrating how the local context
can play a fundamental role in explaining the radical right support. A local
analysis contributes to enriching the understanding of radical right support and
party behaviour in four regards. It first allows us to explain the subnational
variations which existing studies, that mostly employed national-level and/or
individual indicators, failed to prove. These analyses masked effects which are
only visible at a level of analysis in which people can make sense of their po-
litical interests. Second, an investigation of the local context helps to reconcile
the two dichotomised camps, economic and cultural, together by showing that
the two are not so indistinguishable when looking at what influences voting at a
proximate level of study. Third, a closer look into the local context invites us to
explore the complex features of what influences individuals to cast a vote for the
radical right beyond economic and cultural characteristics. By examining other
facets of the local changing dynamics, I identify the socio-cultural component
as being part of the complex picture of what truly motivates people to form
certain voting preferences.
The local sociotropic account of voting has gained a degree of flavour in
the field of political science (Enos, 2017). It has recently received more scholarly
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attention by providing a convincing explanation for the geographic divisions of
the Brexit and Trump vote (Hochschild, 2016; Cramer, 2016; Jennings et al.,
2016; McKay, 2019). One instance is Coyle and Ford’s argument that political
discontent has become entrenched in ‘left behind’ areas since the 1980s, after
the decline of economic and social fabric and the failed attempts of governments
to reverse this trend (Coyle and Ford, 2017:67). While this thesis uses this local
sociotropic account, further examination and refinement are needed to unveil
the effect of local context on political behaviour and attitudes in general. In
particular, it empirically means that obtaining more local data across European
countries, and having questions in the Eurobarometer Survey or other EU-wide
survey data about the local conditions of the neighbourhood, could greatly
advance the understanding of local factors on voting behaviour. Some questions
are already part of the UK Household Panel Study but they were only asked
in one wave (wave 6). A more systematic use of these questions across years
would be very valuable.
Greater attention to the local level would also involve more questionnaires
that would tackle the unresolved question of what ‘local context’ and ‘place’
truly mean to people. Recent experiments have come up with innovative ways
to overcome this ambiguity like Bowlers et al.’s working paper (2017) which
has asked respondents to locate their ‘place’ on a map to directly attach this
ambiguous term to what it really means to each respondent. Or, a question
that answers ‘When you think about places with political influence, what areas
matter?’ could be considered. Scholars have attempted this on small scales but
have not yet developed effective tools for measuring the local environment of
individuals in large-scale research (Enos, 2017). More sophisticated techniques
to refine the link between local context and political outcomes would be needed.
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Second, the findings of this thesis have theoretical implications for the
study of demand-side approaches to explaining radical right behaviour. This
includes avoiding cultivating the spurious dichotomy between economic and
cultural factors to explain the radical right support. Instead, understanding
these two forces as complementary rather than mutually exclusive will allow us
to better assess their interaction. Including both of their effects will also add
complexity to the reasons offered for why people vote for radical right parties
and not restrict them to stereotypical and artificial reasons. This thesis also il-
lustrates the theoretical and empirical benefits to using more innovative ways to
capture economic or cultural forces that influence radical right voting. Debates
over economic priorities have to a large extent given way, and cultural back-
lash explanations have gained significant ground (Hainmueller and Malhotra,
2015; Mutz, 2018; Norris and Inglehart, 2016). Yet, new ways to empirically
demonstrate the way the economy influences radical right voting support could
be insightful. Using skill levels of native and immigrant groups, my second
paper has shown that economic factors are non-negligible drivers in fuelling
radical right support. My third paper in particular helps to show that only eco-
nomic deprivation boosts the local socio-cultural degradation effects on radical
right support. Recent studies have also endorsed this view and showed that
economic shock (Colantone and Stanig, 2018a, 2018b), or austerity measures
(Fetzer, 2019), are causally increasing the support for radical right parties and
UKIP. These new findings call for a re-appreciation of the economic explanation
by scholars and for greater caution in implementing austerity-induced reforms
by politicians.
Third, this thesis has provided new insights into the political sociology
of radical right parties. The sociodemographic characteristics and attitudes of
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radical right supporters have been extensively investigated (Arzheimer, 2012;
Golder, 2016; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2007), but no explanation has been
generated as to why people from the middle-class can be attracted to the radical
right parties. By exploring local contextual dynamics, this thesis has demon-
strated why these parties have a socio-economically diverse voting base. Natives
with any skillset can be supportive of the radical right as long as they are under
direct local competition with immigrants of similar skill levels (Paper 2). My
third paper demonstrates that the white working class is more likely to be af-
fected by the closure of community pubs since they embody a British working-
class heritage. This conclusion permits important insights into ways of un-
derstanding how local contextual dynamics can trigger certain socio-economic
groups to support radical right parties. The political sociology of radical right
parties, and parties in general, is contingent on the local contextual dynamics.
This presents a theoretical consensus between compositional and contextual
features.
Finally, this thesis has implications in the field of political geography by
contributing to the scholarly debate on the geographic effect of immigration on
voting patterns. Recent elections have presented the paradox of having higher
anti-immigrant radical right support in areas with few immigrants. Political
geography has traditionally offered two conflicted explanations to justify why
radical right voting behaviour dramatically varies between geographic areas.
Some would explain it by the fact that any individuals who live under certain
contextual conditions, difficult local economic conditions, would share similar
negative views of their community which is then reflected in radical right vot-
ing preferences (Pattie and Johnson, 2006; McKay, 2019; Jennings and Stoker,
2019). Others would advance that it is the ethnic composition in these areas,
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older individuals with lower education, which drives this radical right support
(Maxwell, 2019; Cunningham and Savage 2017; Oberti and Préteceille, 2016).
This thesis provides a more nuanced understanding of compositional versus
contextual predictors of radical right support. My second paper finds a middle-
ground position which shows that both contextual and compositional factors are
of relevance: while contextual factors (immigration) influence radical right vot-
ing behaviour, it is the specific skill composition of these immigrants and the
relative skill composition of the natives that eventually leads to radical right
support. It is only the direct competition between immigrants and natives of
similar skill levels that will push natives to cast a radical right ballot. As for my
third paper, although local closures of community pubs influence radical right
support, these contextual phenomena particularly hit one socio-economic group
who most usually frequent these social spaces - the white working class. More-
over, these two papers also consider how some contextual levels can compound
the radical right effect. My second paper demonstrates that the competition be-
tween natives and immigrants is magnified under conditions of unemployment.
My third paper also shows that the local socio-cultural degradation impact on
radical right support is reinforced when there is larger economic deprivation in
the area. This reinforces how radical right support is contingent on local con-
textual features and how local economic hardship is a fertile breeding ground
of radical right support.
5.5 Policy Implications
This thesis has shown how individuals are politically embedded in their local
context and how in turn this local context conditions their radical voting be-
haviour. Above scholarly implications that aim to develop this theoretical and
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empirical linkage, this thesis has broader policy horizons. It has informed us
of the need for politicians and policy-makers to acknowledge the local context
in their political messages and policy recommendations. Most studies link the
national political distrust directed towards the workings of social and political
institutions to heightened party dealignment and support for non-mainstream
parties. This study stresses how the factors that directly affect voters in their
proximate level can also affect their views on parties, politicians and represen-
tative democracy. A national-level discourse by politicians can only exacerbate
the contention raised by individuals about feeling unrepresented by their ‘out-
of-touch’ representatives, which ultimately offers windows of opportunity for
radical right politicians to instrumentalise the message of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and
gain supporters. This study has provided a large exploration of the fact that the
local communities in which citizens are embedded - economically, culturally and
socially - shapes their political views and their likelihood of supporting radical
right parties. This calls for further attention to the local context as one path-
way for politicians to address the crisis of representative democracy. Despite
the importance of national considerations and political parties, the local matters
in shaping individuals’ view on democracy. Local economic conditions and the
lived experiences of the individuals will mediate the global phenomena to which
they are exposed. That is why politicians and policy-makers should tailor their
messages to specific audiences by taking into account local conditions.
This thesis helps inform politicians and policy-makers about the need
to avoid any territorial reform that would increase regional differences. This
directly goes against the narrative that dominated urban economics and gov-
ernmental policies in the 2000s in the United Kingdom. Following failed waves of
regeneration policy aimed at revitalising middle-sized towns, the policy remedy
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was to first focus on parts of the country that were prosperous and dynamic
(i.e. London and the South East) and, second, to allow people from other
cities (i.e. Manchester, Sunderland) to move to these affluent places to benefit
from the material opportunities there (Rodríguez-Posé, 2018). These policies
have contributed to greater regional disparities that, as this thesis identifies,
have electoral implications. Marginalisation in rural areas due to the growing
mobility of capital and people, and the rationalisation of public services have
created a further spiral of emigration and decline. Jennings and Stoker (2018)
advanced that more deprived areas in the UK voted to Leave in the 2016 EU
referendum, which confirms the combination of higher radical support in more
deprived areas. The UK has prioritised ‘place-based’ policies that try to ensure
more regionally inclusive economic growth instead of relying on ‘people-based’
policies that focus on economic efficiency with prosperous big-cities. There-
fore, the evidence explored in this thesis all seems to indicate that ‘place-based’
policies instead of ‘people-based’ policies should be privileged, as suggested by
other political scientists (Jennings and Stoker, 2018) and economists in geog-
raphy (Rodríguez-Posé, 2018; Barca et al. 2012). These ‘place-based’ policies
involve higher regional development intervention in order to prevent a larger
exodus of young aspirational individuals from middle-sized towns and reduce
regional inequality.
This thesis also sheds light on the need to consider variation on the lo-
cal level when thinking about policy making. Understanding the subnational
variations with a local outlook is a central prerequisite for the formulation of
neat and appropriate policy proposals. Differences within local areas are as
important as differences between local areas; therefore, policies should be tar-
geted to specific localities. They should be frequently reviewed and updated
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to respond to changes in local communities and guarantee a better provision of
public services.
Since the findings of the thesis speak to economic and cultural factors,
policy reforms that aim to tackle anti-radicalism should combine both aspects.
Since the roots of radicalism are similar for both ends of the political spec-
trum, as shown in my first paper, counteracting the rise of radical right and
radical left parties might require similar policy tactics. Policy reforms should
equally help facilitate the integration of immigrants and prevent any local sub-
sidy cuts that could further harm the poorest places and the poorest people.
Central governments should shift their agenda from short-term cuts and savings
to longer-term reforms with more substantial support for communities. This is
particularly acute in the era of Brexit given the large loss of spending power of
27 per cent in local authorities in England between 2010/2011 and 2015/2016,
with the most deprived authorities witnessing greater cuts (National Audit Of-
fice, 2017).
Finally, this thesis addresses concerns about the way radical right sup-
port might be addressed. Some who view the radical right as a ‘revolt against
globalisation’ suggest that a way to cope with it would be to provide more
compensation to people on whom international trade has imposed concentrated
losses. Redistribution policies are the solutions to the subsequent economic in-
equalities that globalisation has created (Colantone and Stanig, 2018a, 2018b;
Astryan et al., 2014). The fact that radical right support is more prevalent in
areas which are most exposed to the strains of globalisation seems to fit the
rationale. However, my study advances that compensation in the form of social
benefits may not be enough to discourage voters from supporting radical right
parties, insofar as it may not resolve the deeper concerns that these voters are
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facing. As shown in my third paper, the increasing social marginalisation of the
white working-class identity, which has been pushed to the periphery of society,
remains a stronger predicament that is likely to incentivise this voting group to
cast a radical right ballot. My third paper highlights that ways to counteract
radicalism do not only concern objective measures of living conditions and indi-
vidual characteristics, but also include socio-cultural ones. More comprehensive
policies that aim to preserve local assets of communities - libraries, local pubs,
community centres and so on -could be the first step towards reappraising these
local socio-cultural communities. Radical right support can be mitigated by
supporting socio-cultural communities.
The question of the extent to which subjective social decline, labour mar-
ket competition and local socio-cultural degradation lies behind radical right
support in Europe is unlikely to be tackled quickly or by any single set of poli-
tics, whether oriented to economic compensation or restrictions on immigration.
Addressing problems of status anxiety and local social decline are long-term en-
deavours which will require economic, cultural and social measures that both
improve the material situation of people disadvantaged by the current globali-
sation shift and also build national narratives that accord respect to all groups
and regions. Restoring the pride of places with high street vibrancy in town
centres would bring an end to national malaise that contributes to radical right
support. Accomplishing these tacks is not easy, but stemming the tide of rad-
ical right support depends on bold policies that consider economic conditions,
tolerate diversity and restore the social glory of groups of people who have been
relegated to vulnerable positions.
In hindsight, the papers in this thesis have offered contributions and
insights into this broad research agenda, and represent a starting point for
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further enquiry into the multifaceted economic, cultural and social features of
local context and radical right support.
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A | Appendix 1
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Radical Right Support 87,670 0.141 0.348 0 1
Radical Left Support 86,500 0.072 0.259 0 1
Mainstream Right Support 87,670 0.191 0.220 0 1
Mainstream Left Support 86,500 0.170 0.375 0 1
Green Support 86,452 0.060 0.039 0 1
Social Distance Compared to Parents 87,697 0.360 0.756 0.195 0.46
Social Placement 87,697 0.331 0.031 0.202 0.39
Immigration Attitudes_Culture 87,320 0.466 0.499 0 1
Immigration Attitudes_Economy 87,320 0.568 0.495 0 1
Rights for Immigrants to Reside 87,125 0.629 0.483 0 1
Against Immigrants (Same to Population) 87,323 0.281 0.450 0 1
Against Immigrants (Different to Population) 87,316 0.428 0.495 0 1
Against Immigrants (Non-EU) 87,316 0.449 0.497 0 1
Redistribution 87,196 0.873 0.332 0 1
Equality 87,028 0.707 0.455 0 1
Fair Society 87,113 0.815 0.388 0 1
No Trust of EU Parliament 84,478 0.682 0.466 0 1
Against Further EU Integration 84,506 0.587 0.492 0 1
No Trust in Politicians 83,712 0.772 0.420 0 1
Gini Index 88,546 .293 4 0.929 100
Unemployment Rate 88,546 0.040 6.890 4.234 46.050
Immigration Stock 88,546 0.038 7.865 0.929 58.789
Age 82,785 48.374 18.626 14 123
Gender 82,785 0.524 0.499 0 1
Class 82,240 3.186 1.400 1 5
Ethnic Minority 82,604 0.043 0.203 0 1
Education 82,534 1.447 0.964 0 3
Region 88,546 6.610 3.622 1 226
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Table A.2: Codebook
Variable Source Label Operationalisation
Radical Right Support European Social Survey (ESS) Who did you vote for in the last election? 1= Radical Right; 0=Other parties; .= Inapplicable, Don’t Know, No Answer
Radical Left Support ESS Who did you vote for in the last election? 1= Radical Left; 0= Other Parties; .= Inapplicable, Don’t Know, No Answer
Mainstream Right Support ESS Who did you vote for in the last election? 1=Mainstream Right; 0 = Other parties ; .= Inapplicable, Don’t Know, No Answer
Mainstream Left Support ESS Who did you vote for in the last election? 1=Mainstream Left ; 0=Other parties ; .= Inapplicable, Don’t Know, No Answer
Green Support ESS Who did you vote for in the last election? 1=Green ; 0=Other parties ; .= Inapplicable, Don’t Know, No Answer
Social Decline Compared to Parents 2017 Eurobarometer Survey Where would you place your parents I build mean values for each year group (1900-1941, 1942-1951, 1952-1961, 1962-1971
on this ladder by comparison to you 1972-1981, 1982-1991 and 1992-2001). For instance, there are 15 % of 1992-2001
in your country ? (Top, Middle, Bottom) with high values, 70 % of 1992-2001 with middle values and 14 % with low values
The mean value for year group (1992-2001)= ((0.15*3)+(0.7*2)+(0.14))/6=0.332
Social Placement 2017 Eurobarometer Survey Where would your place yourself on the Mean values calculated for 7 year groups
social ladder? (Top, Middle, Bottom) *1 if in lowest position, *2 if in middle position *3 if in higher position
Immigration Attitudes_Culture ESS Is your country’s cultural life undermined 0=Good for Culture; 1=Bad for Culture; .= DK
or enriched by immigrants?
Immigration Attitudes_Economy ESS Is Immigration bad or good for country’s 0=Good for the Economy; = Bad for the Economy; .=DK
economy?
Rights for Immigrants to Reside ESS Do immigrants make country worse or better 0= Better ; 1= Worse; .=DK
place to live?
Against Immigrants ESS Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic 0= Allow many; 1=Allow none, .=DK
(Same to Population) group as majority
Against Immigrants ESS Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic 0= Allow many; 1= Allow none; .=DK
(Different to Population) group from majority
Against Immigrants ESS Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries 0=Better ; 1=Worse; .=DK
(Non-EU) outside Europe
Redistribution ESS Government should reduce differences 0=Against government reducing income inequality
in income levels 1=For government reducing income inequality ; .=DK, No Response
Equality ESS Social benefits/services lead to 0=Against benefits and equality
a more equal society 1= For benefits and equality; .= DK, No Response
Fair Society ESS For fair society, differences in standard 0= Against small differences of living standard for fair society
of living should be small 1=For small differences of living standards for fair society, .=DK, No Response
No Trust of EU Parliament ESS Do you trust the EU Parliament? 0=Yes ; 1=No , .=DK, No Response
Against Further ESS Do you think the European unification 0=Go further ; 1= Went Too far; .=DK, No Response
EU Integration should go further or has gone too far?
No Trust in Politicians ESS Do you have trust in politicians? 0= Yes; 10=No; .=DK, No Response
Gini Index Eurostat Gini coefficient of equalized disposable income Continuous Variable
SILC- European Union Statistics for each Region
on Income and Living Conditions
Unemployment Rate Eurostat NUTS 2 regional long-term unemployment share Continuous Variable
in the total active population
Immigration Stock Eurostat % immigrant population Continuous Variable
Age ESS Continuous Variable
Gender ESS 1=Female; 0=Male
Class ESS Based on Oesch’s class position 1= Higher-grade service class; 2= Lower-grade service class; 3-small business owners
5 Classes 4 Skilled Workers; 5=Unskilled Workers
Education ESS 0=Primary, 1=Secondary, 2=Vocational, 3=Tertiary Education
Ethnic Minority ESS 1=an Ethnic Minority; 0=Not an Ethnic minority
185
Table A.3: Classification of Radical Right and Radical Left Parties
(a) CSES Score: 1=Extreme Left / 10= Extreme Right
Country Radical Right Parties Radical Left Parties
Austria Freedom Party(FPÖ) (8/10) Community Party (KPÖ) (1/10)
Team Stronach for Austria (7/10) Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) (7/10)
Belgium Flemish Interest (VB) (8/10) Worker’s Party (PTB) (3/10)
Front National (FN) (8.3/10) PVDA+ (Partij van de Arbeid) (2.5/10)
Parti Populaire (7.2/10), Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (NV-A) (7.6/10)
Lijst Dedecker (8/10)
Bulgaria Attack (9/10), Reformist Block (7/10)
Patriotic Front (8/10)
Denmark Danish People’s Party (DPP) (7/10) Socialist People’s Party (until 2012) - Red-Green Alliance (EL) (2/10)
Estonia Estonian Independence Party (EIP) (8.7/10) Estonia United Left Party (EURP) (2.3/10)
Constitution Party (1.3/10), Estonian United People’s Party (2/10)
Finland Finns (PS) (9/10) Left Alliance (VAS) (6/10)
Freedom Party – Finland’s Future (8/10) Communist Party of Finland (and Communist Workers’ Party of Finland) (1.2/10)
France Front National (FN) (7/10) Workers’ Struggle (LO) (2/10)
Left Front (FDG, former PRG) (3/10)
Anti-Capitalist Party (NPA) (2/10)
Germany Alternative for Germany (AfD) (8/10), Republikaner (8/10) Die Linke (The Left) (previously Party of Democratic Socialism PDS) (2/10)
National Democratic Party of Germany (NDP) (9.5/10)
Great Britain UK Independence Party (UKIP) (8.2/10)
British National Party (BNP) (8.7/10)
Hungary Jobbik (9/10), Fidesz (8.7/10) Communist Party (MKP) (2.1/10)
HTJP-Hungarian Truth (8.9/10) Workers’ Party (2.5/10)
Italy Northern League (LN) (8/10) Communist Refoundation Party (2.7/10)
Tricolour Flame (8.5/10) Party of Proletarian Unity (3/10), Party of Italian Communists (2/10)
Ireland United Left Alliance (3.5/10), Sinn Féin (3/10)
Workers’ Party, Socialist Party – United Left Alliance (until 2013) (3/10)
Independents (3/10), Anti-Austerity Alliance–People Before Profit (3/10)
The Netherlands Party for Freedom (PVV) (7.8/10) Socialist Party (3/10)
List Pim Fortuyn (8/10)
Poland Law and Justice (PiS) (6.2/10) Razem (Together Party) (3.5/10)
Wolność (Liberty) (7/10), Kukiz’15 (7.5/10)
League of Polish Families (7.8/10), Congress of the New Right (7.6/10)
Portugal National Renovator Party (PNR) (8.5/10) Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU/PCP/PEV) (2/10)
Bloco de Esquerda (BE) (previously Democratic Popular Union) (2/10)
Portuguese Communist Party (1/10)
Slovakia Slovak National Party (SNS) (7/10) Communist Party of Slovakia (2.2/10),
Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS) (2.3/10)
Slovenia Slovene National Party (SNS) (7/10) United Left (2/10)
Spain Unidos Podemos (3/10)
United Left (previously PCE-Communist Party of Spain) (2.8/10)
Sweden Swedish Democrats (SD) (7.6/10) Left Party (previously VPK-Left Party-The Communists) (3.4/10)
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Table A.4: Social Placement, Radical Right and Radical Left Support
Radical Right Radical Left
Support Support
(1) (2)
Social Placement -1.662**(0.654)
-2.083**
(0.842)
Immigration Attitudes (0=Agst) 0.624***(0.035)
-0251***
(0.043)
Redistribution Preferences (0=Agst) 0.108*(0.049)
0.549***
(0.079)
Age -0.003***(0.000)
-0.012***
(0.001)
Female -0.108***(0.032)
-0.110***
(0.039)
Class (0=Higher-Grade Service)
Lower-Grade Service -0.041(0.058)
-0.045
(0.062)
Small Business Owners 0.124**(0.061)
-0.215***
(0.082)
Skilled Workers 0.236***(0.055)
0.149**
(0.064)
Unskilled Workers 0.244***(0.061)
0.054
(0.073)
Ethnic Minority -0.205*(0.115)
0.040
(0.166)
Education (0=Primary)
Secondary 0.080(0.056)
0.136**
(0.063)
Vocational 0.240***(0.071)
0.208
(0.082)
Tertiary -2.272***(0.077)
0.216***
(.076)
Constant 9.277(0.536)
1.954
(0.660)
Observations 87,670 86,500
Number of Countries 19 19
Number of Regions 226 226
Region, Year and Round FE Yes Yes
Contextual Variables Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p
< .001.
Radical right and radical left parties have overlapping positions and pref-
erences. Table A.5 confirms the populist attitudes that are common among
radical right and radical left supporters. They are against further European
integration while the effect is slightly more important among radical right than
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radical left voters. Such finding is commonly defended in the literature (Mudde,
2007; Rooduijn et al., 2017, Santana and Rama, 2018). Radical right supporters
are also untrustworthy of the EU Parliament, but there is no effect on radical left
support. Both radical right and radical left supporters are dismissive of politi-
cians. In line with previous studies (Mudde, 2004), the feelings that politicians
are out of touch and that the political system and parties are unaccountable
have been largely found among supporters of radical left and radical right par-
ties.
Table A.5: With Populist Attitudes
Radical Right Radical Left
Support Support
(1) (2)
Social Decline Compared to Parents 1.721*(0.895)
4.458**
(0.101)
Immigration Attitudes (0=Agst) 0.458***(0.059)
-0.216**
(0.096)
Redistribution Preferences (0=Agst) 0.123*(0.057)
0.186**
(0.160)
Eurosceptic Attitudes
No Trust of EU Parliament 0.302***(0.066)
0.156
(0.111)
Against Further EU Integration 0.356***(0.066)
0.167*
(0.083)
Trust Measures
No Trust in Politicians 0.016*(0.066)
0.262**
(0.112)
Constant -3.363***(0.701)
-4.412***
(0.055)
Observations 87,316 82,500
Number of Countries 19 19
Number of Regions 226 226
Region, Year and Round FE Yes Yes
Individual and Contextual Controls Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p
< .001.
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Table A.6 shows the results are the same when we use similar attitudinal
determinants. The regional contextual variables have no significant effect on
radical right and radical left support. The fact that Gini index and unemploy-
ment have not impact radical left support and radical right support goes against
previous findings (March, 2011; Golder, 2003, 2016). However, it confirms that
a better assessment of the influence of contextual variables on radical right and
radical left support should be conducted on a smaller scale. Immigration at
the regional level does not positively affect radical right and radical left parties,
which goes in line with the contact theory that advances that tolerance towards
immigrants increases the lower the level of analysis (McLaren, 2013).
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Table A.6: With Other Attitudinal Determinants
Radical Right Support Radical Left Support
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Decline Compared to Parents 2.518***(0.610)
2.026**
(0.644)
4.240***
(0.218)
4.793***
(0.143)
Immigration Attitudes_ Economy (0=Agst) 0.203***(0.039)
Right For Immigrants to Reside (1=Agst) 0.192***(0.039)
Against Immigrants (Same to Population) 0.101**(0.045)
Against Immigrants (Different to Population) 0.214**(0.050)
Against Immigrants (Non-EU) 0.152***(0.045)
Equality -0.078(0.101)
Fair Society 0.143(0.152)
Contextual Variables
Gini Index 7.266(0.028)
4.346
(0.017)
Unemployment Rate 7.266(3.098)
8.211
(2.465)
Immigration Stock -3.266(0.008)
-2.761
(0.991)
Constant -3.825***(0.528)
-4.946***
(0.543)
-4.093***
(0.578)
4.087***
(0.532)
Observations 87,670 87,670 86,500 86,500
Number of Countries 19 19 19 19
Number of Regions 226 226 226 226
Region, Year and Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
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Table A.7: Without Different Set of Countries
Without Eastern European Countries Without Scandinavian Countries
Radical Right Radical Left Radical Right Radical Left
Social Decline Compared to Parents 5.162***(0.298)
6.367***
(0.435)
3.454***
(0.836)
5.770***
(0.450)
Immigration Attitudes (0=Agst) 0.674***(0.059)
-0.239***
(0.061)
0.561***
(0.046)
-0.263***
(0.063)
Redistribution Preferences (0=Agst) -0.102(0.082)
0.431***
(0.120)
0.116*
(0.076)
0.373***
(0.122)
Constant -0.332(0.325)
-2.780***
(0.729)
-2.300
(0.103)
-2.871***
(0.735)
Observations 43,567 43,567 54,789 54,789
Number of Countries 13 13 15 15
Number of Regions 226 226 226 226
Region, Year and Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual and Contextual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
Table A.8: Status Anxiety and Mainstream Parties
Mainstream Right Mainstream Left Green
Support Support Support
(1) (2) (3)
Social Decline Compared to Parents -3.359***(0.556)
-2.372**
(0.693)
-0.164
(0.725)
Immigration Attitudes (0=Agst) 0.207***(0.025)
-0.254***
(0.059)
-0.395***
(0.037)
Redistribution Preferences (0=Agst) 0.180*(0.023)
0.527***
(0.068)
0.591***
(0.043)
Constant 0.757***(0.240)
0.259
(0.282)
-3.539***
(0.510)
Observations 87,670 86,500 86,085
Number of Countries 19 19 19
Number of Regions 226 226 226
Region, Year and Round FE Yes Yes Yes
Individual and Contextual Controls Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
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Table A.9: Hierarchical Models
Radical Right Radical Left
Support Support
(1) (2)
Social Decline Compared to Parents 0.359**(0.181)
0.191*
(0.102)
Immigration Attitudes (0=Agst) 0.115***(0.010)
-0.021***
(0.006)
Redistribution Preferences (0=Agst) 0.031*(0.015)
0.028**
(0.013)
Age -0.003***(0.000)
-0.012***
(0.001)
Female -0.026***(0.008)
-0.007
(0.008)
Class (0=Higher-Grade Service)
Lower-Grade Service 0.010(0.012)
-0.008
(0.012)
Small Business Owners 0.015*(0.016)
-0.002
(0.009)
Skilled Workers 0.033**(0.015)
0.021*
(0.009)
Unskilled Workers 0.059***(0.018)
0.006
(0.011)
Ethnic Minority -0.078***(0.016)
0.020
(0.038)
Education (0=Primary)
Secondary 0.018(0.016)
0.006
(0.014)
Vocational 0.040**(0.019)
0.011
(0.022)
Tertiary -0.050***(0.021)
0.012
(0.015)
Constant -0.067(0.071)
-0.093***
(0.039)
Observations 84,670 84,500
Number of Countries 19 19
Number of Regions 226 226
Region, Year and Round FE Yes Yes
Contextual Variables Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p
< .001.
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B | Appendix 2
Table B.1: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
FN Vote Share 117,872 19.465 8.578 0 72.22
Registered FN Vote Share 117,872 15.689 6.935 0 59.09
Low-Skilled Immigrants 118,023 0.791 1.402 0 50
Low-Skilled Natives 118,023 24.521 6.960 0 100
Medium-Skilled Immigrants 118,023 0.324 0.756 0 16.667
Medium-Skilled Natives 118,023 10.203 4.578 0 60
High-Skilled Immigrants 118,023 0.277 0.768 0 20
High-Skilled Natives 118,023 8.957 6.924 0 50
Unemployed Immigrants 117,872 0.194 0.348 0 25
Unemployed Natives 117,872 3.320 1.534 0 40
Unemployment 118,023 2.716 1.717 0 23.856
Immigration 118,023 24.61 9,21 0 100
Retired Immigrants 117,872 0.754 1.474 0 37.04
Retired Natives 117,872 23.696 8.074 0 100
Student Immigrants 117,872 0.187 0.535 0 15.77
Student Natives 117,872 9.883 10.252 0 52.17
Urbanity Score 117,872 2 0.152 0 2
Economic Activity 117,872 2.189 0.828 0 3
Share of Mosques 117,512 8.160 4 0.929 29.050
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Figure B.1: The Spatial Distribution of FN Vote Shares in Presidential Elections
194
Figure B.2: The Evolution of the Net Migration Rate
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Table B.2: Reconfiguration of Socio-Professional Categories along Skill and Ed-
ucation Levels
Skill level Classification Socio-Professional Categories (INSEE) Education
Low-Skilled Workers Manual Workers No Higher
Account Clerks, Sales Workers, Administrative Education
Employees and Personal Assistants
Medium-Skilled Workers Craftsmen, Merchants, Managing Directors > 2 years of
Intermediary Office Staff Higher Education
Civil Servants, Police and Military
High-Skilled Workers Higher Office Staff, Entrepreneurs, Head of Industry > 2 years of
Professionals, Executive Employees < Higher Education
Intellectual Professions, Teachers, Art Specialists
Figure B.1 shows the spatial distribution of FN vote shares (in percent-
age). Dark orange corresponds to communes with strong FN support whereas
light yellow represents communes with low levels of support. Most of the FN
support is located in Northern, Eastern and Southeastern areas of the country.
Figure B.2 depicts the evolution of net migration rate across two time
periods 1999-2009 and 2009-2014. Bright orange represents municipalities with
a positive net migration rate whereas blue represents municipalities with a neg-
ative trend. Overall, net immigration has decreased between 1999-2009 and
2009-2014. The downward trend is larger in Northern, Eastern and Southeast-
ern areas which are areas with the biggest FN support. This confirms previous
findings that immigration inflow has a negative effect on radical right vote share.
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Table C.1: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
UKIP Support 47,473 0.019 0.137 0 1
UKIP/BNP Support 47,473 0.216 0.145 0 1
UKIP Closeness 47,473 0.022 0.148 0 1
UKIP/BNP Closeness 47,473 0.023 0.151 0 1
Labour Support 34,557 0.097 0.296 0 1
Conservative Support 34,557 0.109 0.311 0 1
Community Pub Closure 44,157 0.010 0.019 0 0,25
Gastropub Closure 44,157 0.031 0.047 0 0,667
Pub Chain Closure 44,157 0.022 0.031 0 0.4
Closure of Pubs in the City Centre 44,157 0.043 0.054 0 0.667
Gender 47,473 0.527 0.499 0 1
White British 47,473 0,699 0.459 0 1
Education 47,473 2.331 1.251 0 4
EU Migrant Population Growth 45,214 0.028 0.028 0.01 0.138
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth 45,214 0.036 0.040 -0.021 0,179
Population 60 and Older 45,214 0.205 0.037 0.127 0,360
Unemployment Rate 45,205 5,802 2.223 1.6 12.1
Index of Multiple Deprivation 39,196 22.633 8.691 5,009 41,997
EU Migrant Share 2001 45,214 0.014 0.010 0.003 0.112
Non-EU Migrant Share 45,214 0.076 0.086 0.007 0,382
Low-Skilled Workers Change 45,214 0.026 0.035 -0.042 0,146
EU Structural Funds/Capita 43,992 47.463 84.500 0.991 829.705
EU Fiscal Cuts 43,992 46.234 21.500 0.999 25.678
Crime – Average Score 39,196 0,064 0.492 -1.22 1,019
Barriers to Housing 39,196 22.915 6.956 8.343 41.892
Living Environment 39,196 23.058 10.236 4.315 66.56
Income Deprivation 39,196 0.186 0.086 0.062 0.497
Health Deprivation 39,196 0.025 0.628 -2.191 1.489
Assets of Community Value 44,834 0.884 0.319 0 1
UKIP Support (SCoRe project) 25,001 0.472 0.499 0 1
UKIP/BNP Support (SCoRe project) 20,809 0.074 0.261 0 1
Brexit Support (SCoRe project) 20,844 0.506 0.500 0 1
Neighbourhood Degradation in the last 5 years 22,981 0.517 0.309 0 1
Gender (SCoRe project) 25,001 1.517 0.500 0 1
White British (SCoRe project) 25,001 0.911 0.285 0 1
Education (SCoRe project) 25,001 1.072 1.074 0 3
Jobs (SCoRe project) 25,001 4.913 2.264 0 3
Buckner’s Neighbourhood Cohesion Scale 10,191 3.590 0.734 1 5
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Table C.2: Codebook
Variable Source Label Operationalisation
UKIP Support UK Household Longitudinal Study If there were to be a general election tomorrow, which political 1=UKIP, 0 =Other Parties, .=DK, No answer, Non Applicable
(UKHLS) party do you think you would be most likely to support?
UKIP/BNP Support UKHLS If there were to be a general election tomorrow,which political 1=UKIP/BNP, 0 =Other Parties, .=DK, No answer, Non Applicable
party do you think you would be most likely to support?
UKIP Closeness UKHLS Which party do you feel the closest to? 1=UKIP; O=Other Parties; .= DK, No answer, Non Applicable
UKIP/BNP Closeness UKHLS Which party do you feel the closest to? 1=UKIP and BNP; O=Other Parties; .= DK, No answer, Non Applicable
Labour Support UKHLS If there were to be a general election tomorrow, which political 1=Labour, 0 =Other Parties, .=DK, No answer, Non Applicable
party do you think you would be most likely to support?
Conservative Support UKHLS If there were to be a general election tomorrow, which political 1=Conservative, 0 =Other Parties, .=DK, No answer, Non Applicable
party do you think you would be most likely to support?
Community Pub Closure Local Data Company Number of Community Pub Closure/ Nb of Overall Pub in the district[per year]
Gastropub Closure Local Data Company Number of Gastropub Closure/Nb of Overall Pub in the district[per year]
Pub Chain Closure Local Data Company Number of Pub Chain Closure/Nb of Overall Pub in the district [per year]
Pub Closure Local Data Company Number of Pub Closure in the city centre/Nb of Overall Pub
in the City Centre in the district [per year]
Gender UKHLS 1=Female; 0=Male
White British UKHLS 1= White British; 0=Any Other Ethnicity
Education UKHLS 1= Higher degree; 2= High School or vocational; 3= GCSE; 4=No qualifications
EU Migrant Population 2001-2011 UK Census Data Growth rates in the local resident shares of EU population
Growth
Non-EU Migrant Population 2001-2011 UK Census Data Growth rates in the local resident shares of non-EU population
Growth
Population 60 and Older 2011 UK Census Data Share of residents of over 60 years and older
Unemployment Rate Annual Population Survey/ Unemployment Rate per District in 2015
Labour Force Survey
Multiple Deprivation Index 2015 Government Data Score from 0 (low deprivation) to 100 % (high deprivation)
EU Migrant Share 2011 UK Census Data Share of EU residents in 2011 per district
Non-EU Migrant Share 2011 UK Census Data Share of non-EU residents in 2011 per district
Low-Skilled Workers Change 2001-2011 UK Census Data Change in the share of low-skilled workers
EU Structural Funds/Capita Government Data EU structural funds per capita from 2007 to 2013
Crime Average Score 2015 Government Data Measure the risk of personal and material victimisation
Barriers to Housing 2015 Government Data Measure the physical and financial accessibility of housing and local services
Living Environment 2015 Government Data Measure the quality of the local environment
Income Deprivation 2015 Government Data Measure the population living in income deprived households
Health Deprivation 2015 Government Data Measure the risk of premature deaths and the impairment of quality of life through poor physical or mental health
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Table C.3: Entropy Balancing Model
(1)
Community Pub Closures 3.332*(1.925)
Female -0.233***(0.087)
White British 2.020***(0.261)
Education (0=Higher Degree)
High School or Vocational 0.148(0.301)
GCSE or Equivalent 0.844***(0.159)
No Qualification 0.892***(0.178)
EU Migrant Population Growth 2.387(2.917)
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth -2.170(2.385)
Population 60 and Older 3.869**(1.718)
Unemployment Rate 0.010(0.026)
Index of Multiple Deprivation 0.005(0.008)
Constant -6.756***(3.042)
N (Individuals) 34,194
Region, Year, Wave FE Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
In table C.3, I replicate the data with entropy balancing in order to
reweight the survey sample to known characteristics from the target population,
that is to say the white working class. The results are unaffected by using the
entropy balancing model that reweight the sample to a white working-class
population.
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Using a recent survey data from the SCoRe project (Evans et al., 2019),
I show that negative perceptions on the neighbourhood in the past five years is
correlated with UKIP (or UKIP and BNP) support. The SCoRe project, which
investigated subnational context and radical right support in four countries in
Europe (UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands), has contributed to large-scale
representative surveys conducted between March and May 2017. The surveys
consist of questions on people’s surrounding neighbourhoods, their political at-
titudes and behaviour. I use the UK dataset and conduct logit models with
ward fixed effects to test the perception of the neighbourhood and radical right
voting while accounting for any local contextual unobservables. I find that those
who vote UKIP (or UKIP and BNP) think their neighbourhood conditions have
worsened in the past five years. Table C.4 also shows that the targeted popula-
tion that is more likely to be perceiving neighbourhood degradation is the white
working class (columns 2 and 3). Finally, this table shows that this negative
perception on the neighbourhood also concerns those who vote UKIP, BNP and
Brexit (columns 4 and 5). All these findings provide supportive evidences of
the ones found in the main body.
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Table C.4: Neighbourhood Degradation and Radical Right Voting
UKIP UKIP UKIP UKIP/BNP Brexit
Neighbourhood Degradation in the last 5 years
0.095*
(0.080)
-0.329*
(0.199)
0.461***
(0.143)
0.838***
(0.153)
0.700***
(0.074)
Gender -0.024(0.052)
-0.054
(0.058)
-0.056
(0.056)
0.026
(0.098)
0.008
(0.055)
White British 0.165*(0.086)
-0.109
(0.119)
0.228***
(0.076)
1.215***
(0.207)
0.295***
(0.099)
Education (0=Higher Degree)
A-Levels or Equivalent 0.033(0.055)
0.101*
(0.057)
0.109*
(0.059)
-0.161
(0.129)
0.379***
(0.066)
GCSE or Equivalent 0.400***(0.060)
0.492***
(0.060)
0.499***
(0.054)
0.284***
(0.127)
0.909***
(0.066)
No Qualification 0.892***(0.178)
-0.109
(0.119)
0.228***
(0.076)
1.215***
(0.207)
0.295***
(0.099)
Jobs (0=Professionnals)
Clerical and Intermediate 0.148**(0.073)
0.165***
(0.062)
0.209*
(0.126)
-0.053
(0.161)
0.060
(0.087)
Administrators 0.531***(0.088)
0.470***
(0.073)
0.831***
(0.126)
0.300*
(0.182)
0.203***
(0.083)
Technical and Routine 0.538***(0.118)
0.583***
(0.977)
0.523***
(0.190)
0.626***
(0.190)
0.569***
(0.118)
Managers or CEOs 0.075(0.099)
0.142*
(0.076)
0.176
(0.169)
0.425**
(0.169)
0.244*
(0.126)
Anti-Immigrant Attitudes 1.208***(0.052)
1.106***
(0.053)
1.009***
(0.042)
1.870***
(0.016)
1.287***
(0.019)
White British ×
Neighbourhood Degradation
0.765***
(0.210)
Clerical and Intermediate Jobs ×
Neighbourhood Degradation
-0.102
(0.226)
Administrator Jobs ×
Neighbourhood Degradation
-0.759***
(0.251)
Technical and Routine Jobs ×
Neighbourhood Degradation
0.046**
(0.252)
Managers and CEOs ×
Neighbourhood Degradation
-0.074
(0.312)
Constant 4.55(1.264)
4.582
(1.269)
4.609
(1.263)
4.575
(1.26)
4.673
(1.256)
N (Individuals) 13,411 14,249 14,249 14,002 11,082
N (Wards) 3,069 3,188 3,188 2,900 2,675
Ward FE YES YES YES YES YES
Age and Urbanity Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
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Table C.5: With Assets of Community Value
(1)
Community Pub Closures 6.660**(3.148)
Female -0.380***(0.163)
White British 2.969***(0.377)
Education (0=Higher Degree)
High School or Vocational -0.241(0.571)
GCSE or Equivalent 1.123***(0.227)
No Qualification 1.072***(0.283)
EU Migrant Population Growth -2.339(6.075)
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth -0.677(4.408)
Population 60 and Older 6.460*(3.416)
Unemployment Rate 0.074*(0.044)
Index of Multiple Deprivation -0.004(0.017)
Assests of Community Value 0.124(0.294)
Constant -12.249***(1.321)
N (Individuals) 19,519
Region, Year, Wave FE Yes
2cm
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
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Table C.5 shows that the data is not affected by the protection policy
established by the Localism Act in 2011. The Act assigns local public places
as assets of community value to prevent their potential demolition, the major-
ity being local pubs. I test its potential by assigning districts with assets of
community value (any types of public houses) the value 1 and districts with no
asset of community value the value 0. Table C.5 presents the probit model with
this new variable. The results show that individuals who live in districts with
assets of community value are not less likely to vote UKIP. It means that the
protection policy has not affected the results. The fact that this policy has not
yet impacted the pub closure ratio is due to its recent implementation and its
effects are more likely to be noticeable in the future.
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